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2ABSTRACT.
The present thesis, William III and the Northern 
Crowns during the Nine Years War 1689-97’, examines the 
policy of the stadtholder-king towards Sweden and Denmark - 
Norway in the years immediately following the English 
Revolution. His attempts to secure their active 
assistance against France were thwarted by the Swedish 
king’s fears of risking the neutrality he needed to 
complete his domestic reforms and to fulfil his ambitions 
of mediating in the European conflict and by Denmark’s 
hopes of French subsidies and support for her territorial 
ambitions in North Germany; while 6,000 Danish troops were 
secured for the Allies in 1689, a favourable alliance with 
Christian Y could not be concluded until November 1696.
Both northern kingdoms feared the effects of the union of 
the two Maritime Powers on their plans for commercial 
expansion, which were further threatened by the Ango-Dutch 
; convention of September 1689 barring all neutral trade
with France. This led them to form a League of Armed 
Neutrality in 1691 which helped to persuade William to 
abandon the aims of the convention and agree to compensation
u u u'v'
for seizures of their merchant ships. Negotiations 
in Stockholm and the Hague in the latter years of the war 
to persuade Sweden, a guarantor of Westphalia and 
Nijmijgen, to extract favourable peace terms from Prance 
continued until and even beyond the acceptance of her 
mediation at the beginning of 1697» William was also 
active in preventing the diversion of a Northern war such 
as was threatened by the disputes between Denmark and the 
duke of Holstein-Gottorp in 1689 and 1696-7 and by the 
disputed succession to Saxe-Lauenburg.
The study builds on manuscript material in the Publi 
Record Office, the British Museum, the Berkshire Record 
Office, Nottingham University Library, at Plas-Newydd, 
Anglesey and in archives in the Hague, Copenhagen and 
Stockholm as well as on published collections of documents 
and secondary works.
4KOTE ABOUT DATES AND CURRENCY
All dates in the text are old style, 
which was employed in England, Scandinavia 
and North Germany during this period. The 
year is assumed to begin on January 1st. In 
the Notes and References dates are quoted as 
they appear on the documents cited. Those on 
letters etc. originating in the United 
Provinces, Prance or the Habsburg dominions, 
even when written by representatives of 
countries employing the old style, are 
generally new style unless otherwise stated.
The money of account normally quoted in 
transactions with the Northern Crowns was 
the Hamburg reichsthaler banco (abbreviated 
Rd.), of 24 marks, approximately equivalent 
to the English crown and, even more aoproxi- 
mately, to half an fecu and 1& gulden (fl.).
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Introduction
(i) Scone and Purpose
The aim of this study is to examine William Ill's policy
%
towards and diplpraatic relations with the courts of Denmark- 
ITorway and Sweden during the conflict known variously as the 
War of the League of Augsburg, the War of the Grand Alliance,of 
the Palatinate and- - least misleadingly, if most non-committally, 
and mainly by Dutch historians - as the Nine Years'War. The 
emphasis has been placed, as far as the surviving materials 
allow, on the ntadtholder-king's own attitude to the Scandinavian 
kingdoms in the context of his general war aims, and an attempt 
thus made to contribute to a deeper understanding of the foreign' 
policy of a ruler, who, in view of the importance usually 
attributed to the Revolution in English diplomatic history, 
has been curiously neglected. But it is impossible to under­
stand the reasons for his success and failure without considera­
tion of both the policies and reactions of the Northern Crowns 
themselves and of the direction of Louis XIV's plans for the 
Baltic region during this period. The extent to which William, 
who suddenly found himself in effective control of the foreign 
policy of two countries whose interests had for long periods 
been not only independent but antagonistic, was influenced by 
distinct Dutch and English traditions has also had to be 
considered.
Denmark and Sweden are worthy of special attention in 
these years, for they were the most important powers to remain
11
neutral when the greater part of Europe was engaged in the 
struggle either with France in the West or with the Ottoman 
Turks in the East or, as was the case with the Emperor, with 
both at the same time. Both countries had considerable armed 
might at their disposal,were strategically placed and were 
principal sources of naval' supplies for all three great maritime 
protagonists. They were therefore the subject of considerable 
diplomatic activity by both sides for most of the war.
In spite of this, their part in the conflict has been
neglected by historians of the belligerent powers. Anglo-
Danish relations between 1689 and 1697 have been surveyed
■2briefly in an article by M. Lane^ and by J.F. Chance in his 
introduction to the third volume of British Diplomatic Instruc­
tions.^ The latter's article on England and Sweden from 1689 
to 1714^ is concerned largely with Anne's reign and intended 
to form an introduction to his more detailed study of the reign
g
of George I, while his contribution to the first volume of 
British Diplomatic Instructions^ provides little additional 
information. All these essays, while important as pioneering 
works, have been based wholly on materials from English archives, 
of which they are largely summaries. Sir George Clark exploit­
ed also the resources of the Rijksarchief in the Hague for the 
chapter on 'Neutral Commerce' in his extremely valuable 'The 
Dutch Alliance and the War against French Trade'S but he was 
concerned with a. single, if important, aspect of the subject 
and used no Danish or Swedish sources. In Dutch N.J. den Tex' 
account of Jacob Hop's mission to Denmark in 1692-3 in his
12
biography of the lm.sterd.sm diplomat is an able summary based
on his subject's despatches, instructions and final reports in
the Hague, but it stands alone.
Scandinavian, and especially Swedish, historians have
naturally paid somewhat more attention to their country's
relations with the Maritime Powers; even a general survey of
the period cannot wholly exclude them. Here again, however,
the field is limited. ' The summaries of diplomatic papers in
the Rigsarkiv, Copenhagen, by Laursen and Christiansen, which
are to be found in the three volumes of the Danmark-Norges
10
Traktater which cover the years in question, are models of
their kind and have proved invaluable for my purpose, but they
do not attempt an analysis of Christian V ’s foreign policy,
far less an examination of his relations with one country or
group of countries. Perhaps the most interesting account of
Danish policy is contained in Christiansen’s 'Bidrag til Dansk
11
Statshusholdnings Historie'. This forms only a small part 
of a work devoted to financial administration, but Christian V ’s
X
outlook throughout the Nine Years' War was strongly influenced
12
by the need to achieve and maintain financial stability.
Much of Franz von Jessen's narrative of Danish relations with
13William III in the life of his distinguished relative is
based on the account of Molesworth's embassy and its after-
math in Christian Braach's 'Om Robert Molesworths Skrift
14
"An account of Denmark as it was in the year 1692," ? and is
13
biased in favour of its subject.
In Swedish Carlson's history of the Palatinate kings
16
13
contains a good deal concerning Charles XI *s relations with 
the Maritime Powers, and T. Ihyren deals, in two long articles, 
devoted to the evolution of the first armed neutrality in the 
Baltic together with an introduction outlining the Scandinavian 
scene at the Beginning of the Nine Years' War,^ at greater 
length and in a wider context, with many of the problems tackled 
By Clark,But Both he and Carlson relied solely on Scandinavian1 O " I Q  P Q
archives. Theses By Hallendorff, WahrenBerg  ^and Bratt, 
and more recently By Stille and Jonasson treat, in detail 
and Basing their work on a wide selection of original sources, 
of Swedish foreign policy as a whole during a number of years 
within the period, while the latter part of LandBerg's volume
23
in the general history of Sweden's external policy now appearing
offers the Best summary of this aspect of the war as a whole.
Our direct knowledge of William's opinions and intentions
24-can Be derived from his correspondence with Antonie Heinsius,
ptr nC
with Portland  ^and with a number of his envoys. The grand 
pensionary's own letters,2"^ in view of the intimacy of the two
pQ
men, the instructions sent By the impersonal Blathwayt, the
secretary attendant on William in the field from 1692, and By
29the secretaries of state for the Northern department, when 
the king was in England, may, however, Be regarded as reliable 
reflections of the latter's thoughts. The reports of foreign 
envoys must always, of course, be treated with reserve, but, . 
Bearing this in-mind, much useful information can Be gleaned 
from the reports of Scandinavian diplomats in the Hague and
•5"
London to their governments. The long despatches of Nils
14
lillieroot, Swedish representative with the States-General 
from 1692, which often contain detailed accounts of his 
conversations with William and members of his immediate circle, 
are particularly illuminating.
The archival material bearing on the subject of study is 
considerable in bulk but somewhat uneven in distribution.
Thus, -while the despatches from and orders to Swedish and 
Danish envoys have been preserved with few breaks, the minutes 
of the Swedish council for the early years of the war were 
destroyed in the fire which burnt down the Royal Palace in 
Stockholm in 1697, and only the final resolutions of the 
Danish council, not the debates which preceded them, were 
recorded. By no means all ¥/illiam’s correspondence with 
Heinsius has survived, and many of the folders containing the 
latter’s exchanges with Dutch envoys are tantalisingly thin.
In England the secretary's letter books often reveal considerable; 
gaps, and many despatches are missing, possibly because of the 
secretary’s treatment of state papers as private property.^
It ...is frequently possible however, to make good the deficiency 
from another source. Danish council records are, for example,
7  j
illuminated by Christian V ’s diaries, and Swedish chancery 
minutes and memorials give some guide to arguments in the 
council itself. Some lacunae are moreover not as serious as 
may at first appear. In view of William's absences from 
England the instructions from and despatches to English 
secretaries of state during the campaigning season are much 
less important than those addressed to Blathwayt. D Finally
15
it must always be remembered that many important decisions 
were taken after oral discussions, which left no permanent 
record behind but which can sometimes be pieced together 
from informal reports and casual remarks in correspondence.
(ii) The Machinery of Diplomacy 
(a) The Maritime Powers
From 1689 to 1702 the vital decisions on the foreign
policy of both England arid the United Provinces were generally
taken by one man after consultation with a very small group
■37 •of Dutch advisers, with occasional reference, when deemed
38
necessary,to Imperial and English representatives,but the 
machinery through which such decisions had been relayed and 
interpreted before the union of the two countries remained.
In England formal instructions to envoys in Northern 
Europe continued to be sent by the secretary of state for the 
Northern department, an office filled by five different men
7Q
in the course of the war,  ^while more routine matters were
N
discussed in correspondence between an under secretary and 
the secretary to the e n v o y . M a t t e r s  affecting foreign 
policy still came before the privy council or lords justices, • 
although the records are too scanty to enable an adequate 
assessment of their roles to be made.^ Parliament expressed 
on occasion a desire to know what commitments had-been entered 
into42 and, through its,control of the purse-strings, could 
determine how much money was available, for example, for 
subsidies or compensation for wrongful arrest of neutral ships, 
but few even of the king's ministers, let alone members of the
16
house of commons were qualified to pass judgement on foreign
affairs and challenge the royal prerogative in this field.^
The importance of council and secretaries, none of whom were
deeply in William's confidence, was reduced almost to nil when
he was himself■absent, and he spent from May to October every
year of the war except the first overseas. From 1692 William
Blathwayt became during these periods the main channel of
communication with both English representatives abroad and
the secretary in London, to whom the former often sent mere
duplicates of their despatches to the secretary at war with 
„ 44a covering letter.
The body especially entrusted with the foreign relations 
of the States-General was the committee of deputies for foreign 
affairs. This consisted of one deputy, elected annually, 
from each of the seven provinces, the grand pensionary of 
Holland, chosen every five years, and the griffier or secretary 
to the States-General, who served for life. This council read 
the secret despatches from envoys and took cognizance of such 
matters as were referred to it by the States-General, but it 
often acted in the name of the larger assembly without prior 
reference to it. It was dominated by the grand pensionary 
Anthonie Heinsius, who held this office from March 1689 and 
was re-elected for a further term in 1695, was an able and 
conscientious worker, yet to reveal the qualities of leadership 
he was to display after William's death but trusted by the
A_Cstadtholder as none of his contemporaries was trusted. It 
was through Heinsius that William made his wishes known both
17
to the foreign .affairs deputies and the States of Holland and 
West Friesland, by whom, as the most important of the regional 
assemblies and the one conveniently assembled in the Hague, 
subjects were usually discussed and decided upon before being 
brought before the States-General itself. ^  Resolutions 
taken by the foreign affairs* deputies were communicated to 
the appropriate envoy by the griffier, who also decided whether! 
a despatch was suitable to be read before the full meeting of 
the States, but a Dutch diplomat had also to attend to a regula 
and more intimate correspondence with the grand pensionary and 
sometimes, as did Amerongen when in Copenhagen, with William 
himself.^®
The necessity for each deputy in the States-General to 
refer back to his province on such matters as the ratifications 
of agreements with foreign powers led often to considerable 
delays, especially when money matters were involved, which
aqwere misunderstood and resented by the countries concerned
but against which the stadtholder could do little more than
protest; he was far from being master in his own house when
his countrymen’s or his subjects' pockets or honour were 
50involved. Delays were also inevitable in the winter months, 
when William was in England and a knowledge of his views was
51considered necessary before the taking of any important step*
Neither England nor the United Provinces favoured the use
of the expensive ambassador as their principal diplomatic agent;
52he might so^easily become involved in ceremonial disputes.
But even envoys extraordinary met with procedural difficulties
aggravated by the need to establish William’s position firmly 
among his fellow monarohs, and neither Molesworth nor Duncombe 
his first representatives in Copenhagen and Stockholm respect­
ively, were able for this reason to take part in formal public 
audiences to present their c r e d e n t i a l s . T h e y  both returned 
to England in 1692 and were not replaced; reliable men with 
diplomatic experience were difficult to find in England 
immediately after the Revolution, especially if required to 
exile themselves in the Swedish capital and face its rigorous 
winters.*^ Reports continued to be sent by the secretaries 
they had left behind them, and one of these, John Robinson, 
had risen to the rank of minister by the end of the war. This 
weakening of English representation in the North was not so
serious at a time when William was attempting to concentrate
55all negotiations in the Hague "and when the larger pool of 
experienced diplomats in the United Provinces could also be 
tapped for missions when considered necessary. These appoint­
ments were generally made by the States-General on the 
recommendation of the States of Holland and West Friesland 
after the stadtholder’s approval had been secured, and the• 
representatives chosen were expected to supply the griffier
with a full written report (verbaal) of their embassies on 
56their return.
Posts to and from the North usually passed by way of 
57Hamburg, which was also the centre for financial transactions 
involving the Scandinavian kingdoms, and the reports of sir 
Paul Rycaut, the English resident in this city,*^ are therefore
19
of considerable interest, although rumour flowed thither as 
freely as reliable news. The greater speed of communication 
between the .Northern capitals and the Hague compared with - 
London alone decreased the diplomatic importance of the latter, 
but even between Stockholm and the Hague a letter might be a 
fortnight or more on the road, an important consideration when 
in the latter half-of the war William was debating the desira­
bility of using Sweden as the channel for peace projects and
counter-projects. News usually reached Copenhagen nearly a
finweek earlier than Stockholm.
0 >) The Northern Crowns
The day to day administration of Sweden's foreign policy
lay in the hands of the chancery, and all instructions were
drawn up and countersigned either by the secretary of state,
the secretary for German affairs, the secretary for Finnish,
Livonian and Ingrian affairs or sometimes by the secretary
for internal affairs, acting on orders from a committee headed
V filby the chancellor (kanslipresident) Bengt OxenstiernaD with
62Nils Gyldenstolpe as his deputy.. But the ultimate authority 
was always the king, in whose presence all despatches were, 
whenever possible, opened and in whose name all orders were 
sent. He it was who determined whether or not a particular 
matter should be discussed in the council (Riksrad). If it 
were decided to raise it there the chancery was expected to 
prepare a memorial as a basis for the debate, and at the 
conclusion’'of the .latter the royal will was made known. But 
the rad was a large body unsuitable for discussion of the most
20
secret business, which was dealt with in smaller informal 
gatherings or even by-the Icing and his chancellor alone* The 
precise importance of the rad during the early years of the 
Nine Years* War is difficult to estimate owing to the loss of 
its minutes already referred to, but it was here, as will be 
seen, that the Icing could hear the opinions of all his ministers 
on the most important issues and where conflicting views were 
brought to light. About the significance of the Estates 
(riksdag) there is no such doubt. They met for only a few 
weeks in 1689 and 1693 and were allowed an even smaller say
fWin foreign affairs than the English parliament.
Just as long delays were caused in the United Provinces 
by the need for the States-General to seek authorization from 
provincial estates and by William’s absence in England during 
the winter, so in Sweden Charles XI's absences at his country 
residences or on tours of different parts of his kingdom and 
the fact that the great majority of his councillors left 
Stockholm for a large part of each-summer was the despair of 
many a foreign diplomat who required a speedy answer to a 
request or protest. It was often necessary to beard Oxenstiema 
on his estate at Rosersborg, twenty miles north-west of the 
capital, and wait until letters had passed between him and his 
master and until members of the rad within easy reach had been 
consulted.^ -
Christian V of Denmark took a far greater and more direct 
interest in foreign policy than did Charles XI,who, while 
anxious to maintain his realm’s power and prestige in Europe
21
and her neutrality as a prerequisite for the completion of
internal reform, was not particularly interested in the details
of diplomatic negotiation, and, while the handsome Holsteiner
Conrad Reventlow was commonly regarded as first minister and
was created chancellor when the office was revived after
fifteen years in 1694,  ^his position cannot he compared with
that of Bengt Oxenstierna. He was not even the minister with
the greatest influence on Denmark's external relations.
Membership of the royal council (Geheiraekonseil) was severely
restricted to five or six, which made it much more suitable
for its purpose than the rad,^ but, like Charles, Christian
felt himself quite free to seek advice from whoever he chose,
whether from inside or outside the council. Of the two
chanceries in Copenhagen, neither of which were organized as 
67colleges, ' the Danish, which had originally concerned itself 
with correspondence with Sweden and Eastern Europe as well 
as internal matters,was now confined to the latter while the 
German (it should be noted that all official records in 
Copenhagen, not only those of this department, were written 
in German at this time) dealt with all external affairs. The 
latter was headed from 1688 by Thomas Balthazar von Jessen as 
chief secretary (Oversekretarie), who, although not a member 
of the council, was often present at its meetings and possessed 
of considerable influence. 88
The diplomatic service in both Scandinavian monarchies 
was organized on a similar pattern to the English but one or 
two unusual features are of interest. The Swedes attempted
22
supply of trained young diplomats by appointing 'commission-
secretaries' in the more important capitals; unlike the
English secretaries these were not chosen and paid by the
envoy but by his principals.^ in 1687 Christoffer
leijoncrona was assigned to London, where he took charge on
the death of the envoy Leijonberg in 1691, and Carl Gustav
Friesendorff to the Hague, where, in view of the presence of
an accredited envoy for most of his stay, he was entrusted
71with full responsibility for only brief periods. In
Copenhagen the appointment of an envoy to England gave rise
on three separate occasions to a trial of strength between
the rival factions in the Danish court. In 1689 Plessen,
the leader of the pro-allied party, twice put forward the
» »name of his protege Skeel and was twice defeated but in
1692 managed to win the king over to his point of view and
72secure his appointment. The difficulties caused by
the vagueness of the duties ascribed to the commissary-
resident Pauli, sent to England in 1693, will be discussed 
73later.'J .
(c) Irregular Representation and Special Missions
Diplomatic work was not always carried out by regular 
agents. Bengt Oxenstierna's eldest son, serving as a 
brigadier with the allied armies in the Low Countries with 
many opportunies for meeting king William in the field, was
in the 1680s to ensure a continuity of service and a regular
23
used toy the Swedish government to plead for favour to toe shown 
to Swedish ships and to gain support against Denmark's treatment
of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp in the closing stages of the wari 
The duke of Wurtemberg-Neustadt, the commander of the Danish 
auxiliary forces in Flanders, was involved in alliance negotia- 
tions in 1692' , and Christian hoped for assistance from his 
torother prince George in London to ensure the success of early 
missions to W i l l i a m . T h e  residence in Stockholm during the 
early months of 1690 of the French lieutenant-colonel, Benoit 
Bidal, sent to Sweden with instructions from Louis XIV to woo 
Sweden to France's cause, gave the Allies legitimate cause for 
alarm.^7 in a rather different category a certain Petkum,
protoatoly the son of a former Danish diplomat who had settled in 
the United Provinces, was employed without official character, 
apparently toy Heinsius and the city of Amsterdam, in talks with 
Danish ministers in Copenhagen in 169U-»^ ®
Sometimes important or delicate tasks were taken out of
V
the hands of an envoy extraordinary and entrusted to one of 
higher rank, one in whom greater trust was placed or simply 
a special messenger. Christian V sent the atole and experienced 
advocate of Scandinavian co-operation Jens Juel to Sweden in 
693 to conduct negotiations of particular significance^, and 
in the same year lord Lexington and Jacoto Hop were despatched 
Dy William to - try and effect a settlement in the 
Ratzetourg dispute between Denmark and Brunswick-Luneburg.^O 
The earl of Selkirk travelled to Copenhagen in March 1691 to
7
24
.return Christian V's compliments conveyed by the younger 
Christian Reventlow earlier in the year,and count Christian 
Ditlev Rantzau was entrusted in 1695 with condolences on
q-i
queen Mary1 s death,.
qp
(d) Bribery and Espionage
'Bribery' in all its many forms was a recognized weapon 
of diplomacy in the late seventeenth century. The Northern 
Crowns were usually in the position of the wooed and were 
therefore less concerned with the giving than with the receiv­
ing of presents; the state of Denmark's finances would have 
hardly allowed her to spend large sums on attempting to influence 
foreign ministers, and Swedish government departments had to 
suffer considerable economies in the 1 6 9 0 s . A s  far as it 
is possible to judge from the available evidence, all the great 
belligerents seem to have spent a certain amount purely in 
quest of information, to learn the secrets of the council 
meeting or the text of treaties by payments to minor government 
officials.^ At the other end of the scale lay the granting 
of regular pensions to ministers. Nils Bielke, the governor 
of Swedish Pomerania, was already in receipt of such from 
France when war broke out and v/as promised in 1691 compensa­
tion for two of his regiments serving with the Allies,though 
payment v/as very irregular.8  ^ William agreed in 1690 to 
contribute his share to a pension for Bengt Oxenstierna of 
2,000 Rd. annually and severally from the Emperor, England, 
the United Provinces and Spain and he at least appears to have 
fulfilled his obligations in this. The Sv/edish ministers
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Gyldenstolpe, Wrede and Hastier had an income from France for
87part of the war, hut Louis desired adequate returns and
88"became more and more sparing with his gold. Lump sums were
offered to convert influential men to the views of the giver,
and Oxenstierna, it was rumoured, had been offered 100,000 Rd.
in 1689 to adopt a pro-French policy. William on several
occasions, when he had become exasperated with the Swedish
attitude,.declared that she could be gained only by bribery -
of her ministers and in 1697 proposed offering a large sum to
Lillieroot, who was then acting as Swedish mediator at Rijswijk,
90to ensure the return of Strasburg to the Empire.1' Haren
and Heekeren especially among his diplomats urged the need
91for a greater expenditure in this field. But the funds 
available to the Maritime Powers for such purposes were severely 
limited and, with the exception of Oxenstierna's pension, 
bribery seems to have played a very small part in allied 
diplomacy. The presents usually promised and made on the 
conclusion of a successful agreement such as the troops treaty
with Denmark in 1689 can hardly be considered in this category;
92they were generally acknowledged and expected. They may be 
more aptly compared with the valuable gift given to a diplomat
93
on his departure from the court to which he had been accredited.
The effect of bribery on policy is always difficult to 
determine,but - and it is largely the effect of French gold 
which concerns us - it does not seem that any important 
decision in either Copenhagen or Stockholm during this period 
was influenced by the hope of monetary reward or by such a
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reward granted optimistically in advance. Louis’ reluctance
to empower d'Avaux to make further payments, even when the
ambassador was claiming that the irregularity in transmission
of the sums promised was losing France valuable friends,
94indicates that he was reaching the same conclusion. It
has still to be proved that even the views and actions of
99Bielke were affected. The power of the French king's purse
became a myth in allied circles to explain much that was other-
96wise inexplicable or simply unpalatable.
Espionage, took the form largely of the interception of
correspondence between enemy and neutral envoys and their 
97principals. Heekeren, Dutch envoy in Stockholm, managed to
see the despatches of the Swedish envoy in the Hague until
98suspicions were aroused. . There are copies in the Public
Record Office of despatches from Martangis■ and d'Avaux,the
French ambassadors in Copenhagen and Stockholm respectively,
which had been opened by Klippe, a Dutch agent in Celle, copied,
99resealed and allowed to pass on their way, and in the Ileinsius’ 
Archief in the Hague lies a volume containing copies of letters
ftv/ritten in 1695 by French representatives in Saxony, Munster, 
Denmark and Sweden, by Danish diplomats in Paris and Dresden 
and by Louis XIV and Christian The fact that mail from
the North to Paris had normally to pass through Hamburg in the 
same way as that destined for London or the Hague made it 
particularly vulnerable. A change of cipher does not seem to 
have been very effective as a c o u n t e r - m e a s u r e T h e  extent 
to which the latter, which usually took the form of a number
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code and was normally reserved for matters relating to bribery^ 
espionage, secret negotiations, and intimate relations with or 
judgements upon members of the foreign court, was used varied 
from envoy to envoy. Buncombe, William Ill's first envoy to 
Sweden, employed it lavishly in his early reports, and
English envoys appear to have used it more freely than others,
' 103who generally found it sufficient to conceal proper names.
In viev/ of the rarity of cipher keys for this period1^  it is
fortunate that the cipher clerk in the secretary of state's
office would as a rule decipher the code on the despatch itself
or on a sheet of paper preserved with it. Not so helpful to
the researcher is the practice of recording instructions in
the secretary's letter book already coded.
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Chapter 1
Northern Europe at the Beginning of the Nine Years* War
(i) Sweden and Europe 1680-8
Sweden was,on the eve of the English Revolution,still 
the dominant power in the Baltic which she had become under 
Gustavus Adolphus. , At the peace of Nijmijgen in 1679 she 
had paid.for her alliance with France by the cession of some 
territory to Brandenburg, Brunswick and Munster?" but she 
continued to control the mouth of the Oder in Western Pomerania 
and of the Elbe in Bremen-Verden, to hold the important trading 
city of Wismar and to bar Russia from the Baltic by her occupa­
tion of Finland, Ingria, Estonia and Livonia. Her position 
was, however, seriously threatened by her jealous neighbours, 
above all by Brandenburg-Prussia,with eyes on Western Pomerania 
and especially the port of Stettin, and by Denmark, who hoped 
to recover the lost provinces in South Sweden, which had 
previous to 165.8 given her complete control of the Sound, and
who wanted also to eliminate Swedish influence from North-West
■ * 2 Germany. Russia also lurked ominously in the background.
It had become, therefore, one of the prime aims of Swedish
foreign policy to secure guarantees of her possessions by
alliances and agreements with powers lying beyond the confines
of the Baltic. Some Swedes still dreamt, in spite of the
recent disasters, of a return to the more ambitious aims of
the period which had ended with the death of Charles I in 1660,
and even the more cautious backed minor territorial claims
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such as that to the enclave of Hadeln in the duchy of 
Bremen-Verden, but there was a general feeling that war 
should be resorted to only in face of a threat to Sweden’s 
most vital interests.-
After the death of Johan Gyllenstierna in 1680 Swedish
foreign policy was directed by Bengt Oxenstierna, a grandson
4of one of Gustavus Adolphus' great minister's uncles. He 
was not a man of outstanding gifts and wsb timid in the face of 
opposition, but he enjoyed the all-important support of the 
shy Charles XI, who took little interest in the details of 
relations with other powers and was generally content to entrust 
these to a man who promised the peace necessary for the execution 
of the king's great internal reforms and the recovery of his 
kingdom's strength . Under Oxenstierna Sweden drew away from 
France and associated herself More and more closely with the 
victims of louis XIV*s aggression,whom William III was welding 
slowly into a league to curb permanently the ambitions of the 
French king. The superior attitude of the latter to his 
erstwhile comrade-in-arms at Nijmijgen, where he disposed so 
freely of her territories, and the involvement in the réunions
nof the duchy of Zweibrucken, to which Charles had the right 
of succession after the death of duke Friedrich Ludwig in 
April 1681, gave the Swedish king personal reasons for 
resentment which reinforced his minister's more comprehensive 
European aims of placing Sweden's weight in the balance against 
France's territorial ambitions, which Sweden could no longer 
control as her ally and which merely placed her empire in
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jeopardy by uniting the Continent against her.
The first fruit of Oxenstierna*s policy was the ratifica­
tion in 1680 of a trade treaty with the United Provinces, 
previously rejected by Gyllenstierna, which gave Dutch merchant 
ships trading in the Baltic almost equal rights with those of 
Sweden and conferred on the United Provinces the status of 
’most favoured nation* .1 In the following year a further 
treaty with the States General, joined later by the Hapsburg
powers, guaranteed for twenty years the settlements made at
8Westphalia for the Empire- and at Nijmijgen for Spain. 
Oxenstierna received only lukewarm support from his fellow 
councillors for such a definite reversal of alliances, but 
he was backed by the king and had his hand strengthened by 
new royal appointments made in 1682.^ In this year the new 
French ambassador Bazin de Bandeville had to return to Paris 
after a stay of only three months in Stockholm as the result 
of a ceremonial dispute, which Oxenstierna made little attempt 
to smooth over, and Louis had no official representative in 
the Swedish capital for the next ten y e a r s . T h i s  was 
followed in October by a defensive alliance with the Emperor
s
by which Sweden pledged herself to lend 3,000 troops in the
event of an attack on the Empire in exchange for a guarantee
not only of her southern provinces but also of her ally the
duke of IIolstein-Gottorp who was seriously threatened by
Denmark, firmly allied to France by a subsidy treaty in March
and planning an attack on Sweden in cooperation with the elector
12of Brandenburg.
nEarly in 1683 the guarantee treaty of 1681 was completed
by a convention by which the United Provinces, Sweden and the
Emperor each pledged 6,000 troops and, with the exception of
the Emperor, twelve ships. J In the crisis which preceded
the Twenty Year Truce of Ratisbon in 1684 Sweden played a
passive role, such as might have warned her allies not to
expect too much of her in the event of a large-scale conflict
and which demonstrated also the limits of Oxenstierna's power
against a king less willing than he to enter into commitments
which might lead to war and the destruction of all the work oi
reconstruction.^ A further warning sign came in 1686 when
Sweden refused to promise more than the 2,000 troops thought
commensurate with her German possessions to the league of
Augsburg. She was, however, one of the few states to ratify 
15the latter, and in the same year she renewed her former 
alliances with the United Provinces and engaged herself to 
give them the same military aid as laid down in the 1683 
convention if not required under,other agreements.1  ^ This 
complex series of treaty obligations was to give rise to lengt 
disputes in the succeeding decade. -,
The chancellor, as Oxenstierna became in 1685, was by 
no means unopposed in Sweden in committing his country in 
this manner.
The alliance with the United Provinces strengthened 
the Dutch commercial hegemony in the Baltic,1*^ which Swedish
1 Qmercantile interests, led by Fabian Wrede, who took charge
•S'
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of the colleges of commerce and finance in 1687, hoped to
19hreak. These were joined by others like Nils Bielke, 
ambassador in Paris between 1679 and 1682 and appointed 
governor-general of Swedish Pomerania in 1687, a great admirer 
of all things French and capable of pursuing an independent 
and ambitious foreign policy when the opportunity offered, 
but admired by the king for his personal bravery and a 
dangerous opponent, the hard-working and influential Erik
n 20Lindskold, the crown prince’s governor, and Johan larrson 
Olivecrants, mistrusted and out of office since 1685 but 
one-time governor of queen Christina’s estates and extremely
gifted. These men favoured the maintenance of the traditional
22.
links with France as a counterpoise to the power of the Emperor,
which grew with the successes of the Holy league against the
Turks in the later I680s^ and the place he took in the European
coalition against Louis XIV. Such sentiments were fostered
assiduously by the French agent La Picquetiere, who arrived in
Stockholm in the autumn of 1685. But while Denmark, whom
Charles XI always regarded on the prime concern of Swedish
25foreign policy,  ^was encouraged by her French alliance to 
threaten action in the Lower Saxon Circle contrary to Sweden’s 
interests and the attitude of the England of James II remained 
enigmatic, this group did not possess a strong enough case to 
risk the displeasure of the king by protesting openly against 
Oxenstierna’s line of action.
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(ii) Danish Policy after 1679
After the breakdown of Gyllenstierna's attempts, 
immediately after peace had been re-established between
Sweden and Denmark at Lund in 1679, to bring about a
26Scandinavian union, Denmark reverted to a policy aimed at
dominating the Lower Saxon Circle with the assertion of
sovereignity over the lands of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp
and the independent Imperial cities of Hamburg and Lubeck
and, ultimately, at destroying the Swedish empire and
recovering Scania. With this end in view Christian V
concluded on March 15th 1682 an alliance with Prance, who
eagerly courted Denmark as she watched Sweden slip from her
grasp. By this he was to receive a subsidy of 200,000 Rd.
annually for eight years, in order to support the armament
necessary to fulfil his ambitions. United with Brandenburg,
already in Louis’ pay, he planned to launch an attack on their
27Northern neighbour , but France was not anxious to provoke a 
Baltic conflict at this stage and declined to lend the
OQnecessary support to the project. Brandenburg swung once 
more away from Prance, and Denmark wavered. For the'time 
being she confined herself to the prosecution of her quarrel 
with the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, whose lands in 1684 
Christian declared forfeit.^ In 1686 the death of the
moderate chancellor, Frederick Ahlfeldt, left the field open 
to the ’cabal*, a group of middle-class bureaucrats which 
favoured the ’forward policy’ which appealed to Christian V . ^
•S-'
J 4
Conrad Bierman von Ehrenschild,^1 the Alsatian head of the
German chancery, ’esteemed', according to Molesworth, 'a
cunning Man hut has no great Reputation for Integrity,
his son-in-law and immediate subordinate Thomas Balthazar
von Jessen,"^ Peter Brandt,^ in charge of Danish finances
since 1680, Michael Wibe^ and Conrad Reventlow.^ But the
tide was turning against them. An attach on Hamburg in
1686 received no support from France, Brandenburg hurried
to the defence of the city, and Brunswick-luneb erg drew
nearer to Sweden. Christian had to submit his case against
Gottorp to a group of mediators meeting at Altona, near 
37Hamburg.
Opposition to the ’cabal's' policy was led by Christian 
Siegfried von Plessen,^® a Mecklenburger and manager of 
prince George's estates, whose 'inclinations', Molesworth,
who was quite close to him, rightly divined were 'rather
*59English than French',  ^but for the time being this party 
was forced to wait on events, especially on the outcome of 
the struggle between James II and his subjects.
Relations between Denmark and the United Provinces 
were particularly strained throughout the 80s, not only on 
account of the latter's premier position in the anti-French 
camp and close association with Sweden, but also because of 
the Dutch failure to pay the subsidies still owing to Denmark 
from the alliancies of 1666 and 1674 together with a sum due 
after the French arbitration in 1671 - debts amounting, so
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the Danes claimed, to 1,500,000,Rd. and countered by claims 
from Holland and Amsterdam for the repayment of loans to 
Frederick III. Negotiations in the Hague in 1684 for a new 
trade alliance to replace the Christianopel treaty, which 
expired in 1685, revealed wide differences on visitation, 
definition of contraband and measurement of ships in Norway 
for customs purposes. An agreement was signed in September, 
but Amsterdam, led by the pensionary Jacob Hop^ and the 
burgomaster Kristian van Beuningen, refused to ratify it.
Hop himself took part in new talks in Berlin under Brandenburg 
mediation in 1687, while the States-General banned all trade 
with Norway. Particular difficulties arose over the customs 
privileges accorded by the Danes to their defence ships - 
merchant ships liable to serve as naval auxiliaries in time 
of war, but the international situation continued to worsen 
for Denmark and she gave way sufficiently for Hop to sign in 
Berlin a preliminary agreement, valid for two years, with 
the Danish envoy to Brandenburg, J.H. Lente, on June 26th 
1688. According to this trade between the United Provinces 
and Denmark - Norway was to be regulated by the previous 
treaties made in 1645, 1647, 1666 and 1669, and all impositions 
and prohibitions on goods not in accordance with these were 
to be lifted. The Danish defence ships retained their 
privileges and the Dutch ban on trade with Norway was withdrawn, 
but the new Danish toll roll of 1686 was suspended, and Dutch 
ships were allowed once more to participate in Dano-Norse 
coasting trade.^ "
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Negotiations for a definitive treaty were to continue 
throughout the Nine Years War and Dutch debts to Denmark 
to constitute a serious barrier to the conclusion of any
AOpact William hoped to make with the Danes.
(iii) The Northern Crowns, the War and the English Revolution
(a) Swedish Reactions
In September 1638 French armies were set in motion 
towards the middle Rhine and the Nine Years War had begun. 
From a narrow Baltic viewpoint a European conflict might 
well be regarded as to Sweden’s advantage, since, with the 
great maritime powers engaged, it was a golden opportunity 
to seize commercial advantages which might well be maintained 
into the peace, and Denmark would be isolated when France 
was fully engaged in the West. It might on the other hand 
result in a shift in the balance of power against Sweden's 
wider interests, cause a breach in the Westphalian settlement, 
in the maintenance of which she had such a keen interest,and 
even draw her with unforseeable consequences into the vortex.
The Emperor asked Sweden to appeal to Louis to withdraw 
his troops. Charles,always attracted by an opportunity to 
assume the distinction of mediator,agreed to do so and sent 
the requisite instructions to his envoy in Paris.^ Nils
lillieroot,^ one of Sweden’s most experienced and able 
diplomats, had been recalled in 1686 as a protest against 
an inscription on a French victory monument, which portrayed 
Sweden gratefully receiving back her lost possessions at the 
hand of the Sun King, but had returned the following year in
37
an attempt to secure the latter's support against Denmark
4.cfor the exiled duke of Holstein-Gottorp.  ^ He received no
response to his efforts at peace-making,"but Louis was anxious
to win "back Sweden to his side and offered an alliance with
the proposal that Charles should take Eastern Pomerania 
46as payment. Charles replied that there could be no question 
of an alliance until Louis had demonstrated his sympathy for 
the duke.^ This would mean desertion of Denmark,and, 
however unsatisfactory the French king might be finding 
Christian's conduct at this time,he was not prepared to 
take such a risk. His ideal was always a reconciliation 
of the two Northern Crowns under French aegis, and his 
diplomacy was always directed ultimately to this end.
Sweden could gain no further satisfaction,and in January 
lillieroot was instructed to return home. He was to explain 
that there was no intention to break off relations with France,^® 
and his commission secretary JohanPalmquist^ was left behind 
as charg^ d'affaires. Palmquist remained alone throughout 
the war.
Charles XI, especially anxious for Imperial support in 
the quarrel with Denmark over Holstein-Gottorp which was 
approaching a new crisis,declared to Leopold's envoy,Anton 
Nostitz, in November 1688 'Last time we were the last to 
stand by France and it is well known what we had to suffer 
on that account. God has now led us on to the right path... 
where we shall remain faithfully and act in such a way. as 
His Majesty the Emperor will be pleased with us.'^ Before
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the riksdag called in February 1689 he launched a vigorous
81attack on French aggression. He promised to'fulfil all
82Sweden's treaty obligations. William had thus good 
reason to hope for considerable assistance from this quarter, 
but he had also more material evidence of Swedish sympathy, 
for his crusade.
In July 1688 Christian Contantijn Rumpf, the Dutch 
resident in Stockholm, approached Oxenstierna in great 
secrecy with a request for 6,000 troops to enter the service 
of the States-General; it was intended that they should 
replace the contingent to accompany the stadtholder to 
England. Mauritz Vellingk, commandant of Stade, Swedish 
observer at the negotiations in Altona and expert on the 
affairs of the lower Saxon Circle, had already been sent 
by Charles to secure William’s support in the Holstein-Gottorp 
dispute and was at this very time engaged in talks with the 
stadlholder at loo. With his attention on these negotiation^, 
the Swedish king, in spite of opposition in his council, 
consented to Rumpf's request on condition that the bulk of 
the troops were taken from his German possessions, thus 
avoiding a dangerous denudation of the defences of the 
Swedish mainland and a large-scale trans-Baltic transport, 
which might alarm the North German princes. An agreement 
was signed on September 12th by which 1,000 men were to be 
ready at Gothenburg fifteen days, 2,000 in Bremen a month 
and the remaining 3,000 in Pomerania six weeks after 
ratification. A total of 108,864 Rd. was to be paid for
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them by the United Provinces. Ratifications were
exchanged in October,and the Gothenburg troops under
c olonel lewenhaupt. had been assembled by the end of the
month, but they were not collected by the Dutch until 
54.mid-December. Bielke was given the task of selecting
the German contingents and expressed his concern lest
their departure should expose Pomerania and Bremen to
Danish attack. His fears were shared by the duke of
Celle,who appealed to prince Georg Friedrich of Waldeck,
commander-in-chief of the allied forces, to delay calling
55for the troops. By the second week in November, however,
recruiting had filled the gaps in the ranks of the Swedish 
56garrisons , and the treaty’s time-table was able to be
fulfilled. Eekhardt, the Dutch commissioner, did not,
however, arrive home with the Pomeranian detachment until
mid-January 1689»and the Bremen regiments appeared at the
57end of February. This was presumably in accordance
with Celle's request,and,in any case,little blame seems
to attach to Sweden for the tardy implementation of her
agreement, but Dijkvelt complained nevertheless to the
58Swedish envoy in London.
No Swedish troops had therefore arrived in the 
Netherlands when William sailed, but there may be some 
truth in Rumpf's claim, made in his despatch of December 
29th 1688, that Charles XI's speedy granting of William's 
request had prevented Louis from attacking the United 
Provinces for fear that even greater aid might be forthcoming
53
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59 'from Sweden,  ^as indeed the Dutch were entitled to expect 
under the terms of their defensive alliance.
All this does not mean that the far-reaching consequences 
of the English Revolution were watched by Swedes with equanimity. 
The unexpected rapidity and extent of the stadholder's success- 
and there is no evidence to suggest that Charles enjoyed any 
special foreknowledge of William’s plans - paradoxically 
strengthened the hand of Oxenstierna's critics. The strengthen­
ing of the Protestant camp by the downfall of James II, which j 
was certainly more welcome to the Swedish than to the Danish 
king, was offset by the fact that two great naval and maritime 
powers, which Sweden had previously been able to play off one 
against the other, were now united, and how far their integra­
tion would go was for long uncertain. Sweden’s share of 
Baltic trade, already threatened seriously enough by the 
Dutch, might disappear altogether. Further the alliance 
of. what might become a new Anglo-Netherlands state with the 
Empire caused a shift in the balance of power which compelled 
a revaluation of Sweden’s place in the European system of 
states.^ Gabriel Oxenstierna,^1 a cousin of the chancellor 
and Swedish envoy in the Hague, summed up the dilemma to 
the Imperial ambassador in 1691. ’The King of Sweden', 
he claimed, 'can never admit that these two great sea powers 
shall be led by one will. It was possible before at
/Tpleast to have one of them with us.' Even the chancellor
himself, always more closely linked in any case with Vienna 
than with the Hague and London, seems to have had his doubts
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as the coalition grew in strength. ^
(t>) Denmark in the Crisis
There was far less uncertainty of attitude to the war 
and the Revolution in Copenhagen than in Stockholm. Although 
Denmark might hope to benefit commercially in much the same 
way as Sweden, the engagement of France, her sole remaining 
ally, in a general conflict meant the abandonment of her 
forward policy and even a retreat before Swedish and Brunswick 
threats. At first there was hope that William might be 
persuaded or bribed to turn against the duke of Holstein- 
Gottorp, and as early as September 1688 an offer of a closer 
alliance was forwarded through Brandenburg.^ Louis’ failure 
to keep his ally informed of his intended attack on the Rhine 
and apparent lack of interest in Denmark’s wishes^ pushed 
Christian further in the same direction, but he carried out 
this reorientation, hesitantly, incompletely and with a bad 
grace.
When Hyacinthe Guillaume Foull& de Martangis,^ the 
newly arrived French ambassador approached the Danish king 
with a proposal for a new alliance in November, Ehrenschild, 
who had resigned his posts in August to retire, ostensibly 
for the sake of his health, to Hamburg but who continued to 
exert a powerful influence on foreign policy through his 
son-in-law and successor Jessen,^ advised against any 
fresh commit m ent for, fear of the bad effect such might 
have in Altona on the Holstein-Gottorp dispute and in the
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conviction that no aid could now he expected from France.
In pursuance of the French ambition to unite both Northern
Crowns to herself she persuaded Denmark to make approaches
to Sweden at this time, but Martangis was told that his
69offer came too late.
This did not'mean that Christian had taken any final 
decision; much more time was needed to work out new policies 
and watch the course of events. These were merely the early 
stages in that hesitant investigation of the possibilities of 
new alliances, which often involved negotiations with both 
belligerent parties at the same time, which is the main 
characteristic of his foreign policy for most of the war.
A rebuff to France might bring to an end the subsidies being 
drawn under the treaty of 1682, which, - such was Denmark’s 
financial state - he could not afford to lose without a sure 
and adequate compensation. He thought twice on the other 
hand before ranging himself too obviously on the side of a 
power against which more and more European states were allying 
or offending an Emperor whose influence was growing.
Thus,while a new attempt was made to bring about a 
reconciliation with William through Brandenburg, the latter’s 
appeal for troops under the terms of her defensive alliance 
with Denmark was rejected on the excuse that Louis had offered 
to treat,and offers were even made to reconcile the elector 
with France. Mediation was offered both to France and.through 
Ehrenschild and Haro-von GSdens, the chief Imperial mediator 
at Altona, to Leopold. This may well have been as much a
68
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sincere attempt to prevent a war, which promised Denmark
little good, as one merely to gain time, hut Sweden seized
upon the opportunity to represent it to the Allies as a
70French artifice.
The dangers of Such a policy on Christian’s part 
soon became apparent. France grew suspicious and stopped 
her subsidies. When news of James’ flight to France raised 
hopes that he might be speedily restored by French arms and 
England forced into a French alliance, Christian tried to 
regain Louis’ favour by having plans drawn up for an armed 
mediation or third party,for which an annual grant of
600,000 Rd. was expected. The terms offered by Martangis
nfor an alliance and diversionary attack on Brunswick-lune’berg- 
Celle were, however, found unsatisfactory by the Danish king,
71as was a new project presented to him at the end of February.
Already an invitation had been extended to the States- 
General to despatch an envoy to Copenhagen and to discuss 
renewal of the 1674 alliance with such changes as were 
necessary in the conditions of 1689.72 In February Plessen
was prepared for a visit to London, officially on prince 
George's affairs, but with instructions to propose a closer 
alliance with George's help and to point out that the 1682 
treaty was, contrary to report, the only engagement Christian 
had with the French king and that even this was due to expire 
in 1690.75
It was impossible to use the existing envoy to England,
74Frederick Gersdorff, - who had reflected too openly his
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government's sympathies for James II. He, an ardent 
legitimist, had appealed to prince George not to desert 
his father-in-law,and Christian had betrayed great dis­
pleasure when these appeals were disregarded. In fact 
Denmark's dislike of the Revolution and her welcome of the
early news of William's failure were common knowledge, of
75which Sweden made full use. ^
(c) The North German Princes
It would he rash to attempt to review William's 
Scandinavian policy without constant reference to the 
situation in North Germany, where both Denmark and Sweden 
had not only extensive territorial possessions, for which 
they owed allegiance to the Emperor, but also close ties 
with other rulers. Of these the most important were the 
elector of Brandenburg and the dukes of Brunswick.
The Great Elector had, it is true, found his way into 
the Dutch-Imperial camp since 1683,and his son renewed his 
alliance with William in 1688 and lent him both his general
Schomberg and a large body of troops. Frederick III,after
\
his accession in May 1688, also continued his father's policy,
however, in maintaining close ties with Denmark and in siding
with her against Sweden, relations with whom were also complica
ted by frontier disputes in Pomerania,in the Holstein-Gottorp
quarrel. His attitude even during the first campaign was far
less cooperative than might have been expected and he did not
join the Grand Alliance until March 1691. Altogether he did
76not prove to be the most amenable of allies.'
Of the four dukes of Brunswick, Anton Ulrich and Rudolph
Augustus of Wolfenbuttel shared Denmark's fear of the rising
power of Hanover and were ready to listen to any project aimed
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at curbing' it. Their sympathies were generally pro-French.
George William of Brunswick-Luneberg-Celle was, in spite of
a French wife, a particular friend of the stadholder and
throughout the war a firm ally of Sweden,but his younger
brother and probable heir, Ernst August of Brunswick-Luneberg-
Calenberg, father-in-law of Frederick III of Brandenburg and
usually referred to simply as the duke of Hanover, was always
an uncertain factor. His driving ambition was the securing
from the Emperor of an electoral hat, an award opposed not
only by his jealous neighbours but also by the Catholic
princes in the Imperial Diet. He was willing to use all
means at his disposal to attain his goal including alliance
with France to frighten the Allies into making the necessary 
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concessions. In 1689 he showed particular reluctance to 
relinquish his ties with the Sun King,and his wife Sofia 
resisted the bait of the English succession which William
79held out to her and openly expressed sympathy for James II..
The duke feared any access of power by either of the Northern 
Crowns.
Northern Germany was thus far from solidly behind 
William III 5 its princes had to be constantly wooed or 
cajoled. Their reactions depended to a very great extent 
on the attitudes of both Denmark and Sweden, William's 
relations with whom thus acquired a double significance.
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(iv) The Place of the North in William III*s War Policy
It is not within the scope of this study to disentangle 
the causes which led to the outbreak of the Nine Years War, 
to argue if and when an armed conflict became inevitable,or 
to debate how far William welcomed an opportunity to set in 
motion a European coalition and settle finally the problems 
left unsolved at Nijmijgen and Ratisbon and how far he entered 
with reluctance into a struggle for which - especially with 
his principal ally engaged already in the East - he was not 
prepared. What seems indisputable, however, is his belief 
in the rightness of his cause and his determination to employ 
all means available to win through.
It was with these convictions that he approached the 
Northern Crowns - the most important of the uncommitted 
powers. It was they who could provide most help as allies 
and do most harm as enemies,and in this way his policy towards 
them separates naturally into its positive and negative aspects 
Positively both Denmark-Norway and Sweden could provide much 
needed man power for the allied armies in the form either of 
national bodies operating semi-independently and on an equal 
footing with those of the Empire, the United Provinces and 
England or of hired auxiliary detachments.
Sweden had at the beginning of the war about 64,000 
men under arms.8® She had already lent 6,000 to the United 
Provinces, was bound to lend a further 6,000 under the Imperial 
Alliance of 1682, guarantee convention of 1683 and Dutch
o-l
Alliance of 1686, and as a belligerent her contribution
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might "be very considerable. In 1687 and 1688 Denmark was
82able to maintain an army of 45 to 50,000. Only a small
proportion of these were Danes, and a force of such a size
could not have been supported without French subsidies.
But when these ceased Christian was anxious to sell a large
number of 1te traps to the highest bidder. Both Northern Crowns
owed small contingents to the Emperor for their possessions
within the Empire, Sweden for Bremen-Verden and Pomerania,
Denmark, for Schleswig-Holstein and Oldenburg-Delmenhorst.
Naval support was for William, with the combined forces of
two great maritime powers at his command,not such an urgent
problem, but Sweden had forty-four ships of the line in
service,8  ^of which twelve were liable to be called upon by
the Dutch in accordance with the agreements of 1683 and 1686,
84.and Denmark could commission thirty-five. Even without a 
declaration of war the giving of military aid would loosen 
any ties the Scandinavian kingdom had with France.
No less vital aid might be rendered by their blocking 
of all Baltic supplies to France, who relied almost wholly
V
85on them for her naval repairs and construction.  ^ At the
end of the seventeenth century Sweden-Finland had a virtual
world monopoly of tar, and Norway's prosperity rested on her
86timber exports. William, however little he may have been 
interested in economic affairs as such, realized,as his new 
English subjects had long done ,that the sinews of war comprised 
a far wider range of goods than those commonly recognized as 
contraband when there was not even agreement on the inclusion
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under this of shipbuilding materials.^ An import of ■ 
grain from the Southern or Eastern Baltic lands might enable 
France, in the event of a bad harvest, to sustain herself
OO
for a further campaign. Should the Northern Crowns join
the Allies as belligerents the problem would solve itself
automatically, but, even without the taking of this step,
they might be persuaded or compelled to desist from supplying
France for the good of the 'common cause' or for compensation;
this might in its turn lead to belligerency in the same way
as the lending of troops. Denmark might help further by
refusing shelter to French warships and privateers in
Norwegian harbours, from which they could operate against
89English and Dutch convoys.
Negatively the help which William desired for himself 
must not be allowed to be given to France. The geographical 
position of Sweden and Denmark made them in many ways more 
dangerous as enemies than useful as friends. Their entry 
into the war on the French side would not only take the Allies 
in the rear and fully engage the armed forces of BrandenburgV
and other North German princes but might even persuade the 
latter to seek their fortunes against the. Emperor rather 
than in his company. It had long been a maxim of English 
foreign policy that the Sound must be kept open, and its 
closure against the merchant ships of the Maritime Powers, 
which would follow the entry of. the Northern Crowns into 
the French camp, would have disastrous results. The Baltic 
trade was unpopular with English mercantilist economists,
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because of the .quantity of bullion it -demanded, but England
nevertheless took nearly half of Sweden’s exports, being her
most important all-round customer, and in-the middle of the
war England and the United Provinces imported over "¡Ofo of
the iron which itself constituted over half the value of
90 -
Swedish exports. . It was perhaps some comfort to consider 
that Sweden would hesitate before breaking such links. As 
for Denmark, Molesworth wrote that ‘the Danes are of the 
opinion that neither the English nor the Dutch can possibly 
want the Norway. Trade for their Naval Stores1 and had regret­
fully to agree that, until the potentialities of North America
91were exploited, they could not.
Even if the Northern Crowns did not join France, either
or both of them might be persuaded by Louis to head a ‘third
party' of neutral princes with the object of imposing on
France's enemies an unfavourable peace by threats or overt 
92
military action or to form a league to oppose any aspect
of allied policy considered by them to be harmful to
93Scandinavian interests.
Such, however, was Dano-Swedish antagonism that united
action by the two nations was less likely than open conflict
between them, and William had always to face the possibility
that the establishment of close ties with one would drive
94
the other into the’opposing camp. Any disturbance in the 
North not only threatened to bring about the withholding of 
help but also provided an excuse for the withdrawal of any 
already given, not only on the part of Denmark and Sweden-but
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also of those of their neighbours who felt,.or could claim
95that they felt, that they themselves were threatened.
It was just such a threat which faced William at the very 
beginning of his reign. Sweden and the duke of Celle 
stood poised ready to restore at the point of the sword 
the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, whom Christian V had driven 
into exile, and until this quarrel was settled peacefully 
the new king's more far-reaching and positive aims in the 
North would remain unfulfilled.
nChapter 2
William III and Holstein-Gottorp in 1689
(i) The Background
The roots of the age-long dispute between the kings
of Denmark and the dukes of Holstein-Gottorp are to be
found in the settlement made on the election of king
Christian I in 1460 to the county of Holstein, an Imperial
fief, and the duchy of Schleswig, which owed allegiance to
the Danish Crown. It was then agreed that the two territories
should be perpetually united, but at the same time remain
independent of the Danish kingdom as such and retain their
own laws and administration."*" . Fourteen years later Holstein
2was raised to the rank of an hereditary Imperial duchy.
In 1544 Christian III partitioned both duchies, retaining 
lands in each for himself and using the remainder as apanages 
for two of his three half-brothers. Their relations with 
each other and with Denmark were regulated by the ’Union*, 
drawn up on the death of Frederick I in 1533, which anticipated 
such a division by making rather vague provisions for mutual 
defence, but the situation was complicated by the arrangements 
made for the joint rule of certain privileged areas, mostly 
in Holstein, consisting of the lands of the ’knights, prelates 
and towns.’ Here the so-called 'communion' enjoined that 
taxes should be paid into a common chest, the administration 
of higher justice shared and the presidency of the estates 
(lanttag) assumed by-the dukes in rotation.^ In 1579 at
5 2
Odense Schleswig was declared a Danish fief but ’francum, 
liberum et sine onere’, and in 1581, on the death of the 
duke Hans the elder, a fresh division, retaining joint rule 
in the common lands, was made as a compromise solution
between duke Adolf, who claimed the whole duchy, and his
4
nephew king Frederick II. It was between the descendants 
of these two men, the dukes of Holstein-Gottorp and the 
kings of Denmark as' dukes of Schleswig-Holstein, that developed 
the struggle with which we are concerned.
By the beginning of the seventeenth century the duchies 
consisted of a jigsaw of lands, some held by the duke of 
Holstein-Gottorp, some by the king of Denmark, some governed 
jointly, and a small proportion of the whole shared among 
the heirs of duke Hans the younger, founder of the S^nderborg 
lines. Some were legally Imperial, some Danish fiefs and
all were bound together by vaguely worded and frequently
5contradictory agreements. Neither duke nor king had a 
clearly defined position in either Schleswig or Holstein, 
and the duke’s status in Schleswig was particularly parlous.
In such circumstances it was only to be expected that each 
should seek to improve his lot and that each should find 
reason and law to support his claims. The king dreamt of- 
complete control of the duke’s domains, especially in contiguous 
Schleswig, the duke of sovreignity without hindrance of union 
or communion.
It was equally natural that the latter should seek 
outside help and that his choice should fall on Denmark’s
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chief antagonist in the struggle for Baltic supremacy.
Sweden had pressing strategic reasons for refusing Denmark 
control of the Gottorp land$ and the family quarrel rapidly 
Became not only one of European concern tut a permanent 
threat to peace in the North. As well as a harrier across 
Denmark's line of march into that part of the Empire which 
she aimed to make her exclusive sphere of influence and her 
lines of communication with her own possessions of Oldenburg 
and Delmenhorst,the duke's territories formed a vital link 
between Swedish Pomerania and Bremen-Verden, reinforcement 
of whose garrisons by sea always lay at the mercy of the 
Danish fleet. Outright control by either of the Northern 
Crowns would seriously jeopardize the other's position in 
Germany and the Baltic and,in the event of war,would prove 
a weapon of prime importance. But Sweden also had an interest 
in keeping alive the disputes between Denmark and the dukes, 
for not only would Denmark's attention be diverted to the 
south as long as they lasted but the dukes would have continued 
reason to maintain close ties with Sweden. This led her to 
oppose the various projects for exchange of territories which
ftwould have provided the best answer to the problem.
Denmark failed to break Gottorp*s ties with Sweden, 
cemented under duke Frederick III by the marriage of Charles X 
to his daughter Hedvig Eleonora in 1654,^ and in 1658 at 
Boskilde the duke secured full sovereignty over his Schleswig 
lands, although still subject to the unions and communion, 
in payment for his services against his overlord, a gain
5 4
confirmed at the peace of Copenhagen in 1660 under the
O
guarantee of the Maritime Powers and Prance. There was 
a considerable lessening of tension in the 60s, symbolized 
by the marriage of Christian Albrekt to Princess Frederikke 
Amalia of Denmark in 1667, but with Christian V's accession 
in 1670 a new period of crisis began. The Gottorp-Swedish 
alliance was renewed in 1674, and finally in 1675» when he 
was on the verge of war with Sweden, Christian forced the 
duke, partly at least as a defensive measure, to submit
gto a state of virtual vassalage by the treaty of Rensborg.
In the following year he occupied Schleswig. The status 
quo was restored under article xvii of the Treaty of 
Fontainebleau four years later, again under the guarantee 
of the Western Powers."L<“> . This meant that all the old
claims and counter-claims, especially those regarding 
the extent of the duke's independence in matters of taxation, 
foreign affairs and defence, his 'ius collectandi, foederum 
et fortaliti' under the unions of 1533 and 1623 and grant of 
sovereignty in Schleswig, remained and were further aggravated 
by rival interpretations of Fontainebleau. In 1682 Christian,
V
confident in his French alliance, sent his troops into Gottorp 
after Albrekt had fled to Hamburg, and in 1684 not only did 
he proclaim the ducal part of Schleswig forfeit to Denmark 
but for a short time raised the Holstein 'contribution' or 
taxes in the common lands, which had formed the main ostensible 
bone of contention, for Danish benefit alone. Sweden 
encouraged her protqge, although, occupied as she was in
recovering her strength after the humiliations of the war, 
she had to confine herself to diplomatic representations in 
Copenhagen. The Emperor offered his mediation,but it was 
not until Denmark tried to assert her sovereignty over 
Hamburg by force in 1686 that other powers became keenly 
interested in the duke's plight. The Brunswick-Luneburg 
dukes and Sweden drew closer together, and Christian V, who 
always claimed his disputes with Gottorp to be purely family 
quarrels for as long as circumstances permitted, agreed to 
the mediation of the Emperor, Saxony and Brandenburg. 
Negotiations opened in Altona at the beginning of November 
1687.11
No progress was made during the early months of the 
new year,and, with the death of the Great Elector in April,
IPthe talks came virtually to a standstill. Sweden grew
alarmed that the duke would give way in despair, opened
negotations with Brunswick-Luneburg to restore him by force,
and at the end of the year Charles XI decided to call a
riksdag. This met in February 1689 and, while expressing
its hopes for a peaceful solution, voted supplies for the 
‘ 13support of 14,000 men. J On the 12th of the same month 
an alliance was signed with luneburg by which,if the duke 
were not restored by May 20th, Denmark was to be attacked 
with 18,000 men and territorial compensation exacted from 
her by the victors.^
(ii) William and the Altona Negotiations
William had of course been neither blind to the approach 
ing crisis nor kept aloof from it. The United Provinces was
a guarantor of Northern peace and the duke's rights. Nor
could any action by the pro-French Denmark be ignored. He had
long backed the proposals for settlement by mediation, and
Jacob Hop had been present during the early abortive stages of
the negotiations at Altona while he was in the North to settle
the Dutch commercial differences with Christian V.  ^ In August
1688 Mauritz Veiling]*; Swedish observer at Altona^ had visited
the stadtholder at loo after taking part in negotiations in
Hanover. Not only did he hope to enlist William's support for
the cause of Christian Albrekt but also to persuade him to use
his influence with the young elector of Brandenburg, whose
refusal to commit himself in the dispute was causing considerable
concern in Stockholm. William approved the Swedish proposals
for a general concert to protect the duke's legitimate rights
and promised both his help with Brandenburg and Saxony and a
welcome for Gabriel Ihuresson Oxenstierna, Sweden’s envoy in
Vienna, who was to be sent as a more permanent representative
to the States-General. At the same time, however, he emphasized
the dangers which faced the United Provinces, who would certainly
17be attacked by France if James II were successful in England.
v
It was obvious that no decisive intervention was to be expected
until the problems of the latter country had been settled, and
the troops agreement which was signed between Sweden and the
United Provinces the following month was, as has been already
suggested, dictated to a considerable extent by Sweden's Baltic 
T8interests.
While there can be little doubt that William's sympathies,
in view of the links between Denmark and France, the former's 
acts of aggression in the lower Saxon Circle and Sweden's 
tokens of friendship, lay with Christian.Albrekt and his allies 
his overriding concern had always to be the preservation of 
peace in Northern Europe as part of the larger crusade, even 
if this meant considerable sacrifices on the duke's part.
Thus his subsequent policy aimed at restraining the belligerenc 
of Sweden and Brunswick-Lüneburg without alienating their 
friendship while persuading Denmark by all means short of 
war to restore the duke and the status quo, at least for the 
duration of the war with France.
Gabriel Oxenstierna arrived in the Hague in October 1688
19following the conclusion of the troops treaty , but he could 
do little until the English scene had become clearer. Even 
then little could be accomplished without William's cooperation 
and, in reply to an invitation through Waldeck, he was sent 
instructions for a voyage to London in January. He was ordered 
to impress on William the harm done by Denmark's behaviour to 
the common cause and how necessary it was to remove all 
opportunity for her to come to France's aid and so prevent 
Sweden and the princes of the Lower Saxon Circle ¿joining him 
with all their strength. Negotiations, he was to point out, 
seemed merely to give Christian time to improve his position.
He was to repeat the libels perpetrated against the stadthdLder 
in Copenhagen and win his support for a request being made to 
the States-General for eight to ten ships to be sent to . 
Gothenburg and to be used to cut Danish communications with
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Norway and prevent the manning of her fleet. As an 
additional incentive the treaty aid, for which the United 
Provinces had applied under the guarantee treaties of the 
1680s, was to be made dependent on help from the States-General 
under the alliance of 1640, renewed in 1686, and the guarantee 
of the Peace of Copenhagen. Finally, Oxenstierna was to 
apply for a loan of 1,000,000 Rd. at 4 or 5% to anticipate 
the grants made by the riksdag, which would take some time 
to collect.20
He sailed from Brill on March 27th in the company
of two other delegates from Northern powers, Schütz from
the Brunswick dukes and WdL%ang von Schmettau from the
elector of Brandenburg, both of whom had been sent with
the avowed purpose of congratulating the new king but who
21were as interested in Holstein-Gottorp as himself. He 
was warned from Stockholm of the pro-Danish inclinations of 
Schmettau while at the same time being cautioned to tread 
wearily in view of William's regard for the elector. From
ft P PSchütz he could, however, he was told, expect support.
The ground had already been prepared for him by Johan 
leijonberg, Swedish envoy in London since 1 6 7 2 , whose 
caution throughout the Revolution won him a happier fate 
than his Danish counterpart. He had secured an audience 
with the king on March 17th and handed over a copy of 
Charles* propositions to the estates. He had answered 
questions about Sweden's military strength and pleaded 
the duke's cause. William had promised, so leijonberg
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reported, to send someone 'to receive your Majesty's instruc­
tions how he was to act' and had claimed that he found no
24.difficulty in supporting Sweden.
Oxenstierna landed in England on April 2nd and arrived in
25London two days later.  ^ He secured a private audience,
o ghut Plessen had anticipated him. The Dane had arrived on 
March 28th with orders to emphasize the generosity of his 
sovereign's offers to Gottorp, the necessity of discouraging 
Sweden's lust for power and the dangers of a transfer of troops 
to her German provinces when the removal of Bengt Oxenstierna
27was all that was needed to throw her into the arms of France. 
Soon after his arrival came news of Christian's offer at 
Altona, where negotiations had been resumed at the end of 
1688, to restore the duke, hut the saving clause that this 
should he done without prejudice to Danish honour and security 
destroyed much of the effect, and William was very guarded in
OQ
their first talk. Plessen*s task was little helped hy 
his allies at the English court. Gersdorff, who was not
finally recalled until April 9th, confessed he could do nothing
29and his reputation prohahly made him a liability. Prince 
George, on whose behalf the visitor had ostensibly come, 
assured his brother constantly that no hostile action was to 
be feared from the Maritime Powers^ and can hardly have made 
much impression on William. Even Schmettau does not seem 
to have been such a consistent supporter of the Danish line 
as the Swedish envoys believed. In fact neither party 
could find much satisfaction in either London or the Hague.
A sincere desire for the preservation of peace in the North
was evident,hut the Swedes soon found that this implied an
unwillingness to aggravate matters by sending the squadron,
for which they and Brunswick-luneburg were pressing, or even
32by the hiring out of ships. The question of a loan was
quietly shelved. It was made quite clear to them that no
support was to be expected for the duke’s claims either for
compensation or for use of his Schleswig lands unrestricted
by ’unions’ and 'communion*, ^  and it was even suggested that
the whole problem might be the more speedily and satisfactori
solved if Charles turned all his forces immediately against 
34France. The Danes, on the other hand, found dissatisfacti 
with the conditions which their king attached to the restora­
tion offer, suspicion of the nature of their relations with 
France and a cool reception to their offers of military aid.^ 
In his first discussion on Holstein-dottorp with 
Oxenstierna on April 21st William said he realized how 
difficult was the position while Denmark had France at her 
back and agreed to warn her of the dangers she was running 
if she remained stubborn. He was eager to renew the guarant< 
of the duke's rights but showed his displeasure when the envo; 
spoke of his master's patience becoming exhausted and, in 
answer to the request for an allied squadron, could only 
repeat observations already made by Portland about the
•2/r
weakness of his fleet. The Swedes did, however, make 
full use of the unsatisfactory nature of the Danish reply 
to the mediator’s proposals at the end of March and elicited
6l
William’s surprise when this was communicated to him.
It is not clear how detailed was William’s knowledge 
at any stage of the treaty between Sweden and Brunswick- 
Luneburg of February 12th. Gabriel Oxenstierna was himself 
informed on February 20th. In a debate in the chancery 
on April 1st on a letter from Bielke of March 15th informing \ 
of Schütz* mission and asking if the Luneburger should raise 
the question of Holstein-Gottorp with William, Oxenstierna 
proposed that the latter should not be told the details of 
the treaty at once lest he believe there was more behind it, 
but that it should be revealed to him little by little.
. IfLindskold agreed and suggested beginning with the agreement
to restore the duke and then the method proposed for his
restitution. There is, however, no mention of this method
of procedure in the instructions sent to Gabriel Oxenstierna
on April 3rd with a summary of the alliance, of which he was
to inform the English king. These did not arrive until
April 28th, so no mention of the agreement could have been
made in the first talk. There is no record of William’s
reaction to it, but it is perhaps significant that shortly
afterwards, in a letter to Heinsi\is on May 7th, he agrees
38to the sending of Dutch ships to the Baltic.'
Already he had begun to take more vigorous action
in defence of Northern peace. Coenrad van Heemskerck,an
39ex-pensionery of Amsterdam and experienced diplomat , was 
sent with the king’s full approval to Altona at the end of 
April with orders to further a settlement without giving.
37
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umbrage to S w e d e n . A t  the beginning of May Robert Goes,^-
the States-General's resident in Denmark, whom they had
recalled to the Hague to report, arrived back in Copenhagen
4.2with the same task. About the same time new English 
envoys were appointed to the North as part of the wholesale 
replacement of James' servants. William Duncombe^ went 
to replace Edmund Poley^ in Sweden, Robert Molesworth^ to
A C
succeed sir Gabriel Sylvius^- in Denmark, Robert, lord
4.7Lexington to Brandenburg and air William Dutton Colt to
4-8 ^Brunswick, but none of these was destined to arrive in time
to affect the course of negotiations in Altona, and Dutch
agents alone executed the king's policy up to the final
settlement. Time was now running out. Heemskerck, who had
written soon after his arrival that all hope of a settlement
was past but that at the moment it was necessary only to hold
a squadron in readiness, was empowered to threaten Denmark
with its despatch, and the king, according to Gabriel
Oxenstierna, told Schütz that, if a settlement was not reached
by mid-June, it would have to be sent.^® On June 14th Heinsuis
reported to the States of Holland on replies received from the\
admirality colleges concerning such a squadron and announced
that the States-General was to be advised to fit out twelve
SIships to be victualled for four months.
In Altona Vellingk and Gortz, the Brunswick observer, 
agreed to a postponement of their ultimatum until May 51st 
since they knew that their countries’ military preparations 
could not be completed-until mid-June. An effort by Denmark
6y
to have the points in dispute referred to the arbitration 
of William and the Emperor failed, and the mediators demanded 
an unconditional restoration,but,when the new time limit was 
reached,they secured a further respite of sixteen days.
A delay beyond this was hardly to be hoped for, but Denmark 
remained stubborn. She had been encouraged by reports of 
the unwillingness and the unpreparedness of the Maritime 
Powers to intervene by force, by James II's successful landing 
in Ireland, by German fears of a Swedish transfer of troops, 
of which even luneburg warned her ally, J by fading hopes of 
peace between the Holy League and the Turks , and even by 
hopes of French subsidies. In April Christian promised 
Martangis that he would give way no further if assured of 
France’s support, but Louis continued to demand a diversionary
ft CJ £attack on Brunswick-Luneburg as his price. Finally on 
June 4th at a meeting in Celle, in a desperate bid to postpone 
the catastrophe and in face of a threat by Vellingk to order 
the Swedish fleet to sail at once, Heemskerck and Heekeren,
H 56the States-General representative with the Luneburg dukes,
agreed to a request from Vellingk and G5rtz to send a squadron
of a dozen ships by the end of June if Christian did not accept
the terms drawn up on the previous day by June 20th. A further1
twelve ships were to be kept in readiness to protect the
agreement throughout the war with France. By a separate act
the States-General were allowed fourteen days to ratify the 
57convention.
William's representatives, had found it necessary to 
hind their master on their own responsibility and felt it 
incumbent upon themselves to defend their action in subsequent 
despatches. Heemskerck declared that he would have preferred 
the imposition of terms more to Denmark's liking, which would 
also have been in the long run to the duke's advantage, but 
time had been pressing and the commitments entered into by
ft
Sweden and Luneburg too precise to obtain a respite in any 
other way. Heekeren pointed out that the engagement involved 
only twelve ships while by the alliance between Sweden and
58the States-General all the latter's forces were committed.
Denmark was understandably incensed by this development. 
Christian ordered lente in the Hague to protest his astonish­
ment at the action,especially after Denmark's offer of troops 
to the Allies,and to hope it had been taken without orders
and would be disavowed. Similar sentiments were expressed 
59in London. Here Danish representation was once more
changed in thé middle of May. Plessen, whose health was •
60little fitted for the strains imposed on it and whose wife
and daughter had been burnt to death in the Amalienborg^
61castle disaster on April 19th, asked for and obtained his 
recall. He and Gersdorff left together at the end of 
June,  ^but a temporary replacement had already arrived in 
the shape of Frédéric-Henri, marquis de la Forest-Suzannet, 
a Huguenot friend of Schomberg,promoted to major-general for 
the purpose. ^ His instructions of May 14th were to propose 
the reference of outstanding differences between king and
duke to arbitrators, including William, if no settlement 
were reached by the end of September, a solution which, as 
had been seen, proved unacceptable at Altona, and to back 
this with an offer of troops more precise than that already 
made by Piessen. '
William promised la Forest an early reply but delayed
until a settlement was reached in the North for fear of
66hardening the Danish attitude in the negotiations. He
continued to support the threat of sending ships to aid
67Sweden in the event of a rupture0, and preparations went
68cautiously ahead, but he would not allow himself to be
bound to anything too definite^ and betrayed a growing
uneasiness at the intransigence of the duke’s allies. Already
some Brandenburg troops were being held back from the Rhine,
and the elector was threatening to withdraw those already 
70sent. The stadtholder-king approved the demands set out
71in a Gottorp ultimatum on May 6th with the exception of
a claim by the duke to levy an extraordinary tax with which
to build a fortress and his pretensions to compensation,
even though the sum had been reduced from 10,000,000 Rd. to
a mere 500,000 Rd., William feared that Denmark would not be
able to pay it and might be driven to extremities with French
backing. If these points were conceded he had hopes that
Christian might give way, if not the duke must, he judged,
7 0be considered guilty of war. This view formed the basis
7 3of instructions to Duncombe and Molesworth on June 6th 
and to Colt on June 13thl^; William emphasized to Heinsius
66
that ’we must not join in what is wrong*.^ He told
Oxenstierna in the middle of June that he was sure that, if
Denmark had made the same offer she was now making four
months previously, Gottorp would have accepted, and that he
hoped Sweden and Ldneburg were now satisfied and would drive
76Denmark no further. He showed great irritation when news
reached London of the mediators' project drawn up on May 31st,
77just before the fateful visit to Celle.
Unfortunately no first hand evidence has survived of 
his reaction to Heemskerck’s and Heekeren's convention of 
June 4th, but both Plessen and Gabriel Oxenstierna reported 
that he was not wholly pleased with the behaviour of his 
envoys, and he refused to comment on the agreement It
does seem highly likely, in view of his general attitude 
at this time, that he was annoyed at finding himself bound 
by such strict engagements, which he was given little or no 
time to endorse or repudiate before the expiry of the ultimatum, 
and that he feared to alienate Denmark by being drawn so far 
from the middle path, especially when he had La Forest's offer 
before him. He had, it is true, sanctioned the sending of a
- ♦ V
squadron to the Baltic but had been careful to commit himself 
neither to any terms under which it should be employed nor to 
the party against which it should be directed. He was now 
committed on both counts and could not withdraw without 
risking a serious breach with Sweden and undermining Heemskerck's 
and Heekeren's authority; there was nothing left to hope for 
but that agreement b.e reached before June 20th. Leijonberg
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felt a less friendly atmosphere and complained that,'although 
times and even the government itself has changed, the old maxims 
of the English court have not.* He blamed the influence of 
prince George and the offer of troops,by'means of which, he 
claimed, Denmark pretended to acquit herself of her debts 
to the duke. When he expatiated to William on Gottorp's 
wrongs he was met by the sobering assertion that the latter 
could not expect full justice in present circumstances and
79should make a virtue of necessity to avoid greater calamities.
William, however, obviously decided to support the terms
approved by the mediators, and on June 19th these were sent 
80after Duncombe, who had set sail three days before on the
0*1 O O'Swan*, to Molesworth, and were supported in orders to 
Colt85 and sir Paul Rycaut, new resident in Hamburg and the 
lower Saxon Circle,8^ who was to recommend them to the duke 
himself.85
One of the greatest obstacles in the way of a final 
settlement was the return to the duke of the island of Femern
ITand the counties of Steinhorst and Tremsbuttel. These had
been mortgaged to prince George after Danish occupationvas
security for 300,000 Rd. owed by Christian Albrekt to king
Christian, who'made the sum over to his brother in settlement
of a bequest in the will of their father.8^ The mediators*
agreed to try to persuade William and, if necessary, also the 
Emperor and the States-General to be responsible for George’s 
satisfaction if the territories in question were returned 
immediately to the duke. Heemskerck acknowledged the
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irregularity of this procedure but explained that he had
agreed ’because it was considered that it would facilitate
89a settlement, and my good offices alone were required.’
William refused at first to consider the proposal but, finding
his hand forced by his envoy’s engagement, agreed and hoped
the United Provinces would shoulder their share of the burden
’because the matter is of too great importance to take risks
90for so small a thing.’^
Christian V, under threat of Heemskerck’s convention,
faced by a financial situation which could not possibly
support a war on all fronts without great subsidies,unable
to get promises of aid from either France or Brandenburg,
who feared the increase in Swedish power which the war might
bring, aware, from Plessen's despatches, of William's
displeasure with Danish stubbornness, and hankering for an
understanding with Sweden,for which he had been groping since
the beginning of the year, decided early in June, with the
utmost reluctance and under strong pressure from his councillors!
to give way and returned the mediator's project of June 10th
91with only slight modifications on June 15th. Even then
only pressure by Heemskerck on Celle to accept this and threats
by Vellingk, who refused any extension of the time limit to
save the Danes loss of face, produced signatures to the final
agreement on June 20th, less than three hours before expiry
h 92of the Swedish-Luneburg ultimatum. By it the duke was 
restored to full sovereignity in Schleswig but without 
compensation or abolition of the ancient covenants binding
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him to the king of Denmark in.his capacity as duke of Schleswig- 
93Holstein.  ^ William’s attitude had been studiously correct 
throughout the crisis, but, by backing the mediator’s demands 
without at the same time giving the duke and his allies 
unconditional support and by discreetly threatening to use 
force against the party he himself judged guilty of causing 
a resort to arms, he had certainly helped to restrain the 
ardour of one side and weaken the determination of the other 
and so make a peaceful solution possible. It was a solution 
which, however unsatisfactory it might prove to be in the 
future, was largely the one for which he had pressed from the 
beginning and which suited his immediate aims.
(iii) Aftermath of Altona
War in the Worth with all its unpredictable consequences
had been very near, and even after the agreement had been
signed the danger receded only slowly. On receipt of the
news from Altona on June 26th the movement of Swedish troops
towards the Sound was halted,but the fleet, which had set
94.sail a mere two days before,remained at sea. This prompted
Danish counter-activity,and William's representatives found
themselves obliged to work for an early withdrawal of both
sides* ships and avoidance of a chance encounter. Heeraskerck,
who stayed on although the main purpose of his mission was
completed, was finally promised by Reventlow that all Danish
warships would return to port by August 15th if Sweden acted 
93likewise. Swedish' ships were still out on this date,but
96no serious incident resulted.
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By this time,however, the settlement was Being threatened 
on a different plane. The legal position of the duke was 
much the same as after Fontainebleau. None of the old 
causes for disagreement had been removed,the rights of each 
side under the 'unions' and 'communion* remained as ill-defined- 
as ever,and the Danish king had merely left his claims 'to 
God and time'. In July the duke agreed with Sweden and
t»luneburg to take into his service a number of their troops
to provide some defence for his territories until he could
afford his own and to help build a garrison and fortress at
T^nningen. It was particularly important for Denmark that
Gottorp should remain defenceless,and Christian welcomed this
opportunity to keep the dispute open and raise once more the
question of Gottorp's 'ius Collectandi, Foederum et Fortalitii,’
granted with the sovereignty of Schleswig. Flirenschild, who
had been mainly responsible for Danish negotiations at Altona,
was sent back to Hamburg to protest against what he claimed
to be a breach of the unions, demand dismissal of foreign
troops and negotiate a new union with Christian Albrekt
involving a joint army to be paid out of a common chest,
but at-the same time to avoid any preliminary discussion of
the agreement of June 20th. Talks began on September 12th
under the shadow of 7,000 Danish troops, which were being
hired out to William and were gathered in South Jutland prior
97to their embarkation.
As soon as Christian was informed of the duke's treaty 
Danish envoys were 'ordered to protest and obtain support in
QQ
their several courts for Ehrenschild's mission. , William 
promised la Forest his help and spoke to leijonberg. The 
Swede claimed that Denmark would not he satisfied until the 
only foreign troops in the duke's service were Danish, The
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king simply asked his help in removing all grounds for jealousy, 
hut once more he showed his sympathies for the duke, and on 
September 24th Molesworth was instructed that Christian 
Albrekt had a clear legal right to act as he did and that 
Denmark had no cause to fear the consequences of the agreement; 
la Fouleresse, the Danish' legation secretary in london, found 
no inclination at the English court to remonstrate with the . 
duke.^® The death of the duke of Saxe-lauenburg on 
September 30th and the prompt.occupation of his disputed 
territories by the duke of Celle contributed to the tension 
in the lower Saxon Circle and called forth new efforts to 
reconcile king and duke' by Heeraskerck and leopold's envoys, 
Godens and Reichenbach, who proposed a gradual withdrawal of 
foreign troops from Gottorp,1®1 but the most that Christian 
Albrekt would consent to was a written promise, which he sent 
to Heemskerck and Godens only after Swedish consent had been
V
obtained, to return all troops by May 1st 1690, when,
leijonberg was ordered to promise William, they would be
1 nosent to aid the Allies,
Sweden continued to protest at Danish efforts to impose 
an unfavourable alliance on Christian Albrekt and to persuade 
him to take Danish troops into his service. She disapproved 
strongly of mediation projects put forward by Ileemskerck as
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prejudicial to the duke's sovereignty and pressed strongly
for the production of the guarantees of the Altona settlement
103promised by the Maritime Powers.
Nothing had been said about guarantees in the treaty of 
June 20th,since no agreement could be expected from Denmark 
to Gottorp's choice of guarantors, which would inevitably 
include Sweden and Brunswick-Iuneburg. It had therefore 
been decided to leave each party to seek its own securities.
The duke then declared his intention to ask not only the 
mediators, Sweden and Brunswick-luneburg, but also the Maritime 
Powers and the directory of the lower Saxon Circle .-*-04 wiiiiam 
had already expressed his willingness, indeed his eagerness, 
to accede, but the T^nningen dispute prompted Denmark to press 
for a delay,on the grounds that Ehrenschild's talks would 
otherwise be prejudiced, and Sweden to urge with equal vigour 
the guarantee's speedy execution in view of the persistent 
danger of conflict and Danish t h r e a t s . I n  fact the English 
guarantee was held up for at least eight months and the Dutch 
for nearly as long. It is difficult to apportion blame.
The Swedes suspected William of fearing to offend Denmark, 
whose troops he awaited, and of using the guarantee as a 
bargaining counter in his negotiations for Swedish military 
aid.^®^ He certainly proposed that the matter should form 
part of Gabriel Oxenstierna's negotiation with the States- 
General concerning the contingents of troops and ships owed 
by Sweden to the A l l i e s , b u t , o n  the other hand,Denmark was 
given little cause for optimism,and la Fouleresse was told
1J
that the guarantee was as much of a cheek on the duke as.
upon Christian. He found himself reduced to pressing for
the inclusion of additional clattses favourable to Denmark
and could obtain no greater satisfaction than a promise to
consult the Danish king before the documents were sent,
1 08a promise which was soon broken. Some at least of the
technical difficulties put forward to excuse the delay were
hardly convincing. Firstly, it was argued, no formal request
was received from the duke, and, since Sweden appeared to act
as his agent, William demanded that special powers should be
T09sent to Leijonberg or Gabriel Oxenstierna to negotiate.
He wished also to consult with the States-General on a common
model,and lord Dursley, his new envoy in the Hague, was
instructed to do so.^^ The States-General in their turn
raised^.points about which they sought fuller information,
while sickness postponed Dursley’s introduction and his
negotiations with them.11^ A project was sent over by the .
Dutch ambassadors in England,but this, it was claimed, proved 
112inadequate. The impatient Swedes were next informed that
ho reliable copy of the Altona settlement was available^ in
11*London and that Schmettau had requested one from the elector. ^
The States-General finally based their guarantee on that issued
by the Emperor,which had been expedited in O c t o b e r , a n d ,
after Gabriel Oxenstierna, who returned to the United Provinces 
115in October,  ^had persuaded the grand pensionary and Dursley 
that it was unnecessary to send it to London first, it was 
forwarded to Heemskerek in J a n u a r y . T h e r e  was still,
74
however, delay in England. A formal request was made by
the duke at the end of December,but its receipt was delayed
117until February. Schmettau received the desired copy
'll O
early in the new year, but William, perhaps irritated by
the Swedish request to include herself and the Lower Saxon
Circle in the guarantee and thus make him a party to all
Sweden's disputes with her neighbours, to which he could not 
119agree, and by what seemed very like an attempt to blackmail
120him with a refusal of treaty aid, continued to demand the
121sending of special powers to Leijonberg. No sooner was
this done and the documents handed to the latter than a
122dispute arose over the duke's titles. At last all that
remained was for La Fouleresse and Lente to protest against 
the favo\irs bestowed on the duke by the Allies. The States- 
General promised to write to him and persuade him to come to 
terms with the Danish king.^^^
Another part of the Altona settlement which affected 
William directly and which took even longer to settle than 
the guarantee was the payment of the debt to prince George.
On July „9th 1689 he and the prince accepted the conditions 
laid down in clause 3 of the treaty,and the king agreed to
lOAshoulder half the burden. ^ The States-General finally
agreed to raise a further quarter. J Responsibility for
the remainder, agreement on the exact sum involved and the
126payment itself involved further extended negotiation.
Attempts were made to reach a settlement by Plessen when he 
was in the Hague in the autumn of 1690,but the Imperial
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delegate was not empowered. Finally, after the amount
claimed had been reduced from 428,000 Rd. to 340,000Rd.
(£85,000) and William had himself accepted responsibility for
the quarter he had hoped to persuade Leooold to contribute, a
128
settlement was reached in July 1691, but payment was long
delayed largely, it seems, through the stubbornness of the
States-General. The instructions to Mogens Skeel, new Danish
envoy to London, in February 1692 contains an order to request
payment, and in May 1697 lord Villiers, English envoy in the
Hague, wrote to the secretary of state, lord Shrewsbury, in
acknowledgement of an account of the 1691 agreement, that he
r
had spoken to William,.but ’I may be free enough with Yo Grace
to say, that I think this is not sufficient to have anything
129
really effected in the business.'
Ehrenschild's talks in Hamburg were finally broken off
after the rejection of the duke's last offer on December 12th
with no further result than that agreement on the Swedish
and Ltineburg troops already noted. ’ Christian had neither
the financial resources nor the reliable allies to' do more
for the time being. He had, however, succeeded in laying
a foundation for future claims and had succeeded in postponing
the discussion of difficulties arising out of Altona for
.130
which Christian Albrekt had been pressing. The Holstein-
Gottorp problem was not to concern William again for some
time, but it was always to be a factor to be reckoned with in
his Northern policy and was to occupy the forefront again s
131
before peace with France was attained.
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Chapter 3
William and Denmark after Altona (June 1689 - February 1690)
(i) Danish Policy after Altona.
The settlement of the Holstein-Gottorp crisis in June 1689 
released William’s energies for the pursuit of the more 
positive aims of his Northern policy and afforded a promise 
of a more exact definition of the Northern Crowns' attitude 
to the struggle in the West. Denmark's failure to maintain 
the drive against the duke, which had been supported by the 
..'cabal' during the 1680s, forced her to re-examine her whole 
attitude to European affairs. The price demanded by her 
one remaining ally for financial support had been too high 
and the possibility of Louis' helping her in any more direct 
way too remote to risk a head on clash with the united Maritime 
Powers and, as has been seen, even before the conclusion of
ftthe Swedo-Luneburg offensive alliance in February 1689 and 
William's accession to the English throne, Ehrenschild had • 
advised against a closer alliance with France, tentative 
moves had been made to bring about a reconciliation with- 
William through Brandenburg,and Plessen had been sent to 
London to survey the scene and sound possibilities of a 
renewal of old and the conclusion of new alliances.^"
It has been claimed that before the Altona agreement 
financial were always subordinated to political considerations 
while after it the order of priorities was reversed. This 
does help to explain many of the vagaries of Danish foreign
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policy during the Nine Years*. War, the turning from one side 
to another or to both sides at once in the search for subsidies, 
and the large part played by financial questions in all negotia­
tions, for, in spite of the king's efforts, Denmark's financial 
situation, at least until Plessen took charge in 1692, was 
highly chaotic. She had been brought to the edge of bank­
ruptcy by the cost of the Dutch war and an ambitious policy 
demanding larger forces than she was fitted to sustain, and 
without considerable outside help she could not hope to be 
able to put herself into a position from which she could 
pursue an independent course. But she had also to consider 
her security and to build up a new alliance system, in which 
Sweden would, so Christian hoped, play a leading part# She 
was unfortunately cursed not only with financial infirmities 
but also with weaknesses in her central administration which 
have been traced by Laursen to Christian's own lack of insight 
and to his inability to find able ministers who would work 
together; he was, in any case, unwilling to give them sufficiait 
independence#^
(ii) The Troops' Treaty of Au/rust 1689
(a) Preliminaries
The fortunes of Christian's hopes for Williaa's help 
against the duke have been sketched; his change of heart came 
too late to appear very convincing, and the offers which Plessen 
brought with him to London were too vague and tentative.
These and lente's assurances to Heinsius, that as soon as the 
Holstein-Gottorp problem was settled his master would join the 
Allies in exchange for guarantees of his security, looked too
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much, like a bribe for support to be welcomed with, any enthus­
iasm. But William had also to look to the future, to a time 
when, as he hoped, the threat of war would recede from the 
Baltic. He could not afford to antagonize Denmark irretriev­
ably by too brusque a rejection of her proffered help. Troops 
might well be had from the inflated Danish army and an alliance
of some kind, of which mention was made in Molesworth's 
6instructions, would at least draw Christian from Prance’s 
side. But nothing could be expected until negotiations at 
Altona were completed, and the susceptibilities of the outward­
ly more friendly Sweden could not be offended by talks with 
a power with whom she seemed on the point of war. No more 
was promised to Plessen than that an envoy would be sent to 
Copenhagen, and he complained to his government that nothing
was to be hoped for while the English king was under the
7influence of reports spread by Denmark's enemies.
In May lente made a more specific offer to Heinsius of
Q
as many as 20,000 men and 40 ships. Paul von Fuchs, the 
Brandenburg mediator at Altona, brought back with him to Hamburg
Qfrom Copenhagen about the same time an offer of 10,000 men, 
and the duke of IIolstein-Pl/n told Heemskerck that he was 
empowered to offer the same n u m b e r H e i n s i u s  entertained 
grave doubts about the seriousness of Danish professions,'1"1' 
but Goes urged his principals to negotiate for military aid 
as soon as Altona was concluded and warned that France would ' /r’12pay well for such, and the pensionary himself argued before 
the States-General that its acceptance would bind Denmark more
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closely to the Allies and enable Sweden and Brunswick-Lttneburg
13troops to march against France,  ^ Finally La Forest brought 
with him instructions to intimate to his friend and fellow 
Huguenot Schomberg Christian’s willingness to hire out 
8 - 10,000 men for a limited period, if a sufficient guarantee 
could be given against French attack, and to invite proposals^ 
Thus, although the possibility of obtaining troops from 
both Northern Crowns had been mooted in allied circles from 
the beginning of the war and some proposals made to their 
envoys,  ^the real initiative came from Denmark herself,
A straightforward offer of this kind suited Christian well.
It was an earnest of friendship for William without any 
deeper commitments. Nor would he have to give up all hope 
of French subsidies,for which he was still negotiating, and 
it might even enhance in Louis' eyes the value of Denmark's 
alliance or neutrality. He could still watch the fortunes 
of war from a safe distance and wait for any opportunity 
which might offer itself. A large body of men, which he 
could never hope to support, especially if France continued 
to refuse to pay subsidies under the 1682 treaty, would be 
maintained and,with care and luck,a profit might even be 
made on the deal. William on his side could certainly use 
reliable troops in the Irish campaign, to which he was now 
committed, but their political rather than their military 
importance seems to have weighed the more heavily with him."^ 
Their departure would help to ease tension in the North, and 
an agreement of this kind might act as a prelude to a closer
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alliance. This was also Christian's wish, hut over the 
aims of such an alliance there was, unfortunately, to prove 
to he no close agreement.
la Forest communicated the offer to William in an 
interview, where he was supported hy Schoraherg and prince
"JO
George. As has been seen, the king promised a speedy
answer, and Nottingham said immediately afterwards that
7 - 8,000 troops for Ireland would be welcome. la Forest
replied that negotiations could open as soon as the Holstein-
Gottorp crisis was past and reported to Copenhagen that William
was unwilling to commit himself without consulting his allies,
19although Plessen found him more favourably inclined. For
a time it was uncertain where negotiations were to take place.
Molesworth was informed only that they were being entered 
POinto , and there seems to have been some thought of entrusting
21them to Heemskerck, but powers and instructions were drawn
22up for the English envoy on July 12th, a week after news of 
the Altona treaty reached London,2  ^and Thomas Fotherby, who 
had been Sylvius' secretary,2^ was sent to assist him in 
negotiations, supervise the implementation of terms and 
return with the troops. William wrote personally to Christian 
thanking him for the offer.2^
Molesworth was to prove a far from ideal choice for the 
delicate tasks which lay before him. The confiscation of 
his Irish estates by James provide a reasonable pledge of ■*" 
his loyalty and interest in the swift conquest of the island, 
but he was inexperienced,highly irascible, out spoUosn and
17
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2 gcontemptuous of things foreign. This was his first and
last diplomatic mission, but even after his return he was to
do a disservice to Anglo-Danish relations with his 'Account 
07of Denmark'. He landed at Elsinore on July 8th and 
immediately reported a sincere desire for a long peace and 
a warm welcome, but, at the same time, that Denmark was 'an
extream poor country and mony is omnipotent, & may push them
*
to do things visibly contrary to their interest..and... Fr.
mony workes miracles among pub ministers...' His fear
of the power of French money was destined to affect the course
of the forthcoming negotiations. like Duncombe in Stockholm
he failed to secure the public audience planned for July 15th
because he objected to certain demands made in new regulations
for the reception of foreign diplomats. He feared that if he
gave way it would be claimed that his master was anxious to get
himself recognized at any cost, and he made counter-claims
29which the Danes could not accept. He was finally allowed
30to be received in private audience at 5 p.m. on July 27th,
by which time Christian had heard of William's needs from 
31La Forest.
. V
Molesworth had been instructed to refuse to pay levy money,
since the men had already been raised, and to tell the Danes
that 'we can be furnished with the same Number of Regiments by
the king of Sweden upon much easier Terms, whereof Wee have
32
received assurance by his Ministers in Our Court', an offer and 
assurance of which this is the only evidence. Christian was 
not happy about sending his troops so far as Ireland and ordered
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La Forest to press for their employment in the low Countries 
while an equal number of allied troops were sent across the 
Channel after the Swedish example in 1688. He had hoped that 
negotiations for a defensive alliance to provide additional 
security on favourable terms would proceed pari passu, but to 
save time he agreed to conclude the troops* agreement first.^ 
M  The Negotiations
Fotherby arrived on August 1st, and on the next day
X  AMolesworth asked for commissioners to be appointed. On August 
5th he opened his negotiations with Heventlow, Jessen and
X .CEhrenschild, and everything was settled in ten days and four 
meetings. The Danes began by claiming that, in view of the 
lateness of the year, the troops should be transported to 
England first instead of direct to Ireland, that they should 
act as one body under the commander-in-chief, and be returned 
to Denmark within three months if she were to be attacked, 
together with equivalent aid from William. The main difficult­
ies, however, as was to be expected, came over the financial 
provisions. The Danes agreed to reduce the sum demanded from
400,000 Rd. to 500,000 Rd. if the troops were transported to 
England, but Molesworth refused to agree that the whole of this 
sum should be paid after the embarkation and offered half then 
and half on arrival, with sureties for payment. The English
envoy maintained his demand for transport all the way to Ireland
37
under a Danish convoy, for which the commissioners asked 600,000Rd.
On August 6th the Danish council reviewed the general European 
situation and decided'to throw in Denmark's lot with the Allies
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and come to terms with Molesworth.^8 This outwardly momentous 
decision, in view of the fluid and opportunist nature of Danish 
foreign policy, meant very little. On August 10th Molesworth 
told the ministers that he could agree to payment of the return 
transport of the troops only if Denmark were attacked and asked 
for vacancies among the officers to he filled by William on the 
Danish commander's recommendation and not by the latter on 
Schomberg's. His attempts to persuade them to prepare the 
troops for embarkation before the signing of the agreement
XQproved fruitless.
Martangis had meanwhile been working had to thwart the 
English negotiations. Christian'refused the subsidized 
neutrality treaty he offered unless Sweden were included,and 
Louis in turn continued to refuse him the remainder of the 
subsidies owing to Denmark under the 1682 treaty,^ without 
which she could not afford to keep her forces up to pre-Altona 
strength. The French envoy tried bribery and harped on the 
shame of hiring out to France's enemies troops raised with 
French help,^ but, since France could not promise to support 
them longer, Danish pride had to be sacrificed to more material 
considerations. Even Christian Albrekt's Tjzfnningen project 
received Martangis' encouragement in hopes of causing the Danish
A Oking to hesitate.
Molesworth's knowledge and fear of the effect of this 
activity by the enemy led him to give way to several of the  ^
Danish demands in an effort to reach a speedy settlement,even 
though it meant exceeding his instructions. He agreed to the
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appointment of officers by the Danish, commander and left open
the question of payment of the transport of the returning
troops until the alliance negotiations, which, it was agreed
43in the treaty, should commence immediately. The terms
signed on August 15th demanded 240,000 Rd. for conveyance to
England, or 325,000 Rd. if to Ireland, at William's option.^
The English envoy was proud of his achievement and declared
to lord Nottingham, *1 have done a great thing for the good of
Christendom in generall and of his Maty and his kingdoms in
particular, provided he do but think so', but feared both
that the Danes would forbid their troops to go to Ireland after
45
all at the last minute and that the treaty would not be ratified,
William was in fact not particularly impressed with his envoy's
46work and resented the high cost. He ratified the treaty, 
however, when Greg arrived with it on September 3rd for both 
political and military reasons.^ He merely insisted on 
Molesworth's original demand concerning the appointment of 
officers in article 5 and determined that the troops should be 
sent to Scotland, whence English transports would carry them
AO
to Ireland. Greg reached Copenhagen again on September 22nd,
and Christian agreed to the amendment and ratified in his turn
49on September 30th.
(c) Aftermath
The Danish king had been so uncertain of the outcome that,
on the day Greg came to London, he had written to J.H. lente
in Berlin offering the same troops to the elector for less
50money if William refused them, but some preparations were
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nevertheless made even before William's decision was known.
On September 17th Christian went to Copenhagen to supervise
the sailing of the transports to Ribe, where embarkation was
to take place, and issued orders for the assembly and composition
51of the troops, put under the direction of Sehested, Brandt
and Shiers^ on the 20th.^ On the next day he set out for
54.South Jutland and the scene of operations. Molesworth
inspected the troops, whose quality and cheapness he lauded
in his reports, and followed on the 27th to complete the work
55of ratification.  ^ Command was given, at William’s request,
to his friend duke Ferdinand Wilhelm of Wurtemberg-Neustadt5
with the rank of lieutenant-general. la Forest and the
Brandenburger Tettau were appointed majors-general of'horse
57and foot respectively. It had originally been intended "
to have the troops ready at Ribe or Listeidyb on September 20th
58and to embark them on the 22nd, but this proved wildly 
optimistic. Not until October 8th could Christian hold a 
general inspection, and a further week elapsed before the foot 
began to be put on board. The fleet of six royal and seventy- 
two private transports, protected by four large and four smaller 
warships, finally set sail for Scotland on November 6th, when
a dozen ships almost immediately ran aground and a fresh start
60had to be made. Storms separated the fleet and, when 
Flamborough Head was sighted three days later, the main body 
had been reduced to a strength of forty-six.^ Rear-admiral
tf f i P.Christopher von Stocken found it impossible to make for 
Scotland and put into the Humber on the 12th. Disembarkation
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began a week later, by which time only eighteen ships, including 
three warships, were still missing.^
The repeated postponement of the date of departure and 
the slowness of operations aroused anger and suspicion on 
both sides of the North Sea. William had to give up any 
hopes he had of using the troops before the 1690 campaign 
and to resign himself to support them all winter for no return 
of service, while James entrenched himself in Ireland. French 
intrigue and above all French gold was widely blamed, and it 
was commonly feared that the revival of the dispute with 
Holstein-Gottorp, the Saxe-Lauenburg quarrel and the delay 
in sending Swedish treaty aid would be used as excuses for 
further delay. ^ Dijkveldt told la Fouleresse bluntly that, 
if such a retardation had been anticipated, aid would have 
been sought instead from Luneburg and Hesse.^ Any good will
created by the offer and the speedy conclusion of the treaty 
was dissipated by the manner of its implementation.
Molesworth returned to Copenhagen, leaving Fotherby behind
f i f iwith the troops, on October 23rd. He had paid the first half
of the transport money before embarkation in the hope of
hastening operations and was highly dissatisfied with the place
67chosen for embarkation and with the handling of supplies. '
Fotherby turned to Wtirtemburg for remedy, but the general
refused to institute an enquiry or to be present when a
68protest, was made. He was, however, present when the English 
commissary sprang it by surprise on October 31st. Erandt 
'looked as red as a Turkey cock* and claimed that it should
87
be ignored since Fotherby had no powers, but the latter,
before sailing with the troops, sent it to Kolesworth, who
69himself presented it on November 5th. Christian had already 
written to William a week earlier apologizing for the delay, 
and on November 14th the Danish commissioners at Ribe wrote 
to their king defending themselves against the slanders they 
claimed had been perpetrated against them and asking for judge­
ment before the co^^ncil and that a complaint should be sent 
70to William. Molesworth was asked to substantiate the charges
and la Fouleresse ordered to complain against the English
envoy's biassed reports, which were, it was claimed, wholly
to blame for the situation.' William wrote defending
his envoy on December 19th, and La Fouleresse, although refused
copies of Molesworth's despatches, was promised details of
the accusations, only to be told on December 30th that these
72had been forwarded to Copenhagen. The whole question was
in fact soon overshadowed by others more crucial, but some
attempt was made to exact compensation by delaying payment of
a portion of the second instalment of transport costs and by
securing recruits without charge, and even as a condition for
73further payment s.
It does seem clear that considerable incompetence was 
shown in the choice of place for the troops' embarkation and 
in supply and general organization, that the programming of 
operation was over-optimistic, and that there was lethargy 
in execution, which may not have been unconnected with
•S'
Ehrenschild's negotiations with the Gottorp envoys in Hamburg. 
But, while Greg reported that 'I have some passages y^ give 
me great reason to. suspect y^ some of those employ'd in 
preparing things for ye Transportation, did their utmost 
endeavour to retard it’ he fails to supply any further 
details, and the charges of corruption remain unsubstantiated. 
Bad weather doubtless played its part and might well have 
been used to postpone sailings until too late if there had 
existed a deliberate decision to sabotage the treaty. The 
troops arrived in good , shape in spite of their buffetings 
and were praised by William when he inspected those who had 
arrived at York on December 6th. Their late arrival also 
meant that they escaped the sickness which attacked Schomberg's 
men that winter in Ireland, where supplies were already short.
After wintering around York they were disembarked - the 
horse from Glasgow, the foot from Hoylake - in March 1690, 
by which time all but a handful of the missing men had been 
accounted for. They suffered their first casualties at 
Balingarry in May and distinguished themselves at the Boyne 
in July and at Marlborough's assault on Cork and Kinsale in 
September
(ii) Alliance Negotiations
(a) Beginnings
It was hoped by both William and Christian that the hire 
of troops would be only the beginning of more far-reaching 
negotiations, but efforts to secure closer ties during the 
ensuing months were to meet with a discouraging series of
89
setbacks. The English king, while remaining justifiably 
suspicious of Danish motives, welcomed any opportunity of 
winning over the principal client still remaining to France 
and of minimizing the threat of a diversion in the North.
He was not, however, prepared to purchase Danish support at 
any price, especially that of antagonizing Sweden. Nor was 
he to find it within his powers to fulfil many of the condition 
demanded, especially those which also involved his allies.
To Christian and his ministers a defensive alliance with the 
Maritime Powers would form an important link in the security 
chain they were trying to build up in this period. While 
the course of the war remained so uncertain, however, there 
was no reason why they should hurry into an offensive alliance 
against France, and they intended to squeeze every possible 
advantage from the Allies' predicament. Since entry into 
the war would bring to an end all hope of Louis' subsidies, 
an equivalent would have to be provided by his enemies and 
on better terms than could be expected for the simple neutral­
ity with which the French king seemed to remain content. A 
settlement of Danish claims against the United Provinces and 
of trade disputes with them must be reached to Denmark's 
advantage and to support this a joint alliance with both' 
William's dominions would be insisted upon. Some help might 
also be insisted upon against the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, 
the duke of Celle in the Saxe-lauenburg dispute and the duke 
of Hanover's demands for the creation of a ninth electorate. 
Concessions to such demands would signify a very high value
90
placed on Denmark’s friendship but,unless it were paid,a 
breach with France would not be worth her while.
Danish representatives had offered closer alliances 
and even entry into the war on frequent occasions during . 
the early months of 1689,^ but had failed to make it clear 
whether these were to be expected immediately after a settle­
ment had been reached at Altona or on the expiry of Denmark's 
treaty with France in March 1690. La Forest's offer and 
William's impatience with the duke's allies improved the 
prospects of an approach to Denmark. Molesworth's instructions 
of June 6th contained a cautious injunction to inquire 'as 
dextrously and with as little noise as you can endeavour...
whether they are willing to engage with Us and Our Aliys in
T8the common cause...', Nottingham proposed an alliance to 
la Forest as well as a troops treatyj^ and Plessen found the
o n
English king more favourably inclined before he left.
(b) The United Provinces (June - December 1689)
Immediately after, the ratification of Altona Lente was 
ordered to remind the States-General of his previous offer 
and to suggest that Heemskerck might be employed in negotia­
tions while he was in the vicinity, but at the same time not 
to show too much enthusiasm in case the Dutch brought forward 
demands for repayment of Danish debts and to insist that any 
alliance should be accompanied by a commercial settlement .81
The fate of previous trade negotiations between the two 
countries did not augur well for any fresh set of talks if 
Denmark should continue to insist on the latter condition.’
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Heemskerck reported a Danish, willingness to negotiate, 
and Reventlow pressed both Goes and Molesworth to conclude
Op
a defensive alliance to cover the loss of the troops.
Little response was aroused in the United Provinces, and new 
grounds for suspicion were provided by Stockfleth’s approaches 
to Sweden for joint mediation, of which Swedish envoys 
immediately notified the Allies.®^ When Lente informed 
Heinsius in September of the ratification of the troops' 
treaty and Denmark's intention to open alliance negotiations 
with England, the pensionary asked innocently if the envoy 
had orders to conduct similar talks with the States-General. 
Lente expressed his surprise in view of his previous assurances 
and demanded the preliminary settlement of mutual claims, 
which Goes had already mentioned in Copenhagen. ^ He reported: 
that Heinsius seemed favourably inclined but afraid of offend­
ing Sweden,and was sent on October 5th a copy of the project 
which Bodmyn had drawn up in 1680.with orders to say that the 
troops' agreement had already brought Denmark to the edge of 
belligerency and that it would not take much to bring her into 
the war,if the subsidies offered were sufficient and bhe were
helped in her efforts to bring the duke of Holstein-Gottorp 
85to reason.  ^ Heinsius promised to consult William and 
proposed an offensive alliance becoming defensive after the
war, to which Christian expressed himself agreeable.rpy-e 
Danish king did, however, object to the holding Of a conference, 
where his envoy should make his offers, as too public. It
was, he claimed,for the Dutch to draw up a project and he would
92
prefer the sending of a special delegation to Copenhagen, 
for which the fast aporoaching expiry of the 1688 preliminary 
trade treaty could .serve as an excuse, ' The pensionary and 
Dijkvelt objected to this the need to consult the individual 
provinces and claimed that Goes had been sent orders to invite 
Denmark to enter the Grand Alliance, to which an alliance
with the United Provinces could then form a supplement if
, ,88required.
Lente suspected that this invitation, made to Sweden at
the same time, together with that to attend the proposed
congress of allied ministers in the Hague, on condition of
a preliminary declaration of intentions, was made merely to
test reactions, and, as he realized, it would bypass all his
government's conditions for an offensive alliance,which, he
89insisted, must come first. Goes received the same answer 
from Christian, who added that Denmark would have to be more 
certain of the advantages to be gained before making such a 
sacrifice. There was, however, interest in Copenhagen in 
finding out how far the Maritime Powers were willing to go 
to secure Danish support as well as an anxiety not to 'be out­
manoeuvred by Sweden. In a conference on December 6th 
Reventlow made more specific conditions - a defensive alliance 
based on that of 1674 and a commercial treaty based on that
concluded in 1684 but unratified. Denmark could then, he
91said, offer 12,000 troops for subsidies. On December 14th 
lente was finally sent powers to draw up a project with the 
deputies' of the States-General, but was forbidden to commit
92his sovereign to anything oh paper.
There does seem to have "been a swing of Danish opinion
in favour of the Allies in the autumn of 1689, encouraged by
military successes on the Rhine and in the Netherlands and "by
Louis' intransigence in the matter of subsidies. Yet
relations with the Emperor and the Maritime Powers were never
Christian's sole concern. Negotiations continued with
Martangis, who was promised that, if the subsidies provided
for by the treaty of 1682 were paid, no further engagements
would be undertaken until it expired, and attempts were still
93made to interest Sweden in joint m e d i a t i o n . T h e  effort
by William to ban all neutral.trade with France was also
beginning to counterbalance factors in the Allies' favour.
Much suspicion of Denmark and fear of Swedish reactions
remained to dictate caution in both London and the Hague .and
encouraged Christian's 'wait and see* policy.
(c) Molesworth*s Talks (August 1689 - February 1690)
It is not therefore surprising to find that negotiations
for an English alliance made no greater progress that those
for a Dutch, even if no account were to be taken of their
close interdependence. It will be remembered that Christian
had agreed only with difficulty to postponing'a defensive
alliance until after the troops treaty,and then only if
95negotiations commenced immediately.  ^ No great hurry was, 
however, taken in London to instruct and empower Molesworth.^' 
On August 9th he was promised orders on treaties of alliance 
and commerce and William's views on the projects for these
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drawn up by Bodmyn and Sylvius respectively, and on the 16th
Nottingham wrote that he was to 'endeavour to go on with both
together or rather that of Commerce first, or at least to
sign both at a time, for we shall get better terms probably
of Commerce in hopes of an Alliance than we shall do after the
96Alliance is perfected.' A copy of Bodmyn's project with
the desired emendations was dispatched in the middle of
September after discussion with the Dutch ambassadors, who
were given a copy and urged to arrange for negotiations on 
97similar lines. The clauses in the original binding the
party not attached to go to war against the aggressor, if
so requested, within two months of receiving a call for aid
from its ally and meanwhile to attempt mediation and supply
a certain number of ships and troops were unchanged but,
Molesworth was ordered, if the Danes refused to send any
contingent during the war with France,'the Obligation of
sending them Succours commence not on either side till after
this war...* The help specified - in the first separate
article of the project - 10,000 troops and twenty ships from
England and 6,000 troops and twelve ships from Denmark - was
to be cut by half 'because tis most likely to be performed
by Denmarc' Powers for Molesworth were drawn up at the
same time,but do not seem to have been despatched until early 
99in December , and not until December 4th did Molesworth reveal 
his instructions to a commission consisting of Reventlow, ! 
Juel, Jessen and Ribe.^®^ The bad feelings and negotiations 
resulting from the execution of the troops' treaty must be
95
held largely responsible for the delay.
Reventlow informed the English envoy on December 16th
that, if a treaty based'on the project were to come into
operation at once, further English offers and stipulations
would have to be made. Molesworth pleaded the need to write
for further instructions on this but asked how much Denmark
wanted for further troops. He was told that this would have
to form the subject of a separate alliance and that she could
provide 16,000 troops for 800,000 Rd. or at least 700,000 Rd.
and support for Danish claims against the Emperor, Spain and
the United P r o v i n c e s . T h i s  offer was repeated in the
instructions drawn up for I-Ians Henrik: Ahlefeldt til Neuenhof,
who had been chosen to replace la Forest in London and arrived
102there in January. Goes complained that Molesworth would
not give him details of his negotiations because the Danish 
commissioners had insisted on secrecy until the United Provinces 
had declared their views on a defensive alliance, and the terms 
were finally communicated to the States-General by William via 
Citters. ' Molesworth in his turn claimed that Goes had no 
orders to join him.10^ Dursley explained that these could not 
be sent owing to the difficulties over the Danish and Dutch 
monetary claims against each other but also that Goes, a mere 
resident, was not trusted with such important negotiations and
that such negotiations as were taking place were being con-
103 7centrated in the Hague. The English envoy was instructed
on December 20th to concert with Goes in pressing Denmark to
join the Grand Alliance, an invitation which he had criticized
96
to demand sacrifices of Christian without offering anything 
T OPin return. .
In a new conference on January 8th he agreed to discuss 
Bodmyn’s project without reference to mutual military obliga­
tions during the war but proposed the addition of a separate 
article excluding French trade from article 4, which promised 
freedom of trade and communication, for the duration of 
the war. It was decided in a council meeting to agree to
certain restrictions but to insist on the postponement of any 
further obligations. It was hoped that in this way French 
subsidies could continue to be claimed. Nothing further 
could be decided until the outcome of the negotiations with
“I AO
Sweden and the Emperor was known. Molesworth was informed
of this decision immediately and given a trade project record­
ing the stage reached in negotiations with Sylvius,in which
the privileges accorded the ’defence ships’ had again played 
109a large part. On February 3rd he intimated to the Danes
William’s desire to concentrate negotiations in the Hague, 
where the States-General and the Emperor could be constilted
!
on the sum demanded, towards which they would have to contribute, 
In that case, he was told, the English king would have to use 
his good offices with the States-General and guarantee not j
only the payment of their debts after the war and settlement of 
their trade differences with Denmark but also the granting by 
the Emperor of a toll on the Elbe. Molesworth took these 
demands ad referendum,and the Copenhagen negotiations came to
when he had been first informed of it, as one which seemed
97
a standstill. He feared, quite justly, that Denmark was
in no hurry to conclude and intended to delay in the hope
of receiving really advantageous offers.110 Leijonclo drew
the same conclusions and attributed Danish lack of enthusiasm
to the ban on neutral trade, a fear of losing her neutral
illstatus and, with it,her chances of mediation. The reports
sent by Ahlefeldt after his arrival - that there was no anxiety
in England to make an alliance immediately owing to a shortage
of money and a desire to see the outcome of the Irish campaign 
112first. - could only have strengthened Christian's resolve
and he and lente were ordered in February not to hurry their 
i nnegotiations. v
(c) The End of the First Stage
After the receipt of his orders of December 14th Lente 
spoke to Dijkvelt and again emphasized the necessity for a 
preliminary settlement of commercial disputes. He was, he 
said, not very hopeful of Christian's willingness to break 
with France,especially in view of the ban and the failure 
to hold up the Altona guarantee, but at the beginning of the 
new year he was instructed to say that Denmark was prepared 
for a breach in exchange for subsidies, suitable guarantees 
and trade compensation.11^ Meanwhile,in a conference with 
the foreign affairs deputies at the end of December, complica­
tions soon arose over the choice of a basis for a commercial 
treaty,and lente was given a Dutch project. He then presented 
a list of claims totalling over 7,000,000 Rd.,which he promised 
would be reduced to 1,500,000 Rd. if the United Provinces would
98
drop their counter-claims. To a fresh invitation to join 
the Grand Alliance he said again that the States-General must 
detail its terms, settle all disputes, allot quarters for Danish 
troops and provide subsidies. On the last two points Heinsius 
replied that the first was not within their competence and 
that no further subsidies could be afforded. He then broke
off the talk on the pretext that England would have to be
115
consulted. Negotiations thus came to a standstill in
February 1690 in both Copenhagen and the Hague, In the 
Danish capital the conclusion of an offensive alliance with 
England had been made dependent on agreement with the United 
Provinces and the Bnperor, who would have to contribute their 
shares of the subsidies demanded. William ordered Paget 
in mid-January to get the Emperor to instruct Berka, his 
envoy in the Hague, to consult with other ministers in the 
Congress on the apportioning of joint subsidies to the Northern 
Crowns, but, when Dursley raised the subject in March, he was 
told that the Bnperor had no money to spare and that it was feared
that Denmark’s entry alone would drive Sweden into the arms
116
of Prance. , With this all hope of Denmark’s belligerency
had to be abandoned for the time being. For a defensive
alliance to come into operation after the war William demanded
a settlement on French trade, and any pact with the States-
General was dependent on agreement over commercial differences
and debts, neither of which promised a speedy settlement.
The renewal of Denmark’s defensive alliance with Sweden on 
117
February 1st had strengthened Christian’s position and
99
made an alliance with the Maritime Powers so much the less
vital, while the secrecy in which the negotiations and the
terms of the treaty were shrouded had caused grave suspicions,
especially in view of Sweden’s increasingly unsatisfactory
attitude. Neither side, however, abandoned all hopes of an
agreement. Denmark continued the negotiations with the
Bnperor which she had begun in Vienna in February. To him she
also offered 15 - 16,000 troops, in exchange for a toll on the
Elbe until the compensation she claimed had been offered to her
for her part in the Dutch war of 1672-9 had been paid,
opposition to the creation of a ninth electorate, expulsion of
Celle from Saxe-Lauenburg and support in her claims against
118
Holstein-Gottorp and the States-General. Talks on French
trade continued in the Hague, and preparations were made to
send the Dutchman Amerongen to join Molesworth in an attempt to
settle some of the commercial differences outstanding between
119
Denmark and his country.
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Chapter 4
The Quest for Swedish Help (January 1689 - June 1690)
(i) Swedish Treaty Aid 
(a) Negotiations in 1689
On January 1st 1689 Rumpf in Stockholm was ordered by 
the States-General to notify the Swedish government of France's 
unprovoked attack and have instructions sent to Gabriel 
Oxenstierna to negotiate for the despatch of the troops and 
ships owed under the guarantee treaties of 1681 and 1683
The chancellor simply promised in reply that orders would be
Psent as soon as Charles XI retxirned to his capital. Both 
Heinsius and Dijkvelt mentioned the matter to Gabriel Oxen­
stierna at the same time and were told that the obligations 
would be duly fulfilled. When, however, Rumpf's request was 
discussed in the Swedish chancery in February, Lindskold, 
supported by Gyldenstolpe, claimed that IIolstein-Gottorp was 
a prior emergency and that the United Provinces must first 
help Sweden under the 1686 defensive alliance and their guarantee 
of Northern peace in 1660. Gabriel Oxenstierna was ordered to
V
answer in this vein and to express surprise that the 1686 treaty 
had not been mentioned by Rumpf, since Sweden had assumed that 
the conventions of 1681 and 1683 had 'as good as' ceased to be 
operative when the crisis which had called them into being had 
been settled by the Twenty Year Truce and that they had in any 
case been superseded by the alliance of 1686, which was intended 
to renew all previous agreements. There were even, he was
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French declaration of war, but it was considered in Sweden's
interests to agree to help her ally,and the envoy was to hold
out hope that matters could be settled once Sweden's hands 
3were free. The claim that Sweden could not weaken herself 
further while war with Denmark threatened was in fact a reason­
able one, and, in view of her previous earnests of good will 
for William's cause, which gave considerable excuse to hope for 
her eventual entry into the war at his side, there was little 
reason at this stage to doubt the good faith behind such promises 
and little more was heard of the matter until the Altona agree­
ment had been signed.
Immediately news of the latter was received in Stockholm 
Bengt Oxenstierna promised the aid as soon as the treaty between 
Denmark and Gottorp had been ratified and again that all would 
be made ready meanwhile.^ Instructions were sent to Gabriel 
Oxenstierna to invite the States-General to submit proposals 
for the various points which had to be settled before the troops 
and ships could be despatched and especially to find out whether 
the troops were to be divided or whether an arrangement was to 
be reached with Leopold, who was also entitled to them under 
the 1683 treaties, to keep all 6,000 men in one body, a solution 
which Sweden would prefer, how the ships were to be used and 
what was to be arranged about the carrying of flags and aboutr 
salutes, especially delicate matters when the union of royal 
and republican units and England’s claim to a salute in'the
told, doubts whether the latter was strictly applicable to the
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Channel were involved. At the sane time he was to point out
that only with the provision of the Altona guarantee could
the Holstein-Gottorp dispute Tee considered settled and Sweden's 
5position safe. It soon became obvious that detailed and 
possibly lengthy negotiations would have to precede any move 
by the Swedish troops and ships, and hopes of receiving them 
in time to take part in the 1689 campaign faded rapidly.
Even if the duke of Gottorp's affairs were quicker settled 
and the details for the junction of ships and troops arranged 
to the Swedes' satisfaction, they were united in their reluct­
ance to send them so late in 'the year. Gabriel Oxenstierna 
was told on August 9th to argue that they would be better 
preserved in Sweden itself over the winter and could then be
r
despatched in good time for 1690. The chancellor, although
he feared that any delay beyond this would lose Sweden too
much credit and lead to her isolation, supported this argument
and explained to his master that negotiations could in any case
be expected to delay matters until the spring. William feared
that .Sweden would be unable to support a.contingent of 6,000
men abroad, and this was confirmed by Duncombe, who reported
that 'suche a charge to be borne by this crowne (for so runs
ye treaty) is a difficulty next to insuperable' and that there
8
was little likelihood of aid in 1689. Bengt Oxenstierna 
again echoed the Swedish concern with the expense,involved in 
a conversation with Rumpf in September, when he claimed that 
Sweden was not obliged to support her troops beyond her own
103
frontiers, but this was a contention which Rumpf had already 
been instructed to expect and for which he had been prepared 
with references to the relevant articles in the alliance of 
1640.9
Gabriel Oxenstierna*s absence in London delayed the
opening of the talks, and Heinsius expressed his impatience
openly to the Swedish legation-secretary Friesendorff in
mid-August and proposed of himself the replacement of the
ships, over which most of the troubles in negotiation were
expected, by extra troops. Friesendorff replied simply that
everything would have to await his superior's return.1^ Yifhen
the latter did arrive back in the Hague on September 23xd he
applied to the pensionary for details of precedents on the
junction of allied fleets and repeated all the old excuses
for delay, which, Sweden was anxious to point out, was not due
to any inclination for France or to the negotiations with
Denmark, as the Allies seemed to suspect Heinsius and the
States-General continued to urge the immediate despatch of the
12aid in view of the danger of a French winter offensive, but 
William, highly dissatisfied by this time with Swedish conduct, 
recognized reluctantly that it was too late to expect it 1689 
and that the best that could be done was to work for an early 
start in 1690. He informed the States-General through 
Citters that he wished the troops to serve in Flanders but 
that he was not hopeful of a settlement on the ships since 
differences over salutes, flags and precedence, which involved
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questions of national prestige, were likely to prove insuperable, 
or at least to lead to interminable haggling.' He left it to 
the United Provinces to make arrangements for the Swedes' 
junction with the Dutch fleet and promised to take counsel on 
that with the English.
Negotiations with Gabriel Oxenstierna finally opened on
November 1st, when the Swede listed the points to be settled.
The Allies must agree among themselves, he claimed, where the
troops were to be used, how they were to be commanded and how
the council of war was to be organized; his master, he repeated,
wanted them to act as one body. Concerning the naval aid he
wanted to know, beside the proposals on flags and salutes, how
it was proposed to treat Swedish officers in council and action
and how prizes were to be divided. He could not promise that
the troops would be sent before May 1st, which was much too
late for the Allies' liking, and,to Heinsius' proposal that the
troops be sent first to the Netherlands and then allocated to
their sphere of operations,he protested that this would waste
ISboth time and money. On the ships Heinsius claimed-,- in a 
further conference on December 26th, that their small number 
made them mere auxiliaries and as such wholly subordinate to 
Dutch command, that they should salute the English fleet in the 
same manner as the Dutch did and that the Swedish officers 
should sit on the left of the council board with the Dutch. 
Oxenstierna countered with a proposal that they should form a 
separate squadron brought up to strength with Dutch ships
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Y/hen the year ended neither side seemed any nearer agreement
. j
than they had been when the questions, were first raised.
(b) Bidal’s Mission to Stockholm (January - April 1690)
At the beginning of 1690 Sweden was causing great concern
in allied circles. She avowed her intention of forming convoys
to protect her trade^ and Denmark was known to be urging more
17drastic measures. There were widespread rumours of negotia­
tions with France for a neutrality treaty and even that this
1 fihad already been concluded. In such circumstances it is
understandable that the arrival of a French agent in Stockholm
19caused an uproar.
ILieut.-Col. Benoit Bidal, brother of the French resident
in Hamburg, arrived at the end of December 1689, ostensibly
on private business concerned with the family estate of
Harsefeld in Bremen, which had been involved in the reduction,
but in fact to encourage Sweden, if he found her unwilling to
enter the war or at least send large numbers of troops to
Germany, in a strict neutrality, to persuade Charles and his
ministers that the sending of aid to the Allies was wholly
incompatible writh this, with a hint that all chance of mediation
might thereby be lost, and to build up á strong pro-French party.
He was empowered to offer 300,000 Hd. for a strict neutrality
and security by means of an alliance with Denmark. He found
much in his favour. William’s attempted ban of neutral trade 
22with France provided an admirable excuse for refusing aid on 
the grounds that the United Provinces had violated the treaty
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on their side. Charles was most reluctant to part with any 
more of his troops, especially in view of the treatment accorded 
to those lent under the 1688 treaty,^ and to incur the cost
24-
of their maintenance, which was estimated at 5 - 600,000 Rd.p.a. 
His honour was offended by the Allies* demands on the procedure 
to be followed on and after the union of his ships with their 
navies. ■ Other factors were, however, not so favourable to 
Bidal’s purposes. The Swedish king's sensitiveness on points 
of honour also made him unwilling to be accused of breaking 
treaty obligations which he considered binding, and his 
chancellor could well argue that his failure to send the aid
nCwould be equally fatal to hopes of mediation. Even the
presence of Bielke in Stockholm from January to April was a
mixed blessing, since there was considerable jealously between
him and Bidal and the Frenchman's attempts to win over Oxen-
stierna, whom he contacted through Vellingk, rather than to
secure his downfall did not endear him to the chancellor's
rivals. It seems certain that the money which Bidal spent
and the promises which he made, in excess of his instructions,
before he departed on May 1st did not bring commensurate results,
although the extent to which he succeeded in building up a
united pro-French party in Sweden is a subject of dispute among
28
Swedish historians. The arguments for neutrality and against 
the sending of ships and troops were powerful enough without 
the backing of French intrigue, and the course of Swedish policy 
was largely determined by the time he arrived.
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This was made evident in the debate which took place in
the royal council in March and April 1690. Oxenstierna put
up little opposition to the arguments of Wrede and Lindskold
that no aid should be sent until the Maritime Powers conceded
oQSweden her rights as a neutral.  ^ He went so far as to draw 
up, on March 13th,a memorial which supported the sending of the 
troops asked for with a further 6,000 in place of the ships, 
whose despatch would halve the Swedish fleet while Denmark's 
remained intact and partially mobilized. But' this force was 
then to form the nucleus of an army, Joined by a number of German 
princedoms, to impose peace terms on both sides and restore the 
European balance of power, which was threatened by the array 
#of might ranged against France.^ The genuineness of the 
sentiments expressed herein has caused considerable controversy, 
and it is possible, as Bidal suspected, that the chancellor 
was playing on Charles' vanity to enable aid to be sent at all, 
but they are not wholly inconsistent with his known support 
for the maintenance of a balance of power. The plan could 
hardly have been put into operation before the results- of the 
1690 campaign were apparent, which gave plenty of time for 
second thoughts. In spite of all arguments,Charles decided 
that the troops at least should be sent to the Emperor, to whom
the United Provinces had agreed to concede their claims in
32 33March, since he had had no part in William's trade ban. 7/
And noone dared gainsay the king. He was,however, easily
persuaded by Bielke to agree to such delays as could reduce
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the losses of his beloved troops and keep the expense to a
minimum, and the governor-general returned to Germany to
34accomplish what he could in this direction.
(c) Last Attempts to Secure Swedish Ships (January - June 1690)
The ships were, however, quite another matter. Admiral-
general Wachtmeister's request to command them was turned down
by Charles, since it would mean his serving under a Dutch
admiral, and first admiral Sjoblad and finally, as a concession
to the precedence controversy, vice-admiral Ankarstjarna,
33himself of Dutch origin, was appointed, but, with an eye on 
- French reactions, it was insisted that the Swedish flag should 
continue to be flown after the junction, while the Dutch, 
demanded that, as mere auxiliaries, the Swedish ships should
•T  /T
fly the Dutch flag. William, who was equally adamant in
denying the Swedes their flag, proposed as a compromise that
37they should carry no flag at all. This they found quite 
unacceptable, and Gabriel Oxenstierna continued to demand that 
he should be provided with details of the former junctions of 
the ships of a kingdom and of a republic, in spite of Heinsius’ 
claim that no exact precedent for the present case had ever 
been established.^8 William found quite unacceptable 
Oxenstierna*s demands, put forward at a conference on February 
14th, that Swedish officers should have precedence over Dutch 
officers of equivalent rank. The Swedish ships, he claimed,.*' 
must act in precisely the^'same manner as the Dutch and, if.
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Sweden insisted on sending a vice-admiral, he would have to 
serve as a Dutch officer with William's commission, for it 
would create an intolerable situation if a Swede should, as 
the Swedes claimed, act as second-in-command and succeed the 
Dutch admiral in the event of his death.^ Charles was equally 
adamant and wrote to Beijonberg on March 29th that,'in spite 
of OLir great friendship for him, we must yield nothing of our 
sovereignty to the king of England'.^® He also refused Dutch 
requests to send the ships before agreement was reached, and in 
the council on April 8th Stenbock's proposal that they should 
sail as far as Marstrand to await there concessions from the 
Maritime Powers was adopted as a means by which Charles should 
'be applauded and the Allies incur all the b l a m e O r d e r s  
were sent to Ankarstjarna on May 2nd to leave Karlskrona, and 
in the middle of June the squadron finally passed through the 
Sound, not without awakening considerable apprehension in
A ODenmark.
William agreed with Portland in mid-March in rejecting
the proposal, now put forward by Gabriel Oxenstierna, to exchange
ships for troops as likely to umbrage Brandenburg and other
Forth German princes, who v/ould not welcome such an access of
Swedish military power on their side of the Baltic any more
4-3than he would himself. This decision is interesting not 
only as a reflection of the changed attitude to Sweden, whose? 
intentions had become so ambiguous, but also in view of its
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support in Oxenstierna's memorial for just the reason it was 
now rejected by the English king. William also rejected the 
Swedish suggestion that her ships should form part of an 
independent, augmented squadron, since this would so weaken 
the united fleet as to make it numerically inferior to the 
French.44 Even had he not thus vetoed a scheme favourably
A Cconsidered by the States-C-eneral, J any hope of its acceptance
disappeared when the Swedes demanded that the squadron should
be commanded by one of their own officers. An entirely
independent Swedish unit might, it was commonly feared, be
employed not against the French but in defence of Sweden’s
trade with France, in which, case it would be better that the
4.6ships never left Marstrand.
One final, desparate effort was made by Ileinsius in mid- 
June, when he communicated to Gabriel Oxenstierna a proposal 
by Wilde that the Swedish ships should be used to destroy the 
large French fishing fleets off Newfoundland. The envoy 
raised objections at once, and Charles described the idea as 
'unworthy, shameless and impossible'.4^ Negotiations were 
at an end, and, although Bengt Oxenstierna persuaded his master 
to postpone Ankarstjarna's withdrawal from Marstrand until the
A f i
proposals of the new Dutch envoy Haren had been heard, the 
ships sailed back in mid-August and were not even fitted out 
in 1691.49 /
There is no evidence that Swedish claims were put forward
Ill
as an excuse to withhold her naval detachment and, if an 
arrangement which Charles considered consistent v/ith his 
dignity could have been arrived at, at least before the Maritime 
Powers’ attempt to interfere with neutral trade so weakened 
their case, it is probable that it would have been despatched, 
but it is difficult to see how such a clash of proud tempera­
ments could have been resolved and certain that the Swedes 
were relieved at escaping the expense and compromising of their 
neutrality which the sending of their warships would have 
involved.
(ii) Negotiations for Further -Swedish Help
(a) Early Attitudes
At the time of William’s accession he had good reason to 
hope for much more from Sweden than the fulfilment of her treaty 
obligations, and the disillusionment which he suffered over 
the latter is paralleled during the same period by a still 
greater frustration of his dream of Charles II's entry into 
the war-by his side. In fact twelve months after Altona it 
was Denmark’s more pliant attitude which offered him the more 
solid advantages.
At his audience with leijonberg in February, before 
Gabriel Oxenstierna’s arrival, he had promised an alliance 
offer in the near future and expressed great satisfaction with 
Nostitz' favourable account of Swedish intentions^^ Bather 
vaguely worded assurances were frequently made by Charles'
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envoys during the early months of 1689 and, as has been seen, 
efforts were made by allied statesmen-to persuade Sweden to 
join the coalition at once as the best means of assisting the 
duke of Holstein-Gottorp,^'1' but, as with the treaty aid and the 
Danish troops, it soon became clear that she was not anxious 
to take further action until a settlement had been reached in 
Altona. When hews of this reached London in the first week 
in July, however, neither William nor the Swedish envoys were 
at all satisfied with the state of their mutual relations. 
Gabriel Oxenstierna betrayed resentment at the negotiations 
for the hiring of the troops from Denmark, which he and 
Leijonberg did their best to discourage,and the latter 
expressed his deep dissatisfaction with the .English court’s 
attitude since la forest’s arrival.^ William was fully 
conscious of this and favoured the hiring of Swedish troops in 
the same way as the Danish as a means of ensuring Charles* 
friendship. He seems to have expected them to be cheaper than 
any to be had from German princes and, in view of the size of 
the Swedish army, well able to be spared.^ Gabriel Qxenstiema 
did indeed raise the matter in an attempt to wean the Allies 
from Denmark, but his government gave no hopes of reducing their 
forces while relations betv/een Christian V and the duke of 
Gottorp remained unsettled, shortage of money on both sides
ccthreatened serious difficulties and the matter was not pressed. 
In mid-August, when William's confidence in Sweden seems, to
•s--
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have improved somewhat, he told the Spanish ambassador 
Ronquillo that he considered it better to hire troops, whom 
he obviously regarded here primarily as a pledge of loyalty
or bribe for friendship, from the less reliable duke of Hanover
(b) English Alliance Negotiations (July - December 1689)
Gabriel Oxenstierna was asked in July whether Sweden had
any intention of making a declaration against France but
87excused himself from making a reply for lack of orders. A
month later Nottingham asked leijonberg if he had any orders
on alliance negotiations. The Swede replied that he had
understood that matters had been entrusted to Duncombe. To
this Nottingham said that the envoy had merely been instructed
to request Swedish proposals, for which William now intended 
58to wait. leijonberg and Gabriel Oxenstierna were, however,
ordered on July 31st to raise'the matter as on their own
59initiative and themselves to invite proposals. As in the 
negotiations with lente each side waited for the other to make 
the first offer.
Duncombe had been told to improve ’the friendship' and 
good correspondence* with Sweden and ’toe improve the same by 
further allyences and entring into common measures.. .for carry­
ing on the war against the French king until the quiett of
Christendome can be secured against his attempts by a firme and
60 , useful peace*, but he found soon after his arrival in Stock­
holm on July 16th, as others had already reported, that there
56
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was far less enthusiasm for.entry into the war among the Swedes
than might have been gathered from their professions and actions 
6l
hitherto. Like Molesworth he ran into difficulties with a
new ceremonial and had to forego a public audience with the
62
king, but secured a private one on August 6th. In spite of
his instructions, he hesitated to raise the question of an
alliance for fear he would be asked for his powers to negotiate,
63
which he did not possess, but at the end of the month, when
the chancellor was ill and Charles away, he plucked up enough
courage to speak to secretary Bergenhielm. The latter agreed
to draw up an alliance project while the envoy took care of one 
64
for commerce. On September .12, Duncombe wrote to Bengt
Oxenstierna himself, asking for proposals while his powers were
being drawn up, and Charles promised negotiations as soon as
6?
they were sent. At the same time, however, he reported home
that Sweden was not forward in entering into engagements
’because of ye jealousy it may give theire neibours’ and that
want of money led even well-intentioned ministers to press for
66
a delay of one or two years. He finally received, on October
6th, an alliance project from London identical with the .one sent
to Molesworth and with similar instructions on the modifications
67
to be adopted in it.
♦Akerhielm now drew up a chancery memorial summarizing the 
case for and against the conclusion of an anti-French alliance. 
Swedish grievances against Louis were listed, but it was pointed 
out at the same time that all these could be settled without a
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resort to arras and that Sweden had never yet been at war against 
Prance. The whole question was debated in the council on 
November 11th. A conference with Duncombe had to be post­
poned because of his illness but was held at last on the 26th.
In this the Swedish commissioners made it clear that they were 
prepared to make as few concessions as the Danes were in their 
roughly contemporary negotiations with Molesworth on the same 
project. The envoy admitted to them that it was hoped to 
bring Sweden into the war by means of his alliance and put out 
feelers to test reactions to the idea of further military aid, 
but the Swedes insisted that any alliance should remain purely
defensive for the time being and should not apply to current 
69hostilities. They promised to draw up a counter-project, 
which was discussed in the chancery on December 18th and handed 
to Duncombe on December 24th. This limited the obligations 
of the power not attacked to the giving of aid within three 
months of being asked, and its ally was not entitled to demand 
a declaration of war; the Swedes contended that there must be 
a strict observance of the three separate stages - mediation, 
military help and finally, if necessary and convenient, war.
Any aid was to be lessened by that given to another. The 
amount supplied by England was reduced to that to which Sweden 
was bound viz. 6,000 troops and twelve ships, since this was 
considered more in accordance with Swedish dignity, and Sweden 
was given the right to claim a money payment in lieu.of the 
naval contingent, which she felt might not be needed. • An
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additional clause limited the treaty’s validity to 'de
aggressionum casibus futuris'. The English envoy took most
71of the points ad referendum and sent the project to London, 
where it was shelved.
Buncombe gives a brief account of his alliance negotiations
72in his despatch to Nottingham of November 8th 1690, as 
follows -
’I need not remind y yx for sever-1- months after 
I first made ye Overture of an alliance I was fed w’til 
assurances of a readyness on ye p^ of this court, to 
enter into mutuall engagements w ^  his Ma:-^  yet 
plausibly put off, w^11 a quand on s’en expliqueroit 
davantage; till suche time as I delivered them ye 
project of Alliance that yr Lpp sent me, upon w _  they 
gave me a counter-project of a treaty, not to comence 
till ye end of ye present Warr: and therein also, as 
well as in conferences, insisted upon ye point of 
comerce with france, to ye degree, that nothing, could 
be proceeded on,till that were determind...’
In view of this last remark it is interesting to note
that, in spite of the envoy’s instructions, trade with France
was not mentioned in the conference on November 26th 1689 and
that article IV, which concerned it, was one of those which
passed without comment. The real reason why the question of
a defensive alliance was dropped at this stage and why Duncombe,
 ^ 73as he pointed out in his ’summary report', received no 
instructions on the counter-project was the Swedish insistence 
on excluding the war already in progress from its provisions. 
William had to turn to other means of attracting Sweden into 
belligerency.
(c) The Invitation to the Grand Alliance and the Hague Congress
(September 1689 - May l690)
At the end of October, in view of Gabriel Oxenstierna's
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unsatisfactory attitude on treaty aid, William expressed a 
wish for a Swedish alliance as soon as possible, but the 
approach was now to be an invitation to join the Grand Alliance 
with an offer of subsidies, which the king had first proposed 
in September and which Duncombe had thought in August that.
Sweden might a c c e p t T h e  States-General resolved on 
November 25th to make, the request to both Northern Crowns, 
and a copy of their decision was communicated to the Swedish 
government by Rumpf on December 8th as v/ell as to Gabriel 
Oxenstierna in his conference about treaty aid with the deputies 
for foreign affairs on December 10th.^ Charles sent his
reply to the Hague on December 18th. His envoy was told that 
it was considered unwise to reject the invitation outright for 
fear of proposals being made to Denmark which should prove 
unfavourable to Swedish interests, or, on the other hand, to 
show too much eagerness in case Denmark should then draw back 
altogether and wait for an opportunity to offer her mediation.
He should therefore state simply that Sweden was not yet 
prepared to enter the war or to stand the loss to her trade 
which this would involve and should ask what more could be 
expected of Sweden over and above what she had already promised. 
Further, it was claimed, the object of the Grand Alliance was . 
to reduce France to her 1659 boundaries and in this Sweden had - 
less interest than the Allies. Since, however, conditions ;
might change, so, he was to intimate, might Sweden’s attitude' 
to the war.' Rumpf was handed a similar answer on.December 
23rd, and leijonclo was ordered to find out Denmark’s attitude
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to the invitation.
It was especially unfortunate that this reaction,
unsatisfactory and ambiguous as it was, should come at a time
when concern over Sweden’s attitude had reached such a high
pitch. William spoke of bribing her ministers as the only
means to keep her friendship. Yet he continued to plan for
the raising of large enough subsidies from the coalition as a
whole to persuade both Sweden and Denmark to overcome their
scruples and, while Heemskerck's instructions for his embassy
to Vienna on April 4th included an injunction to persuade the
79Emperor to make a fresh effort to engage them, Ilaren's of 
April 18th were to renew the invitation to Charles to join the
OA
Grand Alliance or to conclude a similar agreement in the Hague, 
where the congress of allied ministers had begun its meetings
on
on March 6th.
Already in early September it had been suggested to Gabriel 
Oxenstierna that Sweden might send a representative to this 
congress, and he had been ordered to stand by and await further
Oporders. At the beginning of November he asked Portland for 
William's views and more details of the agenda.8  ^ He -repeated 
the latter request at the conference on treaty aid of December
QA
10th. ^ Finally, on December 1st, the States-General had resolv­
ed to send a formal invitation to Stockholm 'in reguard his 
Majesty (of Sweden) has several times showed his inclination 
to send by the nexte yeare the succours agreed upon...and that 
theire HM have desired the sayd king to enter into the Alliance 
made between the Emperor and theire HM'. J There is no
77
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evidence that any., specific conditions were originally implied 
in this request, nor that it was intended "by itself to commit 
Sweden in any way, although it was probably hoped that her 
participation would hind'her even more closely to the anti- 
French camp, with which she had in the past betrayed such 
sympathy; it sprang, in part at least, from an unjustified 
optimism. The Swedes, however, suspected that the States- 
General wanted a declaration of war to precede an acceptance, 
and Gabriel Oxenstierna was ordered to find out if this were 
so. He was nevertheless sent powers to attend if circumstances 
made this imperative. D He received these on April 14th, 
after two further invitations had been made to him, and on 
May 8th attended on his own initiative.8^ His explanation of 
why he had not waited for new orders was that such a move had
become necessary in order to counter the suspicions aroused
88against Sweden. This was considered hardly sufficient to
justify his precipitancy, but it was decided in Stockholm that
it would be too damaging to Sweden's relations with the Allies
to order his withdrawal and his action was sanctioned on May
24th with a strict injunction to avoid committing himself any 
89further.
It seems that he continued to attend meetings during the 
remainder of his stay in the Hague but that some of the 
belligerent members later criticized the presence of a neutral 
in their midst, and his successor Lillieroot was instructed, 
on his appointment in 1692, not to take part unless specially 
summoned. He was,"however, to do his best to find out details
of what was discussed. After 1690 the Congress in any
case ceased to have any importance in the development of allied
policy, which, was evolved in the course of more intimate
gatherings of William, his closest advisers and such représent­
aiatives of his allies as he considered necessary.
90
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Chapter- ^
The Opening of the War on French Tr».^
(August lfe»9 - June l^QO).'-----
(i) Introductory
(a) Seventeenth Century Attitudes to Neutral Trade
In spite of attempts since the later Middle Ages to
evolve a generally recognized international code regulating
trade between neutral and belligerent powers, and in spite of
limited progress in theory and practice, many problems remained
unresolved, and consequently many openings for conflict persisted,
in the last decades of the seventeenth century» To a
certain extent the position was regulated by treaty, but the
contrasts between the provisions in the various agreements
only serve to emphasize the divergence of opinion in the field.
Few, if any, treaties were able to make allowances for all
possible contingencies, and many were deliberately vague. When
none at all bound together a belligerent and a neutral, or the
validity of treaties was in dispute, as was the case with England
1
and Sweden in 1689, the amount of disagreement was liable to 
be limited solely by the community of interest and the degree of 
good will on each side.
Certain restrictions on neutral trade had, it is true, 
come to be recognized by convention. The concept of contraband 
was acknowledged, but the question as to what did and what 
did not constitute weapons of war remained open. Blockade 
of an enemy port gave the blockading ships an unchallenged 
right to bar entry to all neutral shipping, but the blockade
»*-
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had to he 'effective'. Amidst all possible answers to the 
central problems of the right of neutral ships to carry 
enemy goods other than contraband and the right of their 
owner to neutral goods found in an enemy ship, three had 
crystallized into systems, and from these the powers concerned 
might choose according to their convenience when rights were 
not enshrined unequivocally in treaties.
Most favourable to neutrals was the doctrine, which had 
emerged about the middle of the seventeenth century and which 
had been adopted with fair consistency by the United Provinces, 
of 'free ships, free goods, unfree ships unfree goods* or 
that the flag covered the cargo. According to this, enemy 
cargo, unless contraband* could be borne in neutral bottoms 
without molestation,while neutral goods on enemy ships were 
liable to seizure and confiscation with the ship. Its 
simplicity was appealing,and its general adoption would have 
undoubtedly forestalled many internal crises at this and later 
times. It did not, however, eliminate the possibility of 
fraud by enemy ships posing as neutrals and neutral ships 
concealing contraband, nor of. claims by belligerents to go 
further in their visitations than the examination of papers.
A closer definition of contraband and blockade would also have 
to be agreed to.
At the other extreme was the doctrine, embodied in the 
French Marine Ordinance of 1681, by which not only might . 
enemy goods found in neutral ships be confiscated but the 
ships themselves be declared*de bonne prise.' Several
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countries, including Denmark and Sweden, were in 1689 exempted 
by treaty from the rigours of the Ordinance, and Louis attempt­
ed to apply it only in the latter half of Nine Years' War, 
when he had ceased to maintain a battle-fleet and was concentra­
ting all his energies at sea on privateering activities. It 
was a claim which would almost certainly have to be imposed 
by force, and, unless imposed with the greatest strictness, 
for which a complete mastery of the seas and a large number 
of ships engaged in no other task would be necessary, the 
ill-will engendered would almost certainly outweigh any material 
and strategic advantages. .William was to discover all this 
to his cost when he tried to go even further.
A compromise between these two views, although in time
the earliest, was the 'consulate del mare', originally
promulgated in the late fifteenth century. Under this enemy
merchandise on neutral vessels would be seized but the ships
themselves released, while neutral goods on an enemy vessel
might be redeemed by the owner by purchase of the ship on which
they were found. The 'consulato del mare' was a solution
padopted, though again not consistently, by England.
Even, however, when the choice of policy had been made 
and, in regard to the first and last at least, embodied in a 
treaty, there remained the problem as to how far the belligerent 
government could ensure that its obligations to the neutral 
concerned were observed by its agents. These were not in the 
main ships of thé regular fleet, which could rarely be spared
for such duties, but privateers, who depended upon the sale of 
their prizes for their profits or even for repaying the cost of 
fitting out their ships and had every interest in impinging upon 
neutral rights if it could be done without risking the loss of
3commissions.
Even if William had not favoured more drastic action,
treaties would have been little help in regulating relations
between the Maritime Powers and the Northern Crowns in 1689.
The only agreement recognized as valid by both parties was that
signed by Sweden and the United provinces in 1679 and renewed
on Dutch initiative with the alliance in January 1686. Its
4
guiding principle was ’free ships, free goods’. The Danish 
convention signed with the United Provinces in 1688 was only 
provisional while a full treaty was being negotiated and was due 
to expire in June I69O. England had long been negotiating for 
a commercial alliance with Denmark to replace that of 1670 and 
one with Sweden to succeed that of l66l, which England claimed 
had expired but which the Swedes contended had been embraced by 
a later agreement of no established duration and had always
7
governed their treatment of English merchants. If they were
right,it was the sole treaty in force in 1689 not embodying the
8
principle of ’free ships, free goods’.
(b) The Formation of William’s Policy and the Anglo-Dutch 
Convention of August 1689
Thus William found himself in 1689 in control of the policy
/,
of two countries with strongly contrasting traditions with regard 
to neutral trade and with little guidance, or restriction, in
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the way of treaty provisions. He was largely free either to 
leave each to pursue its own maritime policy, a course which 
would bring with it the risk of endless complications in negotiat­
ions with neutrals and of differences between England and the 
United Provinces such as would not only harm their effectiveness 
in the common cause but also undermine his own none too secure 
position, to attempt to impose the policy of one on the other, 
with much the same danger, or to evolve an entirely new policy for 
both. In fact he chose the latter, but it was a policy which 
could be represented as. an imposition of the attitude of onet
Maritime Power on the other, one likely to offend neutral suscept­
ibilities more than the previous practice of either England or 
the United Provinces and one which demanded the utmost skill in 
presentation and argument on the part of his envoys in neutral 
capitals.
The genesis in his own mind of the idea of forbidding uni­
laterally all neutral trade whatever with Prance is obscure. 
Examples could be found for such a measure on a small scale in
9the past, but these were never quoted in justification of the 
Maritime Powers' decision in the early months of its execution.
The regulations universally recognized in the case of'a blockaded 
port certainly played some part but only, it seems, to justify 
a decision already taken, for they were not mentioned when 10
Waldeck and Dijkvelt spoke to Gabriel Oxenstierna in January 1689.
The approach was then extremely tentative. Waldeck simply 
tried to impress on the Swede the impossibility of forcing 
Prance to agree to allied terms unless all countries without
11 126
It is thereforeexception agreed not to fetch off her goods.
clear that the idea, raised, if not by V/illiam, then in his
immediate entourage, was not a new one when brought forward
by the English commissioners during the Anglo-Dutch alliance
negotiations in London in June.
William was not allowed to overlook all the dangers of
such a policy, even if they had not occurred to him already,
for Hicolaas Witsen, Amsterdam’s delegate in the Dutch embassy
to London, protested strongly and expressed his fear of neutral
reactions, especially those of the friendly Sweden, and of the
establishment of a precedent for future wars, in which the United
Provinces might remain neutral herself. He and Citters delayed
appending their signatures to the agreement as long as possible
12
and finally signed, on August 13th, under protest. William
confessed that he doubted the strict legality of what he was
doing and feared the furore it would cause. He had no faith
in the claim made in the convention that the whole French coast
was in a state of blockade, but his mind was made up and he would
allow no comnromise. He declared to Witsen that it was
13’droit du canon'.
It seems that William was willing to risk losing the 
friendship of the neutral powers by such cavalier treatment for 
the sake of depriving France of all her imports and her export 
markets; he may have been little interested in the finer points 
of economic theory but he grasped the essentials of economic 
warfare. There is little doubt that he was determined to
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humble France by all means ait his disposal as quickly and
completely as possible and he was encouraged by the attitude
14
of his new subjects, but it remains difficult to account for 
such an open flouting of established neutral rights. Later, when 
it had become obvious that neither of the Northern Crowns was 
willing to submit meekly to his dictates, he wrote to Heinsius 
’it will be impossible for us to watch those two powers or those 
who use their flags trade with France while our subjects are 
(deprived) of this advantage...which afterwards, when peace 
comes, could be very prejudicial to the inhabitants of England
15as well as the States’, but this appears to have been a
justification post facto rather than an original prime motive
of his policy. He may have believed that Sweden's devotion
was such that it would outweigh any economic loss, of which
he had no exact estimate, inconvenience, with which he would16
have little sympathy, or feelings of wounded pride. This
was certainly an argument used with Swedish representatives,
and Charles’ early reactions to the idea of a ban may have
encouraged hopes of its being accepted. For, although in
January Gabriel Oxenstiema had told Waldeck that it seemed
unfair to deprive subjects of nations still at peace and that
17such a ban had never been practised, he was sent no definite
instructions while Sweden needed William’s support in the Holstein-
Gottorp dispute, and the attitude he was ordered to display was
as submissive as was possible without actually agreeing to 
18
the proposal. William may have believed that Sweden would
»3^
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in any case soon become a fellow belligerent or that, as the
19Swedes themselves claimed to believe later, that she could 
be forced to enter the war by so reducing the attractions of 
neutrality. If so, his diplomacy was slow to respond when it 
became obvious that such calculations were proving false.
As for Denmark, she was little to be feared if her neighbour 
was willing to fall in with his designs.
It is true that no drastic action was taken immediately
against Scandinavian ships, and he may have intended from the
beginning merely to test Swedish and Danish reactions during the
winter of 1689/90 in order to be in a clearer bargaining position
when'the trading season re-opened, but in this case the
declaration of August 12th was a clumsy opening to negotiations
and a largely unnecessary aggravation. Unfortunately we have
little better evidence on which to base a surmise of his
motivation than the official arguments employed at a later stage
by his envoys and ministers. Possibly the best estimate is that
made by Sir George Clark in a slightly different and wider
context, that 'as an English statesman, as a Dutch statesman,
and as a European statesman he shows the same fixed habit of
getting the immediate action he wants, without regard to the
confusion and damage that he causes to the political, military,
20
or diplomatic system.' He recognized that the economic 
strangulation of Prance was necessary in order to bring her to her 
knees and to ensure a speedy end to the conflict and overestimated 
his ability to impose it by either force or persuasion.
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In extenuation of his attitude it must be emphasized that
some trouble over neutral trade was inevitable from the beginning.
Ships of both Northern Crowns were seized in the summer of
21
1689 on various pretexts; the Dutch vice-admiral Almonde
brought five Swedish and four Danish vessels into Plymouth in 
22
June. And they continued to be seized long after the 
policy of an absolute ban on French trade had been abandoned; 
such formed the subject of negotiations up to the end of 
hostilities and beyond. It is often difficult to distinguish 
/ the two strands during the early months of the war, since ships 
held under more traditional interpretations of neutral rights 
were often seen by their owners as victims of William’s new 
pohcy, and it was fairly easy, the state of international law 
being what it was, to find a pretext for holding and even 
confiscating ships on grounds other than the convention when 
the situation demanded a relaxation of its terms. The principle 
of the ’consulato del mare* was upheld by an order-in-council 
of August 15th 1689, by which all neutral ships held in English 
harbours were to be released after removal of enemy goods, and,V
by a States-General resolution of October 22nd, all ships not
offending against the provisions laid down in the declaration
23
of war of February 26th were ordered to be freed. The
United Provinces ratification of the convention was not complete
until Zeeland notified her agreement in December, and not until
then could her envoys lend their official support to English 
24efforts
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(ii) Early Scandinavian Reactions
Although, the convention was not signed until August 13th,
rumours of the proposal reached Stockholm and Copenhagen soon
25after the Altona agreement, •which had considerably changed
the attitude shown by Sweden in February. Both Gabriel
Oxenstierna and leijonberg were ordered to protest and claim
absolute freedom of trade, while lente received similar
instructions.^ A copy of the agreement was sent to Molesworth
four days before the signing, with the pious hope that 'the
necessity of this method is so great and so plain, that there
will need not many arguments to convince any that are not
friends to France', and on August 13th itself he was immediately
ordered to urge its acceptance on Christian, while Duncombe was
27to secure Charles' approval. Reventlow merely took the
notification ad referendum on August 23rd, but on the following
day Jessen ordered lente to protest against the seizure of ships
which had set sail in ignorance of proposed allied measures,
but not to refuse expedients until more favourable times allowed
28Denmark to press her claims for freedom with more vigour.
•Denmark was very conscious of the weakness of her position
and had realized at an early stage that her best hope lay in
securing the co-operation of the more highly favoured Sweden.
Her first approaches, made by Vibe to Leijonclo and inspired
by news of Almondes' seizures, had not been encouraging; ;
29leijonclo was wholly without orders. Yet the problem was 
an urgent one, especially as many members of the court, led
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by Reventlow and Jessen and including the Icing, had large 
stakes in trading ventures,and Christian hoped that his shaky 
financial position might be helped considerably by capturing 
a portion at least of the Dutch carrying trade and by exploit­
ing other avenues open to a neutral power in time of war, such
as tlie sale of passes to belligerent merchants for trade with
30the e n e m y . O n  August 1st Stoclcfleth told Bengt Oxenstierna
that he had orders to negotiate on measures in defence of trade
at the conclusion of talks on a renewal of the 1679 Dano-Swedish
defensive alliance, for which Christian had been pressing even
31before the Altona treaty and to which Charles had now agreed.
Sweden was, however, in no hurry to enter a concert which 
might result in her throwing away her main advantages over 
Denmark in her relations with the Allies, especially as it 
would be comparatively easy for Christian to throw the blame 
on her and to arouse suspicions which would aid him in securing 
a rapprochement with William at Sweden's expense. She decided 
to leave it to him to make the first definite proposals and 
was at pains to point out that the alliance talks with Stock- 
fleth, which soon aroused allied suspicions, had nothing to do 
with the securing of any trading advantages. She was on the 
other hand even less inclined to submit to William's dictation 
than Denmark.. She could refer to her treaty with the United 
Provinces, which the States-General had pledged itself to hold 
sacred in its declaration of February 26th, and to her 1661 
alliance with England, even if its validity was disputed by
♦S'
132
the latter. Whatever gloss.was put on the convention by
allied representatives and however much they might protest
that no prior consultation had taken place with neutral powers
for fear of French counter-measures and of advantage taken by
33English and Dutch merchants, she protested at the injury to
her sovreignity in such an order. Like Denmark she entertained
hopes of engrossing much of the belligerents trade and could
accuse the Maritime Powers, with justification, of wishing to
dash such hopes rather than to deprive France of supplies.
Her finances were sound, but she could claim that the royal
income from customs dues would be seriously affected and that
the blow to her economic life would harm her capacity to aid
34
her allies. Among her main imports from France was salt,
which was essential for the preservation of fish and meat over
the winter and fears of a shortage of which were endemic in
35Sweden. Both she and Denmark feared an equivalent French
prohibition and the permanent upsetting of the balance of
36sea-power.
Duncombe wrote to the chancellor, who was away from 
Stockholm, on August JOth with his request to inform the king
37of the convention. Oxenstierna advised his master to act with
caution and for the time being answered the envoy 'nothing in
particular* only saying that he was sure justice would be shown to
’ 38Swedish ships held. When Stockfleth approached him again with 
proposals for joint action, the Dane was told that the allied ex­
planations seemed reasonable, tiat Swedish ships bad been released,
133
and that the United Provinces had claimed they could supuly all
39Sweden’s needs for two years. On Charles’ return to 
Stockholm a more definite answer to William was worked out.
In a debate in the rad on October 9th it became apparent that 
the convention was providing the opposition to the chancellor 
with a new lease of life. Wrede and LindsktJld immediately demanded 
vigorous action, pressed the need for convoys, a recommendation 
already made by Leijonberg, and forecast the ruin of all 
Swedish trade. Oxenstierna realized the delicacy of his 
position and attempted'to steer a middle course. He admitted 
that the argument of a blockade was a strange one and that the 
prohibition was not consonant with the treaty of 1679 with the 
United Provinces, but claimed that it would be enough to pint 
out to William the losses it would cause to Swedish trade, of 
which, the Allies were apparently unaware, to remind him of 
the help Sweden was sending and to argue in favour of modificat­
ions. Charles supported him and said that too vigorous action 
would merely play into the hands of France and of Denmark, whose 
demands on Gottorp threatened a new crisis. He rejected the
idea of negotiations with Stockfleth, and it was decided to
- 40
go no further than a mild verbal protest. On October 12th
Gabriel Oxenstierna and Leijonberg were ordered to deliver this.
It rejected the claim of effective blockade, Swedish merhants
knowing only too well that French privateers were not
confined to their ports, invoked Sweden’s treaty rights, and "
41
pointed out how vital was French trade to Sweden. When
the latter blamed England for the violent manner in which the
measure had been rushed through without consulting neutral
powers, and Nottingham, when Leijonberg informed him of his
orders, not received until December 4th, promised that such
a fleet was being made ready as would keep all French shins 
42
in harbour.
It soon became evident that the verbal protests to the 
Maritime Powers were not having the effect which Oxenstierna 
had hoped for, and at the end of November Sweden decided to
43
arrange for convoys to escort her ships to Spain and Portugal.
The failure of a new crisis in Gottorp to develop also favoured
Denmark’s efforts to persuade Sweden to agree to Joint action,
and on December 7th Stockfleth was told that Charles was willing
to discuss Joint convoys with Denmark, preferably in Stockholm,
though he insisted on the omission from the renewed alliance
of the clauses concerning defence of trade, as liable to lead
to complications, and refused to agree to any other change in
44
the original terms. Powers for Stockfleth were immediately
drawn up in Copenhagen and a project composed by Jens and Nils
45
Juel.- At the same time as Swedish envoys were informed of 
the intention to send convoys, they were also instructed to 
reiterate their country’s absolute right to free trade and 
to demonstrate.how reasonable Sweden was prepared to be by 
quoting orders to the convoy commander forbidding the ships ( 
under his escort to carry not only contraband but all French 
goods and by inviting proposals to alleviate the harm done to
Gabriel Oxenstierna spoke to Dijkvelt at the end of November,
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4-6Sweden without demanding an explicit revocation of the ban.
Che decision to send convoys, even though as yet only 
to Spain and Portugal, aroused considerable allied suspicion , 
especially as the Maritime Powers themselves offered their 
protection. Many saw this as only a beginning of measures 
in defence of Northern trade. ^  Heinsius gave Oxenstierna 
a roundabout answer, when the latter informed him and asked
A O
for orders to be sent to Dutch ships not to interfere.
In a conversation with Lejonberg on January 1st Nottingham 
confessed English jealousy that so much war material was being 
sent to Portugal, when the latter had not recognized the new 
government in London and was rumoured to have an agreement with 
France. He asked if it would be possible to arrange to sell 
the goods in England on the way and proceed to Portugal with 
ballast
The States-General was not in a position until December
20th to order Rumpf to join Duncombe in pressing Sweden to
accept the ban as the quickest way of securing a return of 
50peace. He notified the chancellor on January 5th and was
told that, an answer would be given in the Hague, but von January
24-th he received an oral reply protesting against the prohibition
as against the 'ius gentium’ and Sweden’s treaty with the United
Provinces, and as threatening both a complete stoppage of trade,
when France took revenge, and dissensions from which only the
51enemy would benefit. The English and Dutch envoys protested 
against passages in the written version of this, to'.be sent to 
Gabriel Oxenstierna, which suggested that Sweden was speaking
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reference to the offer of expedients by the Maritime Powers,
which suggested that all negotiations were broken off. The
Swedes gave way but emphasized at the same time that any
52
proposals would have to come from the allied side.
Denmark made very little progress in her attempts to
persuade Sweden to go beyond a promise to discuss joint convoys,
partly because she hesitated to make any definite proposals in
the knowledge that her earlier approaches on joint mediation
had been immediately reported to the Allies, but mainly because
of continuing Swedish suspicions. For the time being she had to
confine herself to protests to the Maritime Powers against
53the continued detention of Danish ships and to watching
developments in Stockholm. Negotiations on the renewal of
the 1679 alliance, which had been proceeding since August,
ended in agreement at a conference on January 17th, when
Gyldenstolpe, of whom Duncombe for some time entertained great
hopes, told Stockfleth that England had offered terms and
had ordered her ships not to interfere with Swedish ships,
54
though no assurance had in fact been secured. Immediately
afterwards Oxenstierna confessed that it was not yet clear
whether the Allies’ offer were serious, but claimed that they
should, not be provoked before they had revealed their real inten-
55tions. After .the signing of the renewed alliance on February 1st, 
he confessed that the reactions to Swedish protests had been 
negative, but attempted at the same time to justify the ban 
as necessary. Stockfleth took this as a signal for 
breaking off the talks, but on the same day Christian had
on behalf of all neutrals, and against the omission of all
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convoys to sail to the Maritime Powers and Portugal.
In spite of the identity of the Northern Crowns’ interests 
in the field of neutral trading rights, it was.apparent, and 
was to become even more so as the war progressed, that their 
clash of interests in other spheres had created such a deeply 
engrained mistrust of each other’s motives that no really 
effective co-operation was possible. Sweden was especially 
conscious, during the early months of the attempted enforcement 
of the Ango-Dutch convention, of the strength of her position 
in opposition to it and was unwilling that Christian should 
be given any opportunity to draw benefit from this and at the 
same time to undermine it to his own advantage.
(iii) First Attempts to Reach a Settlement (January - June 1690) 
(a) With Denmark
William continued his efforts to persuade the neutral 
powers to accept the ban into the new year but was not wholly 
uncompromising. In mid-January Nottingham wrote to the 
English envoys in both Northern capitals ordering them to 
continue in the attempt, and at the end of the month the king
57himself declared to Citters his intention not to give way.
But he had already offered to grant a number of passes to
Scandinavian merchants to trade with France, ’Provided
58
it be not in such number as may offend his Aliys ’, and
States-Generals ’ deputies told Gabriel Oxenstierna that, 
in so far as they were their own masters, they had
59abandoned the idea of imposing the prohibition by force.
Strong suspicions that the Northern Crowns were plotting to 
join forces in defence of their trade, to which the Danish 
alliance negotiations had lent colour, provided a prime motive
36
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for some concession. In spite of the Swedish convoy instruct-
ions, which raised William*s hopes of dividing the two powers,
it was Denmark who was found the more accomodating.
As soon as it became clear that little was to be expected
from Sweden for the time being, Ahlefeldt was ordered on
January 11th, while threatening reprisals for Danish ships
still held, to propose private applications for allied
passes and the inclusion of all ship-building materials in 
6l
contraband. On his arrival in London he informed Nottingham
that, while the ban could not for the present be accepted, an
opportunity to build up a store of essential supplies from
France might enable it to be.so in the future. The secretary
pointed out that wine and salt could be procured from elsewhere
but asked how many ships might be needed to fetch them from
France and wrote to Duncombe that he found Denmark *not so pos-.v
itive against all the points of ye prohibition as Sweden seems
62
to be*, an opinion William still shared in May. Also in Jan­
uary Reventlow aoplied to Goes for passes, but he and Molesworth
63
were sent strict orders not to issue any.
Both Northern Crowns refused to give any official sanction 
to applications for passes offered by the Maritime Powers, but 
Lente was ordered to agree Tspontaneo1•to limit the number of 
the ships to be engaged in the traffic and of the ports from 
which they sailed. Heinsius insisted that the United Provinces 
could supply Denmark with' all the salt, wine and brandy she^need­
ed but wrot'e to William for his opinion on the proposals from 
Copenhagen and urged the need for a settlement if serious
60
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trouble was to be avoided.- Meanwhile Christian was
threatened with a stop of all allied trade if he continued
to alio?; his subjects to trade with France , but it cannot
be imagined that he took this- very seriously.
He was most reluctant to make written proposals for
fear of French reactions but finally gave Ahlefedt and lente
permission to do so on March 25th. As usual he wanted
negotiations to take place in Copenhagen,while William insisted;
66on the Hague as more convenient. In response to his
enquiries lente was instructed on May 10th that it was for
the United Provinces to propose the number of ships they were
prepared to permit, but a week later he was allowed to offer j
fifty with the warning that this number would not be adhered j
67 ito if the alliance negotiations should fall through. Denmark j
took full advantage of the Swedish decision at the beginning !|
of April to extend their convoys to France,.and on April 29th 
lente was sent a copy of Stockfleth's account of this so that
|
the States-General could see that Sweden had no intention of j
joining the coalition and that a trade agreement should be ;
68 -made with Denmark, whom S?;eden would then follow. v William
j
soon came to the same conclusion and wrote to Heinsius at the j
69 !end of May that 'necessity shall oblige us to come to terms'.
Finally, on June 17th, lente was empowered to negotiate
in the Hague for an agreement based on a yearly allo?/ance of
70fifty Danish ships to trade v/ith France. * .
(b ) With Sweden
Sv;eden had expressed her willingness to listen to expedients
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as soon as she received official notification of the Anglo- 
Dutch convention, hut the only proposals made in response to 
this were to supply her with goods previously obtained from 
France, (principally salt, wine and brandy), and to buy all 
Swedish exports, which meant in practice naval stores such
71
as pitch, tar and hemp. The Swedes were unenthusiastic
and suspicious. To the former offer, first made to Gabriel
Oxenstierna by Heinsius in the conference on treaty aid of
November 1st, she expressed doubts if it was possible,and,
if it were, whether allied merchants would be willing to sell
72
below the prices inflated by war conditions. Leijonberg 
protested to Nottingham in December that England did not have
73
enough salt even to supply her own needs. To the invitation
to sell her exports, made originally by Duneombe on his own
initiative, Sweden also responded with uncertainty as to the
74
adequacy of any remuneration which might be tendered.
Leijonberg was reprimanded for agreeing in writing to
73
discuss expedients, but some interest in the selling of 
at least a proportion of exports to .England and the United 
Provinces was expressed and in January Bengt Oxenstierna discuss­
ed the possibilities with Duncombe. The English envoy was pro­
mised a detailed calculation of Swedish trade, and the chancellor
suggested that £20 - 30,000 p.a. should make good the losses
76
caused by a stop of that with France. Dursley promised 
Gabriel Oxenstierna to write to his father in the City to 
discover what Swedish stores could be bought in England, and 
on February 25th Nottingham told Duncombe that, if Sweden were
content with £12,000 p.a. in. compensation, this would cause
little difficulty, while, if not more than 200,000 Rd. of
naval stores was in question, England alone could probably
77
take them all. He later suggested to Leijonberg that a
third of the exports might be left in Sweden and a third
78
bought by each of the Maritime Powers.
Duncombe was most anxious to reach a settlement before 
the trading season should open and feared that the Swedes 
were playing for time, waiting to observe the outcome of the
79
Irish camoaign. He found reason for optimism in a
80
conference on February 23rd, but was doomed to disappointment.
Continuing complaints from Swedish merchants compelled the rad
to hold new discussions on trade during March and April, when
Oxenstierna, for all his moderation, found his influence
weakening rapidly. Wrede and LindskOld claimed that England,
in spite of the offer of passes which the chancellor sought
to stress, would never allow trade with France and demanded
a joint declaration with Denmark. Oxenstierna wanted to
await the English reply, and nothing was decided in the first
debate, but Duncombe found his hopes dashed by Charles’ answer
to his renewed arguments in defence of the convention given
to him in a conference on March 7"th. He found that 'it
81
answers little to our hopes or their protestations’.
So urgent, had he considered the matter that he had begun 
negotiations on his own initiative with the four directors  ^
of the Tar Co., which had enjoyed an eight year monopoly of 
Swedish tar production since July 1689, for the purchase of
141
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all available stocks. He soon found that a much greater 
quantity could be had than he could afford to pay for from 
his own funds and that much was already ear-marked for 
individual merchants. At first the'. Swedes agreed to
200.000 Rd. to be paid over within a reasonable period, but 
suddenly demanded 2,000 Rd. by May 20th and a further
32.000 Rd. by the end of the same month, which Duncombe 
protested could not be promised. On hearing that thirty 
lasts had been sold, even though to an English merchant, in 
breach of the agreement made at the beginning of the negotia-
Options, he broke off the talks at the beginning of April.
''Nottingham was pleased, since England would have been unable
to use so much tar, but the Swedes found the seemingly trivial
excuse for ending the negotiations a reason for doubting the
seriousness of English intentions to buy all their available 
83naval stores.
Meanwhile Duncombe had, on March 20th, communicated to 
Oxenstierna the definite offer to buy naval stores contained 
in Nottingham’s instructions. The chancellor feared that 
peace might find England overstocked with goods,butvthe 
envoy assured him that William was building a large fleet 
and that he would rather destroy naval supplies than see them 
go to France. On the issue of the ban as a whole Oxenstierna 
explained that the main difficvilties were 'first Majestas 
Imperiy (but that wee pospon'd)the next, theire necessity of
4 - " Ukeeping measures w France and the last, ye contracts allready 
made for ye delivery of suche goods'.®^ In the rSd two days
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later Charles said that he thought the sales suggested should be
a matter for private agreement. Bielke and V/rede pressed
for the extension of convoys to Prance, and this was decided
on when treaty aid was discussed on April 8th, after Charles’
fears that his merchants would demand compensation for any
ships lost had been overcome. It was agreed that a new
customs duty should be imposed to cover the cost of convoys
to sail in May, July and September, each under the protection
of two warships, and Charles finally declared that ’if the
Maritime Powers attack we shall then see what they are up
to'. Oxenstierna, realizing the extent to which his master’s
feelings had been aroused, offered little resistance, and on
April 11th Leijonberg was ordered to protest once more against
the convention, to declare that Swedish merchants could no
longer stand the prospect of further loss and to threaten
85more drastic measures if the Allies did not give way.
Nottingham sent Duncombe a calculation of Swedish trade
with England on the latter date, but the envoy himself could
not obtain from the Swedish government a satisfactory account
86
of their demands. On April l6th he sent to London a rough
\
calculation, according to which naval stores to Prance amounted 
to £37,580 p.a. or about a tenth of the value of those sent toi
the United Provinces and England. He was also given a brief accoint
of goods available for purchase, sent also to Gabriel Oxenstierna
and Leijonberg on April 26th. This listed also 10 -.12,000 ^
hogsheads of wine and 10 - 12,000 lasts of salt as Swedish 
87
needs. Little progress was made. Duncombe lacked powers
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and instructions; the Swedish government refused official
recognition to any transactions he might conduct with the 
88merchants.
In May William decided to institute negotiations in the 
Hague with both Northern Crowns. I-Ie realized that both the 
Danish solution of a limited number of ships and the Swedish 
one of purchase of exports raised innumerable difficulties.
The first involved not only agreement on the number but the 
problem of visitation, the second those of quantity and price, 
which-the United Provinces was unlikely to pay. But instruc­
tions were sent to Dursley to offer terms based on the former 
project,and it was determined that 'in the meantime the convoys 
of Swede and Denmark (were) to be conniv'd at’.®^ ■ Ahlefeldt
attributed this change to Swedish resolution and the influence 
onof Portland.': Duncombe was informed of the offer on May 20th
and outlined it at the end of a memorial on June 14th. A 
limited number of ships,carrying properly authorized passes 
countersigned by an allied envoy but no naval stores and liable 
to visitation and search, were to be allowed to trade with 
France. Most members of the rad were opposed to -any answer 
being made, especially as Duncombe had said that, as long as 
no agreement was in force,the ban must remain in operation, 
but Oxenstierna referred the matter to Charles, who returned 
a surprisingly mild riposte. Duncombe was told that ,although 
Sweden had thought that all was laid down in treaties,Gabriel 
Oxenstierna would be empowered and instructed as requested 
and the proposals examined, on condition that Swedish'trade
1 4 ?
was meanwhile unmolested. A copy was sent to Gabriel
Oxenstierna on June 18th, and he was instructed that, although
the conditions on which the Maritime Powers insisted were
unacceptable, it would be dangerous to give a definite answer
at once and would,be preferable to play for time and try to
93win better terms in negotiations.
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Chapter 6
New Disappointments (June 1690 - March 1691 )
(i) Embassy to the North
Early in 1690 a proposal was made in Dutch circles, 
possibly by the grand pensionary himself, to despatch an 
extraordinary embassy to Stockholm and Copenhagen in a fresh 
bid to win the Northern Crowns to the common cause. Nottingham 
was favourably inclined to the scheme, but it was not greeted 
with any enthusiasm by William himself. He objected that, 
since all negotiations were now to take place as far as possible 
in the Hague and the envoys chosen for the mission could thus 
be given only general instructions, expectations would be 
fostered among the Danes and Swedes which were doomed to 
disappointment and negotiations would be unnecessarily 
complicated. He agreed, however, to allow the plan to go 
forward, while pointing out that England could not participate, 
since such a mission was not in accordance with her diplomatic 
practice. He also gave his approval to the choice of candi­
dates - William van Haren^ for Sweden and Godard Adriaan, baron 
van Reede, vrijheer van Amerongen, heer van Ginkel for Denmark** - 
who were proposed formally by the delegates of the States of
5Holland before the States-General on March 13th. The instruc­
tions for these two men were,as William had anticipated, in the 
most general terms. They were to urge the respective kings 
to accede to the Grand Alliance or conclude a similar agreepent, 
to be negotiated in the Hague, and to agree to cease all trade . 
with Prance but inform the Allies of any expedients which might
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make this less "burdensome. - Haren was given the additional 
task of ensuring the despatch of Swedish treaty aid.^
(a) Karen’s Mission (July - September 1690)
Haren, like Amerongen, was no stranger at the court to 
which he was accredited and had been popular in Stockholm, but 
his assignment in 1690 was a particularly thankless one; 
William was very doubtful of his success but considered there
7would be little lost by trying. He reached the Swedish 
capital on July 10th at the same time as the news of Fleurus, 
where losses among the Swedish auxiliary troops had been 
especially heavy, and only a few days before that of Beachy 
Head, where the Allies’ claims to have the whole French coast
under blockade and to be able to protect Swedish ships from
8French reprisals were blown to pieces. He judged his recep­
tion cool and soon'firmed fbm his conversations with Duncombe 
an unfavourable impression of his chances.^
He could do nothing until Charles returned to Stockholm 
from his summer travels except attempt to prevent the situation 
deteriorating still further.1^ l’he Boyne failed to restore 
the Allies’ military reputation, and the French trade, negotia- 
tions-made no progress in the Hague, while Swedish merchant­
men continued to be seized.11 The treaty troops failed to 
reach the front until September, and the twelve warships were 
ordered back to Karlskrona. Haren himself seems to have 
appreciated rather inadequately the requirements of the hour.
At a time when it was necessary above all for the Maritime 
Powers to present a united front to enemy and neutral, alike
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he sought, in his early talks with the Swedish chancellor, 
to lay on England the whole blame for the difficulties
13encountered in the French'trade and treaty aid negotiations. 
However.justified.he might have been in making such a charge 
and however well the Swedes may have been aware of English 
responsibility in these matters, it was hardly judicious to 
present them with such an opportunity and such encouragement 
to play off one Maritime Power against the other.
He and Rumpf secured an audience with Charles soon after 
his return in early September in order to inform him of their 
orders."^ The chancery debates which followed revealed 
Sweden's desire at this stage to avoid offending the Allies 
so seriously as to drive them to conclude an alliance with 
Denmark on terms which could not, it was felt, but be prejudic­
ial to Swedish interests, and the Dutch envoy was told simply 
that the king's attitude remained the same as at the time of 
Rumpf's previous invitation to join the Grand Alliance in
December and that the conditions then asked for had not been .
15forthcoming. Haren proceeded to revive the proposal to 
exchange the treaty ships for a body of troops. Oxenstierna 
gave him hope that this might be done and further aid given 
in exchange for subsidies,1  ^but the chancellor had no authority 
for this, and all else was temporarily eclipsed by Sweden's 
offer of mediation, which was contained in orders to her envoys 
of September 24th. ^  /
(b) Swedish Mediation •
Amongst Duncombe's first impressions after his arrival
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in Sweden had "been that 'they had here rather umpire than
“I O
engage', and there can "be no doubt that the idea of mediation
had lain in the background of Swedish foreign policy since the
beginning of the war. Charles was particularly susceptible
to an idea which offered him not only greatly enhanced prestige
in the councils of Europe and more material advantages - both
those which would flow from this prestige and those which a
mediator was in a good position to press - but also a good
opportunity to hold back his troops and ships from the holocaust.
The course of the campaign in 1690 added fresh weight to these
arguments and provided Bielke, as high now in his sovereign's
1 9favour as he had ever been, ■ with a good opportunity to make
20a formal proposal to the king in July. Charles would have
preferred to wait for an invitation from the belligerents but
ordered his chancellor at the end of the month to compose with
21Gyldenstolpe a memorandum on the subject.
Oxenstierna had already, in view of the currency which j
the idea had gained, recorded his views in a letter to Charles 
a few days previously. He approved the principle of an offer ; 
of mediation by Sweden but feared that the Allies wouid regard 
it as merely an excuse for withholding treaty aid; he would go
no further than to recommend that it be mentioned privately
22 ' by envoys to test reactions. Bielke, however, persuaded j
i
the king that neither side would be prepared to make the first I
move for fear of its being regarded as a sign of weakness, and 
Oxenstierna argued in vain in the council on September 17th I
that the time was not yet ripe. His influence was approaching j
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its nadir, and his opponents could point to Denmark's
negotiations in Vienna as as an additional argument for action.
William's expectations of Sweden were, as has been seen, 
slight, but he seems nevertheless to have been unprepared for 
the mediation offer when it came. He considered it 'very 
strange for one who claims to be an ally* when leijonberg 
presented his memorial on October 20th. It would lead, he 
feared, not to the general peace which the Swedes professed " 
to desire, but to the defection of his weaker allies, which 
he always dreaded. He could not see how Gabriel Oxenstierna 
could be allowed any longer to attend the Hague Congress - a 
view shared by Berka.*^ It is hardly surprising that there 
was widespread suspicion of French intrigue, and Nottingham 
instructed Duncombe to discover 'out of what Quiver this Arrow 
comes, whether from France thro' Sv/eden or originally from 
Sweden itselfe', and later William wrote, that 'the step which 
Sweden has taken must result from French corruption, or it is 
incomprehensible*.  ^ When Gabriel Oxenstierna notified 
Heinsius of his instructions on October 17th, the pensionary 
replied that nothing could suit French purposes better than 
Sv/eden's action.*^ Fresh alarms came with the rumour that 
Palmquist had visited king James to inform him of the mediation 
offer. Bengt Oxenstierna assured Duncombe that no orders had 
been sent to do so and that he could not believe such behaviour 
of the Swedish legation secretary, who was 'cautious to a fault'. 
He believed that the accusation was merely a device to sound his 
reactions and complained to leijonberg that 'the Allies are so
23
i n
suspicious that one must grow tired of them'.^ Sut William’s 
reactions to the report may well have Seen prompted by fear of 
the conclusion of a separate peace under Swedish auspices which
O O
did not recognize the English Revolution. He finally replied
to Charles*offer on November 30th,in the only way,really open ;
to him. While thanking his brother sovereign,he stated ’que
sa Majesté s'est engagé par les Traittês conclus avec les
Alliés de ne pas entrer même en aucune negotation de paix ou
f 29de Tresve, sans le consentement commun de tous les Allies'.
The suspicion of which Bengt Oxenstierna had warned -
that the mediation proposal was a device to avoid giving treaty
aid - was reinforced by the-behaviour of the Swedish troops
under Mellin, who immediately seized the opportunity offered
by a rash dismissal of them by the elector of Saxony to march
back to their bases after less than a month in the field and
ignored an appeal to stay made by the Emperor through Horn,
30the Swedish envoy in Vienna. William made no secret of his
indignation and gave his support to efforts to halt the march
and obtain Charles'consent to the troops' maintenance on allied
territory during the winter months in order to ensure their
prompt despatch in 1691. Haren proposed to Oxenstierna on
October 28th that they should be supported in the United 
32Provinces. The council decided,however, on the following 
day in the chancellor's absence that the Dutch attitude to 
Swedish trade did not entitle them to any consideration but 
that they should not be told this so bluntly until they applied 
for aid in 1691; for the time being Haren was to be answered,
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with, some justification, that his proposal came too late, when
the troops were nearly, home, that they must be replenished
and re-equipped, that the treatment.of Swedes already in Dutch i
service gave little cause for confidence and that the Emperor
himself was responsible for the dismissal of the troops by the
elector of Saxony.^ In December Haren made the anticipated
34request for aid and was met by the reply prepared. |
At the beginning of November Duncombe told Nottingham 
that Haren * judges, and I must owne I doe so too, that during 
this war we shall only spend our owne time and or Masters money 
to no purpose’ in trying to win Sweden and that Charles’ 
ministers were ’to far engaged with Prance to be brought off*?'5 
Others were, however, more optimistic. In Vienna a project 
emerged from conversations in December between Solms, Heemskerck) 
and Paget by which Leopold promised a third of a subsidy of
30,000 ecus per month to Sweden in exchange for 6,000 troops. 
This was sent to England for William's approval,^ but the j
financial situation in the Maritime Powers doomed such a scheme 
to failure from the start, even if Sweden had shown any serious l 
intention to bargain away her troops.
The cool reception accorded to the mediation offer intensi-j 
fied a crisis long developing in Swedish policy. Charles ZI’s j 
growing impatience with the Maritime Powers, especially in 
regard to their cavalier treatment of his subjects' ships,is s
fully in evidence in the council debate on October 29th and !i
i
rose to such a pitch that Leijonberg wrote to Bengt Oxenstierna j 
on November 25th that ’I find my Most Gracious King and Master 's;[
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orders to me (diverge) so sharply from the former style of
writing that matters seem to have come to such an extremity
that a rupture between Sweden and England is preferred to a
friendly composition.'-58 At the beginning of November Charles
39ordered a general review of the situation in the council. 
Gyldenstolpe, who had by now come to eclipse temporarily a 
highly embarassed chancellor and shared the king's ear with 
Bielke, expressed the concern at allied distrust and hostility, 
which he knew his master also felt and which, in view of the 
continuing allied negotiations with Denmark, led him to support 
a policy of closer co-operation with the princes of North 
Germany.^-8 Bielke was given permission to negotiate with 
thè duke of Hanover, but the king was unwilling to commit 
himself when the marshal reported that Ernst August, anxious 
to bring pressure to bear on .the Emperor in his struggle for 
the ninth electorate, was offering to leave the war. Bielke 
was, however, far from being discouraged and proceeded to 
develop his grandiose plans for a third party, which had been 
originally mooted by Bidal during his visit to Stockholm; of 
these his master was told nothing.^ v
(c) Denmark and the Defensive Alliance of November 1690
Amerongen was far from happy about his return to Copenhagen. 
He was in his seventieth year and 'had not thought in (his) old 
age to be employed abroad.* He had been heaped with honours 
by the Danes twenty years before but was now being sent to a 
court where the king he had known and most of the ministers were 
dead. He left behind him an aged wife and a large brood of
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/S  ograndchildren,whom he entrusted to William's favour. r
He arrived in the Danish capital on June 3rd, was granted
a private audience on the 9th and four days later asked for
the appointment of commissioners with whom lie could discuss
43the purpose of his mission. It soon became apparent that
William's reluctance in supporting the embassy had been
justified. In the first conference on June 20th the Danes
replied to the renewed invitation to enter the Grand Alliance
that France was offering large sums for simple neutrality,and
Jessen urged la Fouleresse to persuade the English king to have
Amerongen sent full instructions.^ Molesworth was no less
surprised and disappointed at the vagueness of the Dutch envoy's
45orders,and Amerongen sent home repeated requests for powers. ^
He was told that, in view, of the recent disasters,the States-
General could not raise its -subsidy offers,but in mid-July,
after discussions in the Hague which placed the financial
problem even further to the fore, orders were sent to negotiate
an 'Allyance defensive provisionally and in toe an Allyance or
league offensive',for which a project was to be drawn up and
4.6sent .home for 'approval.^
Just before the arrival of the news of Beachy Head, when 
both allied envoys dared 'not go to Court for fear of being 
affronted thereMol eswor th revived the offer to negotiate 
a defensive alliance on the basis of Bodmyn's project excluding 
article 4 on trade, which was still to be settled in the Hague. 
At the end of July the Danes decided to accept this, drew up 
a project and sent to lente details of the debt owed' by the
WUnited Provinces.^8
Particular exception was taken on tlie allied side to the
Danish demands for the entry of one party into the war if the
other were attacked, the granting of the Elbe toll and freedom 
4-9of trade. Nottingham wrote to William that ’the whole 
treaty (even without these new demands) seem in the present
5circumstances to be of no advantage but only to the K. of Den.' 
The English king agreed that Denmark would be the chief gainer 
but, since he saw no hope of an offensive alliance owing to 
the impossibility of offering subsidies, which would then be 
demanded by all the German princes, thought that no better
51treaty could be hoped for. -
Amerongen continued to urge an offensive alliance accord-
52ing to his instructions. At the end of August Christian 
stated that he was still willing to lend 12,000 troops in 
exchange for subsidies of 600,000 Rd. p.a. but considered 
that a defensive alliance, which, he had pointed out, would 
defeat France’s aims to bring about a union between Denmark 
and Sweden, whom she had already won, should be settled first 
and insisted anew on the conclusion of a definitive trade 
treaty with the United Provinces and an agreement on debts, 
which did not, however, have to be implemented until after 
the war.*^ The States-General finally agreed to empower its 
envoy to negotiate on these preliminaries side by side with 
Molesworth, and a conference with Danish commissioners took^’ 
place on October 24th.^ Matters moved surprisingly swiftly. 
The alterations demanded in the Danish alliance project were
conceded, as was also Molesworth’s proposal that a time limit
should "be set for the negotiations on mutual financial claims
and commercial differences written into the alliance. Christian
proposed that three months should be allowed for these and for
the ratification, which was to be consequent upon thdr successful
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conclusion. On November 3rd the defensive alliance was signed.
In spite of Amsterdam’s opposition to the conclusion of 
a trade treaty with Denmark, Heinsius anticipated that it would 
be ratified.y William was not so optimistic but was particu­
larly anxious to obtain Danish troops and supported a plan to 
exchange Irish prisoners for recruits under threat of reducing 
or dismissing the Danish regiments, though in fact recruiting 
was his responsibility under the terms of the original treaty, 
and the non-payment of the remainder of the sums still owing
r7to Christian. The Danes replied to this that the Swedish 
offer of mediation had caused such misgiving that they must
COthink twice before reducing their forces. Denmark made the
fullest possible use of Charles’ action to sow distrust of her
neighbour among the Allies and demonstrate the value of her
own alliance,while threatening at the same time to accept
Louis’ offers for neutrality. Negotiations in fact were
opened with Martingas in November,when the failure of
59liliencron’s talks in Vienna became apparent.
The Danish demand for a toll at Gluckstadt, which played 
such a large part in the latter, was also a cause of friction 
with the Maritime Powers, as well as revealing differences 
between them. Sweden and Brunswick-Luneburg led the opposition
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from the beginning,and Berlin feared that the imposition would 
become permanent,but there was no official reaction from 
either England or the United Provinces until Rycaut, who had 
been informed of the Danish condition by Paget, forwarded to 
Nottingham on July 22nd a protest from the English merchants
go
in Hamburg. Paget had already claimed that the toll ’would
gl
effect ye English traders in those parts very much’, and the
question was discussed in the English council on July 31st.^
As a result Paget, Dursley and Johnston were now ordered to
oppose the demand vigorously, which', Paget complained ’comes 
63very late'. Both Ahlefeldt and Lente protested at the.
attitude in Vienna, especially as the Maritime Powers had
promised to assist Liliencron’s negotiations, and Nottingham
told the former quite unblushingly that no instructions had
been sent to Paget to account for this.^ The Dutch were
considerably less interested in the matter, and Dursley reported
that,although 'this State is very jealous of the concerns of
their merchants...theire merchants interest will no ways enter
into the ballance.' 5 In view of this Paget,and James Johnston
in Berlin were told on August 12th to be 'less vigorous in
opposing this grant though you cannot give your consent to it
66till the king's pleasure be knowne' , but Paget acted on his
C r j
previous instructions and presented a memorial to the Emperor.'
Heemskerck confined himself to proposing orally to Leopold that
6 8other means might be found for satisfying Denmark. Molesworth
69could not 'see that it will be very prejudicial' , and Paget • 
was finally ordered to be wholly passive.^ When Ahlefeldt
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thanked William for this,the king pointed out that, since
there was considerable opposition, he could not promise to
give the plan any positive support, which might alienate
Brunswick and Brandenburg, and urged the discovery of an
71alternative method. Such changes in allied attitudes did 
not add to Danish confidence. f
The three months agreed upon for the ratification of the 
defensive alliance passed without the reaching of any agreement 
on either a new Dano-Dutch trade treaty or the Danish claims 
for payment of Dutch debts, and early in February Molesworth 
and Amerongen were sent ratifications which omitted the clause 
imposing this time-limit in the hope that Christian would rest 
content with a promise that negotiations would continue and 
matters be settled as soon as possible; Heinsius regretted
bitterly that such a precise term had been fixed. The Danes .
73
would, however, agree to no more than an extension of six weeks, 
and, when this was also exceeded without any progress having
74
been made, the question had, for the time being, to be shelved.
Nottingham wrote optimistically to Molesworth on April 4th that,
'there is no doubt but they will ratify ye defensive alliance,
7C>for they have all from Us, that they can wish*. J The Danes 
were unfortunately not of his persuasion.
(ii) French Trade and Armed Neutrality
(a) The Hague Negotiations (July 1690 - January 1691).
The negotiations on Scandinavian trade with France,ojv 
which so much in William's Northern policy depended and which • 
appeared ready to begin in July,were long delayed. • Beachy
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Head greatly weakened the allied position but had little effect 
on the basic attitudes of the Danish and Swedish courts. Den­
mark, while professing a greater willingness to compromise, 
sought to strengthen her position by closer co-operation with 
Sweden. At the beginning of August Christian agreed to limit 
sailings to eight ports of his kingdom and to enforce a strict 
ban on contraband, although lente was ordered to avoid,if 
possible, any discussion of its definition and to demand compensa­
tion for seizures as a preliminary condition.^ Sweden continu­
ed to demand her full treaty rights. Gabriel Oxenstierna was 
instructed on July 15th that, if the Maritime Powers insisted on 
modification of these,he was then to employ Wrede’s criticisms 
of the project presented by'Duncombe and finally to offer sale , 
of Swedish exports, of which tar was considered the most suitable. 
The envoy urged his government not to provoke the Allies too 
much for fear of reprisals when they should regain their lost 
power^® and for some time Sweden was anxious to seem reasonable.
Orders were sent to her German provinces to obey strictly the
79Imperial avocatoria.
However, as has been shown, Charles’ reserves ofvpatience 
ran low as Wrede pressed harder for reprisals and Zeeland 
privateers continued their seizures. On August 23rd Gabriel 
Oxenstierna was told to demand reparation, threaten reprisals 
and warn of the dangers to friendship between Sweden and the 
Maritime Powers.*^ The first Swedish convoy had passed through 
the Channel without incident, much to Y/illiam’s relief,
August sir Ralph Délavai seized seven merchantmen a n d-their two
l6o
escorts on their way to France with naval stores.8 "^ Nottingham
advised his master that, while nothing should be done to hazard
the principle of the convention, especially as the convoy
appeared to be an attempt to test allied reactions after Beachy
Head, 'at this time it may be expedient to buy rather than
confiscate these merchandises, in case the king of Swede would
agree to such termes for trading with Fr. for the fniture as
your Majesty and the States should approve', and Delaval himself 
• *
was ’a little tender of being too severe with them, being 
sensible of the use we have of their commodities.'8  ^ William 
agreed and, after some delay, instructed Nottingham to offer 
to buy the naval supplies in the ships.8  ^ Much difficulty 
still remained over the price which the Swedes would accept, 
and, while the States-General was 'not overwell satisfyd with 
this business', being faced as they were with.a fait accompli,i
Charles protested that his subjects were being forced to sell 
their goods against their will.8^
One of the States-General's objections to the English 
action was that it would prompt Gabriel Oxenstierna to raise 
his demands, although talks with him had not yet begun.8'5 He 
objected firstly that the powers of Dursley and the Dutch 
deputies were not as precise as his own and then rejected
g cHeinsius' proposal to sit 'pell mell as at the Congress.'
IHis obstructiveness was in the spirit if not according to the
letter of his instruct ions, and Diirsley believed that either
'he has not mind to treate at all or at least greater disputes
" 87will be raised when we come to it'» lente was unwilling to
I6l
appear more eager than the Swede but was agreeable to making 
preliminary arrangement s
By the beginning of October all. seemed at last ready,and 
Dursley and the States-General agreed on the terms to be offer­
ed, terms very similar to those proposed by Duncombe earlier 
in the year. These were presented to the Northern envoys on 
October 17th. ^  Gabriel Oxenstierna intimated that, if the
number of ships allowed to trade were left to Charles’ 
discretion and sufficient compensation offered, something might
be done, but his official reply was in accordance with Wrede's 
90memorandum. Heinsius confessed to William that Oxenstierna's
refusal to propose new expedients made him doubt if the Swede
91had any serious intention to reach an agreement. . Lente 
still demanded a preliminary settlement on the Danish ships 
which had been seized and rejected the demands for visitation 
and the counter-signing of passes by allied envoys, but he 
did . agree to the principle of limiting the number of ships 
engaging in trade with France, although his demand for fifty 
was considered too high.^ 2
Berks’s brother Nostitz, just replaced in Stockholm by 
Franz Ottokar Starhemberg,arrived in the Hague in November 
with a highly optimistic report that an allowance of twelve 
to fifteen ships and annual compensation of 25 - 50,000 Rd. 
would satisfy 'Sweden.^ Heinsius was rightly sceptical, since
neither Imperial diplomat bore any written instructions and 
Gabriel Oxenstierna showed no sign of yielding,but William 
thought the offer, as well he might, ’not wholly unreasonable*,
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and Haren was ordered to try.to negotiate on this basis. 
Gyldenstolpe and Lillieroot showed some willingness to discuss 
matters with the Dutch envoy in the chancery debate on December 
30th, but Akerhielm urged the full settlement of all merchants’ 
claims before anything more were done, and in a lively council 
meeting on January 2nd, in which the chancellor and Stenbock 
found themselves quite isolated, Charles refused to discuss
95any new expedients. At no stage was there any acknowledgement
of the original proposals, which Nostitz had given the
impression were of Swedish provenance. Haren was told that
compensation could be discussed, but he replied that, according
96
to his orders, this could only, be done in the Hague.
(b) Danish Reprisals
While Sweden debated and protested it was Denmark who
94
first passed to action. On December 12th Christian resolved to 
arrest Dutch ships in the Sound. A stream of memorials from
Lente demanding satisfaction for the seizures of Danish ships 
was having no apparent effect and pressure from their owsrs 
demanded some outlet, but the king was also anxious to prove his 
sincerity to a suspicious Sweden, whose help in defence of trade 
he was soliciting, and to France, with whom negotiations for a
 ^ +r«=*atv were in full swing. He made much ofprofitable neutrality treaty
, ^n^ing. at Amerongen’s request, the number of his moderation in reducing,
. Tflmiarv 10th agreed to release these on ships held to six and on January x
 ^ v^nwn-tr’q oromise that negotiations would be- being given the Dutch envoy s pro
 ^ o vniiam s h o u l d  arrive in the Hague, butgin as soon as william
■»-p no agreement had been reached in
with the threat that,
At the end of the month Christian went further and agreed to 
accept a lump sum in compensation and.to reduce the fifty ships 
originally demanded for the French trade hy five or Six, 
although he rejected the Allies* condition that each ship 
would make only one voyage."^ A trade treaty project was 
even drawn up with Amerongen and sent to the Hague for comment, 
and, as has been seen, the time limit for ratification of the 
defensive alliance was extended by six weeks.
Yet the underlying suspicions and differences remained.
The Dutch ships were re-arrested twice before the six weeks 
expired101 and agreement on French trade expedients was still 
far off. Amerongen and Molesworth drew up a project on the 
latter, to which the Danes replied with one to which they bound 
themselves for only sixteen days. It was in any case unaccept­
able in the allied capitals1? 2 and any progress which had been 
made was nullified when Molesworth was informed on March 9th 
that, since Sweden had been granted full freedom of trade,
De ran ark must demand the same and could no longer agree to any
. 103limitation in number of ships or lading.
In spite of mediation by Brandenburg, little w s  accomplish­
ed in the Hague, and consternation greeted Lente's threat of a
convention with Sweden in defence of trade.104 Although a
0.  ^ nf February 19th ordered no moreStates-General resolution oi
 ^  ^ Q +n he made under the terms of the ban,arrests of neutral ships to ce
eighteen Danish merchantmen were confiscated the same month and 
Christian, convinced that the Maritime Powers were playing for
98Copenhagen within six weeks,new reprisals would take place.
time and confident in the effects of his policy, ordered new
reprisals on February 25th. The original victims found themselves
again contrained, since they had not been able as yet to
leave harbour, and frigates were desoatehed to seize more up to 
105 ,
a round dozen. On March 10th the threatened convention
with Sweden was signed in Stockholm, and three days later
Christian resolved to accept Martangis’ offer of 200,000 Rd. p.a.
and help if attacked on account of the reprisals in exchange
for a strict neutrality during the war and the maintenance106
of an army of 15,000 men. William’s Northern policy seemed
to be in ruins.
(c) The League of Armed Neutrality.
The fear of a Dano-Swedish rapprochement to the benefit
of France, especially in defence of their common commercial
interests, had haunted the minds of allied statesmen to a
greater or lesser extent ever since the reactions of the Northern
Crowns to the ban on French trade had become apparent, but the
alliance of February 1690 had proved to contain no provisions
for the protection of trade, and many comforted themselves with
the unlikelihood that two rivals of such long stahding would
agree on anything for any length of time. At the end of
November Greg was writing home that ’it ought to be considered
y"k a War may possibly happen betwixt these two Crowns before
107
our War with France be ended’.
A certain strain had indeed been apparent b«tween the 
two powers in the middle of the year, when Danish troop y -
concentrations in South Jutland seemed to threaten Holstein-
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16?
i nsGottorp, but these had dispersed again without incident.
and the situation in Stockholm grown more and more favourable
to Bielke's policy. The marshal'assured Christian through
Ehrenschild of Sweden’s eagerness for the co-operation Denmark
desired as her relations with the Allies deteriorated, while
109Charles' impatience grew. The Swedish king remained
suspicious and unwilling to commit his realm, but in one of
the general debates on foreign policy on November 25th, at
0
which Wrede and Gyldenstolpe supported negotiations with.
Stockfleth, he expressed his willingness to consider any
proposals, which might be made.^^®
He did not have to wait long. On December 13th, the
day of the reprisals, orders were sent from Copenhagen to the
Danish envoy to explain that Christian had been encouraged to
take action by Swedish threats against the Maritime Powers and
to offer to negotiate on joint measures. "*'*'*■ This was discussed
in the council on January 2nd,at the same time as a renewed offer
by Duncombe to buy Swedish exports and Nostitz’ proposals. In
accordance with the previous decision Oxenstierna, Wrede and
Gyldenstolpe were deputed to listen to Stockfleth’s suggestions,
while committing themselves to nothing and continuing to try
112to reach agreement with Haren on compensation. The Dane
was found to be.without detailed instructions,and it was 
proposed by him that a Swedish project should be sent to Bielke 
to discuss in Copenhagen. Charles was not averse to Copenhagen, 
since the previous talks had been in Stockholm, but insisted on 
the use of normal diplomatic channels, and Wrede and Gyldenstolpe
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urged strongly the case for Stockholm for fear they would 
lose control to the chancellor. On January 31st Stockfleth. 
was sent the necessary powers but instructed to wait for a
113
Swedish project.
Hews of the negotiations soon leaked out, and Swedish
'envoys were ordered to make no secret of them, though to avoid
114
goirg into any details. Gabriel Oxenstierna reported a
more conciliatory attitude, and Amerongen, who had also received
word of a report from Meyercrone, the Danish envoy in Paris,
that Prance approved of a triple agreement to include herself,
thought the situation serious enough to send his secretary
113
de Bie to the Hague to report. Haren and Duncombe redoubled
their efforts, and the latter offered full freedom of trade with 
certain regulations, to prevent abuses, a move which, as has 
been seen, Denmark exploited immediately. But, when he devel­
oped his scheme in a conference on February 23rd, the Swedes found
his conditions unacceptable on the ground of possible French116
reactions. They offered once more to sell their tar.
On the same day the Swedish project, which Stockfleth had
been promised at the beginning of the month, was at .last handed
to him, but Christian was already growing more and more impatient
with the length of the negotiations aS the day when he must
embark on new reprisals approached. He was most anxious for
Swedish support for these and had ordered his envoy to agree to
117
any reasonable Swedish conditions. 'Stockfleth, who had
noted with alarm a growing suspicion pf Danish intentions in
Stockholm, was only too pleased to sign as soon as possible.
118
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The treaty was for four years, enjoined both parties to make 
reprisals if the. Maritime Powers failed to give satisfaction 
within four months and to go' to war if counter-reprisals 
resulted. Each side was, however, to he free to continue 
its separate negotiations. Christian ratified these terms 
on March 23rd.
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Chapter 7 
Stalemate
(i) The Results of Armed Neutrality and the Temporary Settlement 
“cTf F r enhTT~Tr ad e"~(l,!ar cft 16~91 -'"Oc'toFer lo9^)
(a) The 1691 Conventions with Denmark
The crisis caused by the second seizure of Dutch ships in 
the Sound at the end of February 1691 and the creation of the 
first league of Armed Neutrality shortly afterwards resolved 
itself in a temporary solution of the problem of Scandinavian 
trade with France and the abandonment of all pretensions to 
enforce the original ban, a ban surely breached already by the 
offers of compensation for the past and limited sailings for the 
future. On March 6th the Danish council had resolved to reject 
the latter conditions on hearing of Duncombe’s offer in Stockholm 
of free trade subject to guarantees against fraud. It proceed­
ed to draw up a convention, which included a compensation agree­
ment on this basis,and was to be ratified in three or six weeks 
depending upon whether William was or was not in the United 
Provinces.1 j
i
• Heinsius could protest as much as he liked that an offer, .j
I
in the form the Danes claimed, had never been made to Sweden ! 
and that the Danish envoys in the Hague and London had no powers
oto negotiate claims; the position of the Maritime Powers was 
extremely vulnerable. The number of Dutch ships lying within i
i • I
the Copenhagen boom was mounting, Christian was threatening to 1 
sell those seized if no satisfaction were given within four
3weeks and there was no guarantee that Sweden would not follow
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her ally's example. Amerongen was consequently empowered to
negotiate, but even then only if Denmark seemed sincere and
willing to give, military aid; otherwise, he was told, there
4was no reason to waste Dutch money. On April 15th he 
communicated his willingness and ability to open discussions 
and asked for the immediate release of the sixteen ships held. 
Such an offer was, however, not enough for the Danes, who 
demanded agreement on a definite sum to be given in compensation 
first. Amerongen finally gave way and began to examine with 
Danish commissioners the merchants' demands, which stood at
200,000 Rd.6
On April 50th he was prepared to present a project for a 
convention, which was intended to govern the conduct of Danish 
trade with France and the attitude of the Maritime Powers to 
it for the future. It revealed the weakness of William's 
position and his anxiety to reach a solution and break up the 
threatening Northern entente. .No limitation was now placed 
on the number of ships to be engaged in the trade, although 
sailings were still confined to seven Danish and Norwegian ports 
and-all coastinm trade was banned. All passes were to be
7
renewed by Christian and ships held by each party to be released. 
The Danes, fully aware as they were of the Maritime Powers' hopes! 
of breaking their links with Sweden, wanted to include a clause 
promising the latter compensation. Although William could see 
no objection to this, Amerongen could not agree. On the Danish 
counter-project <Jf mid-May he again pleaded lack of instructions 
but was persuaded by Falaiseau to double his original compensatjon
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offer of 30,000 Rd. Falaiseau, who acted as mediator through­
out the discussions, intimated that the Dutch were prepared to 
go to 80,000 Rd,, but this was still not enough when the merchants 
claims could not be reduced below 128,870 Rd.^®
New proposals were put forward by the Brandenburg envoy 
on behalf of Amerongen and Molesworth. Contraband was to be 
defined and was to include tar, goods were to be carried to and 
tC from France direct, and no privateers were to be allowed to prey 
in Danish and Norwegian waters.^ Christian would at first 
agree only to an oral promise on the first and second, valid 
for 1691, and on the last merely offered that two frigates 
should patrol the Norwegian coast. The allied envoys managed 
finally to get the validity of the first two conditions extended 
to eight or nine months and all the terms in writing. They 
could not obtain a close definition of contraband but decided
IPto rest content with their gains. Anerongen raised his 
compensation offer to 85,000 Rd., which the Danes, having decided 
 ^ on June 12th to be content with 80,000, gladly accepted,and both 
instruments were signed on June 20th. ^  Christian, still 
anxious to give a demonstration of Northern solidarity, pointed 
out that both were invalid unless agreement was also reached 
with Sweden and told Charles that he had settled for so little 
because he had heard that such an agreement was very near.^^
William declared at the end of June that Denmark and France 
had drawn so, close together that any compensation agreed to 
would be ”raoney down the drain” and, when news came of the 
pact, feared the effect which it would have on Sweden, who was
9
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for the moment behaving well. Heinsius considered Amerongen
had given too much away, especially in his failure to have
contraband defined closely,, and refused to advise the immediate
release of Dutch trade with Norway, banned since the first 
16reprisals. Disputes also arose over the mutual release of
the ships and only after strong representations had been made
were those belonging to the United Provinces set free on July
1710th, and then only on payment of caution money.
The English king doubted if the Danes would agree to any
“I Q
changes in the June convention, but the States-General deter­
mined to insist on certain elucidatory articles as the price of 
its ratification; contraband would, for example,have to be
defined in accordance with the original demand and all French
10privateers banned from Norwegian ports. Christian V agreed
to all their conditions except the exclusion of privateers,
which, he claimed, would not be in accordance with his neutrality
but he promised to order Norwegian ports to refuse to allow any
prize to be sold, to release any prize taken in Norwegian waters
and to force any privateer in harbour to wait twenty-four hours
20after the departure of a merchantmen- before giving'chase.
Heinsius still wanted the enforcement of-an absolute prohibition,
21but the States-General was satisfied and agreed to ratify.
Ratifications of the compensation treaty were exchanged in«
Copenhagen on September 2nd, but negotiations on the elucidatory 
articles and the toll and trade treaty, which were re-opened, 
were interrupted by the death of Amerongen, possibly hastened 
by a"quarrel with Molesworth, on September 28th and hampered by
15
&
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the delay in sending the English ratification, which did not, 
arrive until early December,with modifications similar to those 
ashed for by the States-General. -The final ceremony took place 
on December 21st in-the presence of Molesworth, Goes and Haren,
who had arrived on the previous day from Stockholm to try to
22settle the affairs left unfinished by Amerongen.
William had good reason to be pleased with his envoy’s • 
work. The new agreement was, it is true, a far cry from what
I
he had envisaged two years previously, but Denmark had, in spite 
of her league with Sweden, acceded to nearly all the demands 
originally put forward by Amerongen in April and-Junej naval 
supplies for France from Norway could now be legitimately seized; 
a mutually acknowledged check was imposed on general Danish trade 
with the common enemy/and the number of possible causes of 
friction had been considerably reduced. More important still, 
however, was the effect which the convention could be expected 
to have on Dano-Swedish relations and the brighter prospects 
which it opened up of reaching agreement with Sweden also.
The readiness of the Danes to agree to the elucidatory articles 
is some measure of the rapidly fading force of the Armed Neutral­
ity league. As Christian’s stispicions of Sweden’s seriousness 
grew he had less and less compunction in agreeing to measures, 
such as the'inclusion of tar in contraband, which would weaken 
his neightbour’s bargaining position.
While he refused to risk his neutral status by excluding 
French privateers from his ports, he proposed in September and 
again in November that the Baltic and North Sea.should be
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neutralised. The fact that Louis, according to the Danes, 
had, after initial rejection, showed interest in the plan
I
aroused allied.suspicions. Heinsius even suggested that 
France was hoping to use it in order to convince the weaker 
members of the Alliance that separate peace negotiations were 
being initiated and feared that its execution would at best 
cause them to relax their restrictions on French trade. Even 
Sweden,, who also suspected that the proposal had originally 
come from France when asked to support it, declared that it 
would be impossible to agree on terms with the Maritime Powers; 
it seems that she was unwilling to risk associating herself 
with such a hopeless project and incurring further allied 
displeasure to no purpose. In face of the apathetic response 
Lente was ordered in January 1692 not to press the subject, 
which was dropped for the time being.^
(b) Karen’s Compensation'Agreement with Sweden
It had been hoped that Sweden might be persuaded to join 
the Anglo-Dutch convention with Denmark or conclude on similar 
terms, but she remained adamant in defence of her treaty rights 
and in demanding negotiations on compensation alone. Karen 
was authorized in March to discuss claims against the United 
Provinces as a preliminary, to a wider agreement.^ The 
talks which opened as a result were often useful to Sweden 
as an answer to Stockfleth's repeated invitations to join 
Denmark in the reprisals she had no intention of making alone; 
not until mid-June had all the claims from Swedish merchants, 
with the relevant papers, been received in Stockholm for
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examination by the commission appointed for the purpose.
But there were strong suspicions among the Swedes that Baren 
was also hoping to gain time, and-Charles was genuinely anxious 
that the work of reducing the claims to a reasonable figure 
should be completed as soon as possible to avoid being blamed 
for delay. He was not, however, able to prevent Dutch 
accusations that Sweden was holding matters up in order to
nf.escape her treaty aid obligations.
On October 14th Haren was finally presented with a
demand of; 80,216 Rd. for fifteen ships, which William
considered exhorbitant and a sure sign of Sweden's lack of
27serious intention to reach a settlement. The envoy himself 
was doubtful what his next step should be and would almost 
certainly have held out for a considerably reduced sum, if 
he had not received instructions to leave for Copenhagen and 
been warned by Bengt Oxenstierna through Duncombe, who himself 
urged a conclusion 'well assured in My Conscience that it 
would be for the service of my Master and his Aliys', of the 
certainty of reprisals if he left without having reached an
pQ
agreement. He was also concerned with the que'stion of
treaty aid and tried to salve his conscience by including a
clause promising that it would now be sent, but this was
understandably refused as irrelevant, a.nd> with no further
discussion,a convention was signed on November 19th. It
was expressly stated to be based on the terms of the 1679
treaty between the two countries, which was thus acknowledged
o qto be in full force.
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In spite of his initial reaction to the Swedish claims,
which he still declared to he unjust, William welcomed HarenTs
settlement more enthusiastically thaa he had Amerongen’s. He
was worried, however, by the opening left in it for further
claims to be made for past injuries and recommended that no
30
money should be paid until this loophole had been closed.
His advice was not taken, but* as always in such matters touching 
the provinces’ pockets, there was much trouble in securing the 
various ratifications, and, in spite of repeated Swedish protests,
3iall was not completed until April of the following year.
(c) Trade .Negotiations in 1692
The effective abandonment of the policy embodied in the 
Anglo-Duteh convention of 1689 (it was never specifically 
revoked) meant in no way the end of the difficulties over neutral 
trade. Ships claimed by the Northern Crowns continued to be 
seized on various pretexts, new claims for compensation presented 
and accusations of fraud and injustice freely made. The 
activities of English and Dutch privateers indeed grew, and their
32
control became an ever more pressing problem for their governments. 
These developments help to put William’s original policy in 
perspective and to reveal even more clearly that it was an aggrava­
ting rather than a decisive factor in his Northern policy.
As a result of the change in the attitude of the 
Maritime Powers to neutral trade which had expressed itself in 
the negotiations of 1691 and the Danish convention, new / 
instructions to their naval officers had to be 
drawn up and some attempt made to reach a uniformity of
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from March to September 1692 no agreement could, however, be
reached between .London and the Hague, largely owing to the
English objections to the freedom of trade, especially in regard
to contraband and the principle of 'free ships, free goods'
allowed to Sweden and Portugal in their treaties with the United
Provinces, which the States-General refused to depart from, and
William could find "no other expedient than to leave them 
33unsettled". The confusion continued.
Negotiations in Copenhagen on a trade treaty between Denmark
and the United Provinces, which was always insisted upon by the
Danes as a necessary preliminary to the conclusion of an alliance
had by the end of 1691 reached such a stage that only the question
of the privileges and number of Danish "defence" ships barred
the way to agreement, and on January 25th Christian's co’tncil
decided to accept Goes latest project, although grudgingly and
with every intention to interpret it in Denmark's favour when
34the occasion should arise. But Goes then declared himself
to be without adequate instructions, new demands arrived from
35the Hague, and the breach re-opened. In July Lente was ordered
to offer the abolition of defence ships if Sweden would do the
same, but further than this the Danes would not go, and negotiations
36were again broken off.
Denmark soon became dissatisfied with the way in which the
convention of 1691 was being executed by the Maritime Powers;
la Fouleresse reported in April that it had still not been
37notified to English privateers. It did not prevent the seizure
practice. After a correspondence and negotiations lasting
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of her ships,and the activities of the Zeeland "capers” 
continued unhampered. In the spring Bolle luxdorph,the new 
Danish envoy in .Stockholm, was again urged to seek Swedish' 
co-operation in making joint protests and to negotiate further
33reprisals, while lente made thinly veiled threats in the Hague.
The wording of a memorial which was presented by la Fouleresse
in March caused such offence that William approved a decision
to accept no more memorials from him until a suitable apology
39had“ been made, and he was recalled in June. Sweden agreed
to discuss common measures and draw up model memorials threaten­
ing further action and presenting fresh claims for compensation,
AO
but she showed her usual reluctance on the question of reprisals.
All preparations were completed by the Northern Powers in May,
and Christian added a threat to withdraw his troops from
William’s if all were not settied.^ la Hougue, however,
changed the situation as Beachy Head had done two years before.
Lillieroot, who had arrived in the Hague shortly after the
battle as the new Swedish envoy to the States-General, agreed
with lente to postpone an action which might provoke the
42Maritime Powers dangerously at such a time. Not until
August 17th were the demands finally presented, and, in spite
of his new superiority at sea, they seem to have caused William
43no little alarm. ^
Ruraov.rs had reached london from Copenhagen at the beginning
*of the month that fresh Danish seizures were imminent, and Mary 
ordered Russell to prepare a squadron to sail to the Sound if 
necessary.^ William could ’hardly believe (the report) because
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it is so much against the" interest of the Northern Crowns to
interrupt that trade or to breake with Us' and feared that
despatch of the .ships would only drive Denmark into the arms 
45of France. The joint memorial made him much less sure and
caused him to demand an immediate report on the rumour, which
G-reg, who had teen left in Copenhagen as charge d'affaires on
Molesworth's departure under a cloud of Danish displeasure and
without recredentials in June, was ordered to sxipply, and
enquired whether a show of force in the Sound might not after
all he desirable.^ Greg replied that there was no sign of
preparations for reprisals, although 'they can fit out ships
enough in less than a weeks'time to perform it'f^ but,by the
time his letter was received,the king had had news also of the
Swedish answer to a new Danish request for joint action, which
convinced him that Sweden wotild not support Denmark, and had
been told that most of the allied merchant ships were safe.
The squadron, formed with some difficulty, was again dispersed.
About the same time fears of rather a different natiire
were allayed when the terms were learnt of a treaty between
Denmark and Hamburg concluded on August 16th. Reports had
come in at the beginning of the year that Danish passes and
flags were being offered to the city in exchange for a yearly 
49subsidy. Much unofficial traffic of this kind was already
50carried out between the Elbe and France , but such a flagrant 
abuse of neutral rights by Christian brought orders to Rycaut 
to make strong representations to the Hamburg senators against 
such an agreement, which William considered 'no less in
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• rnConsequence than a Neutrality with the French'." The reports
were in fact substantially correct, but Denmark blatantly
denied the charges and protested at such interference. Rycaut
had to confine himself to private representations."*^ The
final treaty, by which Hamburg was to pay Denmark 400,000
Itlbeck marks in nine years in return for Danish protection
and rights in the Greenland fisheries, did not indeed include
any provision for the city's trade with France but not because
of allied representations but because the burgher party had
asked for the clause on passes to be dropped and because
Christian had been unable to appease Louis' wrath at the
expulsion in 1691 of his agent in Hamburg, who had been sent
to Vienna. The Danish negotiators added in a codicil a
promise to continue their efforts to persuade France to accept
the city back into favour, in which case the subsidy to Denmark
53would be increased. The whole incident places Danish 
diplomacy in a far from favourable light.
(ii) Sweden and the War 1691-2
(a) The Second Mediation Offer and the Collapse of the
Hanoverian Third Party
Not until April 1691 was Bengt Oxenstierna able to regain 
much of his old position in the formation of Swedish, foreign 
policy, enough to ensure that his master would not follow the 
dangerous path being laid down for him by Biellce's intrigues
in North Germany. He was still far from secure, and even in
f
1692, when the influence remaining to the governor-general of 
Pomerania was rapidly approaching its nadir, he thought it 
necessary on two occasions to address to Charles lengthy
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defences of his policy and to appeal to him not to provoke
54the Allies too far. Fortunately his tried, cautious counsel 
suited well the kind’s desire to avoid foreign entanglements
55while engaged so deeply in the task of internal reconstruction.
Bielke's activities in Hanover in November 1690 and the
welcome given to him in Copenhagen in March 1691 on his way
back to Stockholm, combined with Sweden's refusal of treaty
troops to Haren and the turning down of a request by Starhemberg
in January for 3,000 troops, all lent colour to William's fears
of a third party led by Sweden to impose Louis' peace terms on
56the Alliance, such as France and Denmark envisaged. Ilis
suspicions certainly remained long after such a project had
ceased to be a serious possibility and indeed reveal his failure
to understand the relative strength of the influences acting
upon Swedish policy. He predicted in April that the fall of
Mons would 'set the Third Party upon its road' and make the
Northern Crowns unmanageable. With the town's fall he predicted
that the Northern Crowns 'will lay down the law to us' and
prescribe terms of peace. He stressed the even greater urgency
57
of gaining Sweden, of which he still obviously entertained hopes.
The decision in the rad on April 22nd to renew the offer of
mediation was a victory for the chancellor's policy, although
also motivated by the allied setbacks at Lions, where Swedish
58losses had been heavy, and at Nice, but the English king proclaim­
ed it a direct result of the formation of a third party and of
the negotiations in Hanover and a move which he had, he claimed,
59 "long expected. It was too dangerous to reject the new
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invitation outright,but Charles was left in little doubt that 
it was considered highly inopportune.^^
A third party was indeed in process of formation as a 
result of Bielke's engagement with Ernst August; Saxe-Gotha
ttand Munster joined Hanover in March. But Charles had already
declared to his marshal in January that he aimed to secure the
mediation for himself alonetand, when in May a Hanoverian envoy
in Stockholm followed an unsuccessful new attempt by Stockfleth
to interest the Swedish king in the idea of joint mediation and
entry into Denmark's neutrality treaty with France with a direct
invitation to Sweden to participate in a full-blooded third
6lparty, he was rebuffed. ■ The best he could obtain was a 
treaty, signed on June 1st, which promised Hanoverian support 
for Swedish mediation but which was otherwise little more than
f
a strengthening of the defensive alliance with Brunswick-
II g  p
luneburg of 1690. ' Denmark repeated her bid to interest
Sweden in July as the consequence of a promise of French
subsidies but had no more success than previously and gave up
the attempt. Stockfleth was recalled in October and replaced
63at the end of the year by Bol3e Luxdorph. The rejection 
of Hanover's blandishments was greetedwith some optimism by 
the Allies. Duncombe reported to Paget shortly afterwards 
that Swedish professions of friendship 'may ye rather be 
trusted to ' in view of the rejection of the third party 
invitation, though he was not overoptimistic about the settle­
ment of trade differences, and Heinsius could not ..believe that' 
Sweden would risk her chances of mediation, to which it was
Hanover's schemes. But news of the Hanoverian alliance
64revived all William's fears. -
.Meanwhile the third party had all but fallen to pieces.
Munster withdrew half the troops she had originally offered,
and Saxe-Gotha retired altogether in August after the death
of duke. Frederick I. Hanover won the new ruler of Saxony,
John George IV, to her side in October, but Ernst August's real
goal drew in sight as Leopold, v.nder certain pressure from
the Maritime Powers, showed himself increasingly more accommoda
ting to his electoral ambitions. In December he broke with
France and in April 1692 formally announced his abandonment
66of tire third party and signed an alliance with the Emperor. 
Whereupon, as will be seen, a new third party rose against
rrhim under Danish leadership.
Of practical military aid from Sweden William expected 
n on e, although some in allied circles still honed that the 
Dutch share of treaty help might be forthcoming in 1692 after 
the. compensation agreement in November.^ On the 20th Haren, 
having failed to have a pledge incorporated into the convention 
itself, presented a formal memorial on the subject. It was 
answered within the week with a statement pointing out that 
certain 'difficulties well known to the Lords States-General*
- a phrase, piirposely vague, which could be taken to refer to 
both the original differences over the naval aid and the f 
compensation still to be paid for Dutch seizures - wou.ld first 
have to be resolved and that peaceful offices would be more
apparent her foreign policy was mainly directed, by joining in
useful than armed intervention.88 Not only was the aid due 
to the United Provinces as good as lost for another year hut 
that which had been granted to the Emperor under the alliance 
of 1682, which had reached the front in 1691 again too late
r
to play an effective part in the campaign, was threatened.by
a Swedish announcement in October that in the renewed version
of this agreement, for which Starhemberg was applying and
which was concluded in May 1692, the terms would not be operative
during the current war, as full' renewal would be injurious to
Sweden's prospects of mediation and to her trade. This meant
that Swedish troops would march to thè Rhine for the last time 
69in 1692. . The stage was thus cleared for the drama of media­
tion. Even if the opportunity to act should never offer itself, 
Charles had at least saved his precious troops from the slaughter. 
But the new year brought, hopes that mediation might not be far 
off.
(b) Swedish Policy in 1692
By the beginning of 1692 fears of Sweden's joining a pro- 
French third party had largely disappeared,.but, while Charles 
himself was respected in the allied camp, Oxenstierna was 
regarded as the sole member of his council who could be trusted 
to keep the Allies in favour, and any support for his rivals in 
the 'francophile party' threatened to destroy even Sweden's 
usefulness as mediator and guarantor of the Westphalian settle­
ment. It is against such a background that must be viewed the 
impact made by the news early in 1692 that France, after a break 
of ten years,was sending to Sweden a fully accredited . envoy.
184
Bielke had originally suggested .through Denmark that
such a move would be welcome in Stockholm,and Denmark herself
70backed it as support for her joint- mediation plans. Louis
regarded such intimations as an official approach,but, when in
November Croissy told the Swedish secretary of the intention
to send an envoy, Charles replied that he feared allied reactions
to such a move before Sweden took on the role of mediator and *
that it would be quite sufficient for the time being to give
la Picquetere an official character. The latter anplied
for an audience, but in October instructions, partly prompted
by the Swedish declaration on the renewal of her Imperial
alliance, had been sent to’the marquisde Bethune, who had
done much to help keep Poland favourable to France, to sail
72from Danzig for Stockholm.
He arrived in January, and Charles hastened to assure the
Allies that this was not to be taken as a sign of any weakening
73in his regard for them. ' Duncombe reported to Colt what was
probably also William's view of the situation, that 'may be
his ministry will be ineffectual, if he means to engage its in
Warr. But for a peace: he therein may goe farr'I^ The
English envoy himself, tired of his ineffectiveness and the
Swedish climate, had already asked to be recalled and had
75been granted his release , but, in view of Béthune's arrival, 
Brunswick-lttneburg urged William not only to retain him but
to send a representative from the States-Ceneral to replace
76  ■ iHaren. The English king agreed'with Heinsius to order his i
envoy to stay for the time being if the pensionary thought he i
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could "be of use, although he did ’not see that he will "be able
77to do any rood', and recommended the sending of a Dutch envoy; 
In reply in March to an enquiry by ITott ingham, who was acting 
under some pressure from Mrs. Dunconbe, who wanted her husband 
back in England, Blathwayt reported that the king thought that 
Duncombe should wait for further orders before taking his
•J  Oleave , but the latter took matters into his own hands. At 
the beginning of July he wrote to Blathwayt that he had receiv­
ed his recredentials at his own request,for 'as I am. an honest 
man, I can beare these people no longer; for I have lost all 
temper and all patience, since I find they will doe nothing, 
notw^standing their protestations, for ye King our Master or
his subjects' and interceded with the secretary to obtain
79William's permission to return to England. It is not clear, 
owing to a defect in the records, whether this permission was
granted,hut the envoy finally departed from Stockholm at the
fin fiiend of August leaving behind John Robinson, his secretary
and chaplain, to act as chargé d'affaires until his successor
were appointed. The United Provinces did not send an envoy
until the spring of 1693.®^
There was in fact no urgency. Bethune's presence did
little to alter the political situation in Stockholm. His
instructions anticipated that it would not be possible to
bring Sweden into the war, and his efforts were devoted to an
attempt to convince Charles of the community of his interests
with those of France and. to heal:the breach caused by the
occupation of Zweibrucken and to making vague promises to
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restore the Westphalian peace in Europe. He was divided from 
the chancellor's opponents by his attempts to win Oxenstierna, 
had little opportunity of direct contact with the king during 
the summer months when Charles was away from his capital and 
had even his proposals for a defensive alliance received coolly. 
He was also a sick man and died in October when on the point of 
beginning alliance talks with the chancellor. Bielke, already 
under suspicion when he left Sweden in September 1691, fell 
further and further into royal disfavour, both because of his 
attempts to execute an independent foreign policy and the 
slowness with which he carried out the 'reduktion' in his 
province, and, when Oxenstierna produced evidence of his intrigues; 
with the French agent Asfeld in Saxony and he travelled to 
Dresden without permission to try and bring about a reconcilia­
tion between Christian V and John George IV, who, he hoped, 
would replace Ernst August in his third party, his master demand­
ed in December the return of his letter promising special grace 
and favour. France's refusal to grant full freedom of trade 
to Sweden and her weakness at sea after La Hougue made it 
difficult for Louis to exploit Charles' commercial grievances 
against the Maritime Powers.
But La Hougue was offset by the fall of Namur in June and 
the bloody battle of Steenkirk in July, and William's mind 
turned seriously to thoughts of a compromise peace, such as 
might at least secure French recognition of the English Revolution«! 
Heinsius had approached Liliieroot for his views even before 
Steenkirk, and William wrote in September of the need for an
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of using Sweden, since negotiations through Stockholm would take
three months and lillieroot was highly suspect in view of his
close connections with Oxenstierna's critics and his forthcoming
85 *marriage into the Olivelcrans family. Bethune's promises that 
the French would restore the settlement at Westphalia provided 
an opening but, since this was applicable only to the Empire 
and could be regarded as an attempt to divide the Allies,
o/T
William insisted upon hearing France’s offers to Spain, 
lillieroot denied that there had been any formal offer on
Qr7
Westphalia, ' and the question was for the time being overshadow­
ed by preparations for the new campaign.
During 1692 a new and politically dangerous situation 
arose in Worth Germany, to which only Sweden’s immediate reaction 
will be examined in this section. Hanover, as has been seen, 
gained Leopold's promise of the electoral hat, which had been
fthe raison d'etre of her third party adventure, but in April 
Denmark concluded an alliance with the dukes of Wolfembuttel 
directed against the remaining members of the Welf family, who 
had become reconciled to each other in 1691, against Hanover's 
electoral ambitions, in defence of the Imperial princes ' rights 
against the Emperor, and against Celle’s continued occupation
O O "
of Saxe-Lauenburg, which threatened Christian's own ambitions 
in the Lower Saxon Circle. France, realizing the possibilities 
of such a conflict, lent her support and appealed to Sweden to 
join ir} opposition to the ninth electorate. But Sweden, careful 
of her friendship” with Brunswick-Lftneburg, mindful of her alliance
end to the war. He was,' however, not sure of the desirability
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with. Ernst August, to whom she had conceded the titles and
f
ceremonies to which an elector was entitled as far back as 
September 1687, and suspicious of Denmark's motives, promised
■ . 89Hanover her support, reserving the rights of the German princes.
Denmark continued to press for an open condemnation of Leopold's
high-handedness, and for a short time it seemed as if she might
be successful. In September Snoilsky, the Swedish envoy in
Ratisbon, was told to steer a middle course in the controversy,
and the reply to a Danish memorial on September.10th promised to
oppose the increasing power of Hanover but stated at the same
time that opposition to the creation of the electorate seemed
likely to prove fruitless in view of Leopold's consent to it and
90
would be taken by the Allies as favouring Prance. The decision 
of the electoral college in November to invest Ernst August, who 
had won Brandenburg and Saxony to his cause, on condition that a 
further Catholic electorate were also created brought forth a 
strong Swedish protest, but Danish hop® of securing active
91
participation faded. Of her moderation in the matter Sweden mads
92
full use to raise her credit at. allied courts.
(iii} Denmark, Hanover and the Hew Third Party 
(a) Danish Policy in 1691 and Trooo Negotiations
Christian's attitude to the war at the turn of the years 
1690/1 was stated clearly in a memorial drawn up in December and a 
council resolution of January. His immediate aim was the 
conclusion of a neutrality treaty with Prance and of the
/
defensive alliance with the Maritime Powers and the settlement
of trade difficulties with the United Provinces. Otherwise
\
he intended to watch the course of the campaign and ally himself
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with the winning side. As has been seen, by the middle of
the year the neutrality treaty was signed and a provisional
agreement reached on French trade,-but a full trade treaty
with the United Provinces was no nearer and the defensive
alliance remained unratified. Denmark continued her policy
of "wait and see" in all spheres. Amerongen was told in
response to his request for troops in January that there might
be a possibility of some if Sweden should remain loyal to the
'good p a r t y ' . I n  February Molesworth was ordered to renew
negotiations for the 12,000 men in exchange for subsidies,
which could be taken from the money released by the breakdown
95of talks with the Swiss cantons. Denmark replied first with
a demand for a guarantee in addition to the 1690 alliance and
then with a refusal of all military aid in view of the threat
of an alliance between France, Sweden and Brunswick-luneburg.
A new attempt, backed by a promise to have ships ready to come
to Denmark's aid if she were attacked, was answered with the
assertion that her trade with France would be sacrificed, a
96prospect she could not contemplate.
* William's attempts to obtain recruits for the'Danish 
regiments in his service met with little better success. 
Ahlefeldt gave hopes of them when the defensive alliance should 
be ratified and the troops brought over from Ireland to Flanders 
The king protested that the first had nothing to do with the 
case and that he was not bound to make any promises on thfe 
second, but Molesworth and Amerongen, in applying for the 
additional 12,000 men on February 8th, intimated that the .
93
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troops would in fact be brought over. Reventlow for his part 
had promised recruits if this were done and if William agreed 
to take over the 4,000 troops owed- as the Imperial contingent 
in exchange for Irish prisoners. Gol. Barre, sent to 
Copenhagen in February to try to obtain 1,000 recruits and to 
promise payment of the sum still owing under the original 1689 
troops treaty if these were granted, had a cool reception, and, 
after the conclusion of the neutrality treaty with France in 
March, which.forbade recruiting, he had to be content, in spite 
of reports from Wurtemberg, of heavy losses, with the offer of 
an opportunity to secure a number unofficially in Norway"or 
Courland.*^
William expressed alarm in June at Danish mobilisation, 
and rumours, strongly supported by and possibly emanating from 
Molesworth, became current in April that a design had been 
formed against Hamburg after the fall of Mons, but the scare 
subsided again in May, and after the trade convention in June
99
Molesworth was ordered to make a fresh attempt to obtain troops. 
The aims were now, however, more modest. He was to offer a 
stricter defensive alliance in exchange for 5,000 troops and 
additional recruits. Ahlefeldt said that all trade disputes 
would first have to be settled, and in Copenhagen it was said 
that 2,000 might be given as the Imperial contingent when all 
claims on thè Emperor had been adjusted but that only’secret' 
recruiting would be allowed.1^  William considered the plan 
unjust but was willing to discuss it with Windischgratz. The 
latter was,however, equally unenthusiastic and found' the Emperor
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disinclined."1'^
Wurtemberg himself came to Copenhagen in March 1692 with
orders to try again for the 5,000 men and, if this were found
10Pimpossible, to discuss the 2,000 as the Imperial contingent.
The campaign was drawing too near to neglect any opportunity.
Of the first possibility there was no hope, as is evident from
the memorandum drawn up for Christian himself in February and
entitled 'Reasons for not reducing the strength of the army'. J
The second, in spite of Molesworth’s report that the Danes were
likely to 'treat us more civilly than hitherto (they have) done.
being sensible of ye false step they have.made in suffering
Hanover and Munster to close wtla ye Emperor before them’,'1'^
depended at first on an offer, made to Martangis in January,
of a Danish battalion as a counter-balance. This scheme merely
annoyed William and was rejected by France with some contempt"^**
But Christian wanted to show good-will and maintain the corps
and hit on another device, which, however, suited neither
belligerent much better. Denmark signed an agreement on
April 11th for the 2,000 troops to be hired from Brandenburg,'^^
whose intrigues Molesworth was blaming, with little" or no
' ' 107apparent justification, for the Allies' failure to gain Denmark.
On the whole 1691 was a quiet year for Danish diplomacy.
Martangis offered subsidies for a third party, but Stoclcfleth
failed to obtain any promise of Swedish co-operation, and
Christian was quite unwilling to act alone, especially as'he
108himself had eyes on the mediation. At the end of the year 
Reventlow proposed this to Schmettau, the Brandenburg envoy at
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the Hague, together with‘an agreement to attach France if
Louis rejected just terms. I-Ieinsius treated it all with
justifiable caution and advised William that, even if Denmark
was found to he acting above board, she should be told that
the offer was premature and that, v^ ien the time came, both
Northern Crowns could be approached. William was, however,
interested to know what terms Denmark considered just, and a
month later, on January 22nd 1692, he wrote to the pensionary,
after painting a very gloomy picture of the situation, that
he would like to know what Denmark could get from France. His
sentiments were passed on to Schmettau, but no more is heard
of mediation until the discussion between Heinsius and
1 0 9lillieroot referred to above.
(*) The Revival off Alliance Hopes.: The Missions of Skeel.
Wurtemberg and Piessen in 1692
In January 1692 Danish finances were taken out of the
hands of Brandt, whose efficiency Christian had long suspected,
and given to Plessen.'*'^^ In time the Mecklenburger *s pro-
English sympathies came to exercise a significant influence
on his adopted country's foreign policy, but no immediate change
of course is apparent. Mogens Christiansen Skeel, who was
sent in March, rather against his will, to replace Ahlefeldt,
who had been recalled from London the previous September, was
112the new minister's nominee, but Meyercrone continued to
receive repeated orders to persuade Louis to grant an extra
50,000 Hd. in subsidies and in Copenhagen much was made to turn
11"5on his success. . .
Skeel's instructions were to offer mediation, which, he
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was to state, had already- been accepted by Brandenburg and the
Emperor, a closer alliance and a trade settlement and to ask
for William’s support in Denmark’s trade negotiations with
114
the United Provinces. He was well received by the English
king when he arrived in the Hague at the end of April, and the
same month a treaty project was drawn up in Copenhagen and given
to Wttrtemberg to carry back with him at the end of his recruiting
mission. It provided for 16,000 men and twenty to twenty-five
ships, to be supported by annual subsidies of J00,000 Rd. and
held in readiness to aid the Allies in case another power should
join France or a third party should attack them, and for the
lending of 4 - 5»°°0 troops, immediately on conditions, but at
the same time as it was composed it was resolved to draw out
negotiations with the Maritime Powers as long as there seemed
to be hope of receiving from France 250,000 Rd. each year for 
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no added risk.
William discussed the project with Wtlrtemberg on the duke's
return . but showed little enthusiasm for it; he offered 200,000
Rd. for the loan of 5»000 men. WSrtemberg claimed in his report
to Reventlow on this talk that the king was willing to go up to
250,000 Rd., although William later said he could not remember
such an offer, and had suggested that'Plessen, who was coming to
the Hague on prince George’s affairs, might negotiate on this 
116
basis. It was decided in Copenhagen to let Plessen discuss
the matter but to temporize and, as in 1691, to watch the outcome 
of the campaign. Louis finally gave way over the increased 
subsidy, and in 'July Christian determined to make the question
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of an alliance depend on the result of negotiations being 
conducted with Mecklenburg, Wolfenbuttel and Sweden'on the 
third party and.Saxe-Lauenburg and-finally, to win'still more 
time as well as some prestige, to tell William that, since 
Plessen, who was delayed on purpose in Mecklenburg, could not 
yet come to the Hague and could not be spared long enough to 
negotiate there and since to give powers to Skeel might upset 
Sweden and France, an English envoy should be sent to replace 
Molesworth.^^
On hearing this William,gave orders for new envoys to 
be chosen for both Stockholm and Copenhagen, but Nottingham 
found that none of the men proposed were able for one reason 
or other to go, and in fact Robinson and Greg continued to
11 O
represent England alone until the end of the war. But
Heinsius, after reporting on the promising situation in Denmark,
persuaded the States-General to appoint an envoy to exploit
this state of affairs and to select Jacob Hop, who was for the
119time being to look after English interests as well. Plessen 
arrived in the United Provinces at last in September, burdened 
further with the task of raising a loan of 1,000,00X3 Rd. at 
4 - 5f° on the security of the Sound tolls, and was ordered to 
suggest the drawing up of a counter-project to that brought 
over by Wurtemberg.120 1-Ie was given this on October 12th 
and took no pains to conceal his disappointment with it. It 
offered only 200,000 Rd. and demanded a ban on French trade. 
Plessen returned without the loan, which the Dutch had refused 
on the grounds that they themselves were about to raise one,
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but was closely followed by Hop.
The beginnings of the anti-Hanoverian third party have
already been outlined. Its history, as has been suggested
by Sweden's reaction, was little happier than the first,
although its consequences were more dramatic. Efforts by
France to reconcile Denmark and Saxony, whose-young ruler had
jilted his Danish fiancee on coming to the throne, lost much
of their purpose when Schoning, the pro-French Saxon minister,
was arrested on the Emperor's orders in July, Louis' enthusiasm
for Denmark's plans for an attack on Brunswick-Luneburg cooled
and Christian found France's offers unsatisfactory. The
assault on Ratseburg was postponed until 1693» negotiations
came to a standstill, and Martangis was ordered home in 
123November. All this augured well for Hop's mission, but
Christian was far from discouraged and was soon able to build 
up a situation which demanded William's urgent attention.
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Chapter 8
The Second leame of Armed Neutrality and the Rat zebur«r Crisis 
~(.7Tovc'""ber 1&92 - Sente^ber' 1 695T~
(i) Hop's Mission to Denmark (November 1692 - March 1693)
Y/hen V/illiam,in September 1692,had recommended to I-Ieinsius
Hop's speedy despatch to Copenhagen,he had spoken of reports
that Denmark was willing 'to do something good', ~ and the same
news which caused him to order the disbanding of the Sound
2squadron shortly before * may well have encouraged him at this 
particular moment to hope that Christian, having failed to 
secure the co-operation from Sweden he had hoped for, might 
be more sincere in his alliance offer than his previous 
dilatoriness would suggest. The Danish declarations of
t
solidarity with Sweden and new joint memorials presented on 
October 28th in the Hague made him,however,.despair of his 
envoy's success, since, he wrote on November 1st, 'the two 
Northern Crowns seek to unite to such a degree'.
On his arrival in Hamburg Hop confessed to Rycaut that 
his hopes of satisfying Danish claims for trade compensation 
had been dashed by reports of new seizures and tha.t he even 
feared a complete breach.^ In the'same town he caught up 
with Plessen, who claimed that he had not forwarded the counter­
project to Copenhagen, since it differed so widely from that 
given to W$rtemberg, and that the 250,000 Rd. offered would 
merely cover the loss incurred by the ban on French trade. 
Heinsius could not .believe that he had kept the allied alliance 
proposals with him and guessed that he had wished,, by pretending
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to have done so, to demonstrate "both his zeal for good relations 
between his government and the Maritime Powers and the short-
C
comings of the project. The pensionary was right in so far 
as the latter had in fact been sent home and possibly also in 
judging Piessen's motives, although the minister had simply 
written in his despatch that Hop might not want the real
7purpose of his embassy acknowledged so soon. Christian 
doubtless welcomed a further opportunity to win time and 
learn what could be gained from France.
Hop left Hamburg again before Piessen and arrived in
Copenhagen oh November 6th to stay with his brother-in-law
8Goes, in whose company he resumed negotiations on a trade
Qtreaty with Danish ministers on November 16th. • Plessen
did not arrive until the 19th, and only then could the question 
of an alliance be broached.1^ As was to be expected, the 
Allies' counter-project was immediately rejected. The Danes 
offered instead a maximum of 5,000 troops, of whom some were 
to be retained in Dutch service after the end of the war, 
for recruiting bounties, which the Dutchman deemed enormous 
and which in any case he had been instructed to refuse, 11 and 
then only after debts and trade compensation had been settled. 
Wurtemberg, it was claimed further, had had no authority 
to offer any restriction on French trade or privateers, about 
which Sweden 'would have to be consulted, and the defensive 
alliance of 1690 was considered insufficient security. Hop 
pleaded that he had no instructions to negotiate changes in 
the terms offered and even that he was unaware of the original
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Danish draft. He could" do no more than propose a preliminary
12settlement on the hire of troops and the defensive alliance.
William read his envoy's reports on these opening encounters
with a diminishing trust in Christian's good faith, found the
Danish security demands unbearable and declared that little
13would be gained if French trade were to be left free.
Heinsius wrote to Hop on December 6th that Denmark was 
adopting the same attitude as before when negotiating with 
France; the demand for settlement ofdebts in particular made 
him suspicious. But, while no success was really to be 
expected, Denmark might have to climb down in time and he 
thought it worth while continuing n e g o t i a t i o n s W i l l i a m  
was not even sure of this and a few days later wrote that the 
Danish demands seemed so impossible that the complete breaking 
off of talks would have to be contemplated."*""^  By the end of 
the month,however, he was persuaded that Hop should stay while 
Heekeren, who had been appointed to see what could be gained 
in Sweden, negotiated in Stockholm, where, it was hoped, a 16
favourable settlement might help an understanding with Denmark.
„ In Copenhagen the Danes continued to make fresh demands 
and few concessions. They offered to abandon the claim for . . 
recruiting bounties, but only in exchange for the higher 
subsidies and the employment of a proportion of their troops 
by the United Provinces in peace time. William told Skeel, 
who had urged his government in October that an alliance With 
the Allies was likely to prove more reliable than one with
TQ
Sweden, that excuses could always be found when there was
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IQno intention to conclude and news of Hanover's investiture 
as elector on December 9th provided Denmark with fresh material 
to support her dela2rinm tactics. - On December 30th Hop was 
informed that this latest move had made the lending of any 
troops extremely difficult but that Jens Juel was being sent 
to Stockholm to try and clear the way for further negotiations 
and that talks would meanwhile continue with Konigsegg, who 
was offering a defensive alliance to Include support for Danish 
mediation.2^
In fact, as will be seen, Juel's mission was to obtain
Swedish support for opposition to Hanover, for .joint mediation
and for a renewal of the armed neutrality agreement,and the
Allies, while remaining.ignorant of the exact nature of his
' 21instructions, were little deceived. Hop expressed, his 
suspicions openly during a conference on January 9th, after
22he.had refused once more to depart from the counter-project."
The alliance negotiations now came to a virtual standstill, 
although progress was still made on the toll treaty. The
Dutch envoy deemed his continued presence in Copenhagen 
necessary in order to penetrate further into the talks known'- 
to be going on between the Danes and Asfeld, who was represent­
ing France unofficially until Martangis' successor should arrive,
and to watch Denmark's threatening military preparations against
„ 04.the Brunswick-Luneburg dukes«
William agreed that he should stay, 'the affairs of Europe 
being in a state of crisis', at least until Molesworth's 
successor should be sent to replace him,2'’ but Hop himself
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seems to have soon come to the conclusion that he could do
no more in the Danish capital itself and on February "Jth informed
Christian’s ministers that he had orders to return. This was,
however, too soon for the Danes; the results of Juel's
negotiations were still uncertain. They protested their wish
to resume negotiations and finally agreed, as an earnest of
their good intentions, to forbid privateers to take their prizes
26
into Norwegian harbours. They failed, however, to deflect .
Hop from his purpose, and, with this single concession to show 
for his mission, he left Copenhagen on February 26th, a few days 
after the arrival of the new French envoy, the marquis de 
Bonrepos. He made his way to Brunswick to help with the 
 ^ efforrs to reconcile the dukes of Wolfenbüttel and of Brunswick-l . .
Lüneburg and so frustrate Danish plans for union with the former
27in action against the latter.
(ii) The Renewal of Armed Neutrality (September 1692 - July 1693) 
(a) Juel’s Mission
Luxdorph, as has been suggested, was little more successful 
in 1692 than Stockfleth had been in 1691 in committing Sweden to a 
closer identification with Danish policies on defence of neutral
„ V
trade with France, mediation and a third party, and in convincing 
her of the threat of growing Hanoverian power. Charles and his min­
isters remained suspicious of Denmark's motives and, even if some- 
of the councillors would have liked to see a more adventurous for­
eign policy, they knew that their master would do nothing to risk
• » y his chances of mediation nor to expose his troops. The idea
of general resprisals wets flatly rejected, the question of the
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ninth electorate declared to have gone too far and the suggestion
that a third mediation offer should he made turned down as
28
inconsistent with Sweden's dignity. Denmark was, however, not
to he easily discounted. Every move she made had to take
Swedish reactions into consideration.
In September 1692 the council in Copenhagen had decided
to use Bielke to try to extract a more favourable reaction in 
29
Stockholm, hut the marshal's disgrace scotched this plan. He
had, however, proposed to the Danes that Jens Juel might he sent
on a special mission, and Christian had in June promised him
through Hansen, Danish secret agent in Stockholm, that this would
he done. Some encouragement was also given by orders issued by
Charles in November for the junction of Danish and Swedish convoys,
for which the Danes had been working unsuccessfully since the
first northern trade convention, by Sweden's professions of
solidarity with Denmark and by her rather firmer line on the
princes' rights in the electoral dispute. Juel arrived in
30
Stockholm on January 13th.
The Allies had little fears of his succeeding in persuading
Sweden to offer joint mediation or to enter the system of
antt-Hano verian alliances built up by Denmark during 1692,
but it was felt generally that his journey boded no good and
that on the question of French trade he might well succeed
31
in concluding a new agreement. These forecasts proved 
correct. Juel was told that opposition to the ninth electorate 
would endanger Sweden's mediation prospects and that the 
Hanoverian envoy would be received as an elector's represent­
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ative. He met with a like rebuff when he renewed the
32invitations to joint mediation. Once Christian decided,
however, to press on with trade talks alone great progress
was made. There was still considerable Swedish hesitation
over reprisals, but excuses for avoiding such had been found
in the past and the threat of them promised considerable
gains. It was agreed to set September 1st as the time limit
for satisfaction to be made and to present demands in April.
If any counter-measures were to be taken by the Maritime
Powers, the terms of the 1690 defensive alliance were to come
into operation. A treaty incorporating these provisions was
33signed on March 17th. Juel stayed in Stockholm to help : 
luxdorph wring what advantage he could from circumstances 
which were to change rapidly during the following months.
(;b.) The Reactions of the Maritime Powers
C-reg was able to send a copy of the new Dano-Swedish 
convention to Blathwayt at the beginning of May.^ Already 
on May 11th Lillieroot and Lente presented claims for a total 
of 89 ships'^ and it is plain that William viewed the situation 
with considerable alarm; Blathwayt wrote to Trenchard, ’his 
Maty noways doubting but that the Committee will interprett 
these Memorialls if those Courts be in Earnest, no less than 
Declarations of Warr against which fitting preparations are 
•to be made of Expedients found out... the worst that may happen 
foreseen and provided for.* Particular exception was taken 
to a clause making the Maritime Powers responsible for the 
depradations of Spanish privateers, which was described as
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'the most unreasonable and extravagant pretension that ever
36appeared in a treaty.’ The situation was extremely delicate, 
since, in view of Denmark's threatening gestures against the 
lower Saxon Circle, so much depended on not antagonizing Sweden. 
Denmark could represent the squadron,which it was planned to 
send to the Sound to discourage her own aggression,as intended 
to prevent joint reprisals. Sweden's conduct over the ninth 
electorate and the third party had already earned William’s
* 7  O
favourable comment when he arrived in the Hague, but her 
attitude in the event of an open conflict in north Germany was 
still uncertain and her trade the matter on which she had proved 
herself most sensitive.
On September 22nd Blathwayt had written to Nottingham 
that England had no binding agreements on trade with the Swedes 
and 'the King does not conceive it necessary to settle any 
instructions relating to them and if their ships trading to 
France be brought up into our ports upon suspition of trading 
irregularly, they may the sooner be induced to enter into some 
convention with ns which may be "ore to our purpose than our 
present treaty,' a treaty whose validity England had denied 
since the beginning of the war. The main objection to it was 
made explicit at the end of December, when Nottingham offered 
f-abriel Oxenstierna simply to make it the basis of a new agree­
ment with a new definition of contraband i.e. one embracing 
naval stores.^ But such a policy brought only threats of 
closer co-operation between the Northern Crowns, and early in ' 
the new year it was resolved in England to recognize the treaty's
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validity and the form of parses, about which no at disputes 
arose, embodied in it.^
The decision was expressed in the regulations for the
.guidance of English privateers and prize courts,which had
been the subject of such lengthy negotiations with the States-
a oGeneral in 1692.  ^ Nottingham told Robinson that the decision 
had been taken after hearing of Sweden's reply to Juel's 
invitation to join Denmark against Hanover, but there seems 
little doubt that fear of the success of his invitation to 
unite in a new alliance in defence of free trade played a 
part as great or greater, Robinson,with his usual good 
sense,pleaded for an end of all quibbling over passes, since 
'Ho precautions of this nature are worth contending for they
being in truth no more than hedges of aire; when they cone
« '44to be broke thro by the Arts and evasions of Marchts.
Quibbling, however, did continue and, although in early May 
William ordered every favour to.be shown to Swedish shins in 
England,^ he could do not more against the strict legalism 
demanded by judge Hedges than could the States-General on' 
his behalf against the stubborn opposition of the. Zeeland 
admiralty.^
The new English regulations on neutral trade, published 
finally on May 2nd after being shown to the Scandinavian 
envoys,4' generally recognized the Swedish claims and did 
much to define the rights of both sides and reduce the area 
open to dispute. They were not, however, wholly acceptable
to Sweden,and both Northern Crowns protested at the attempt
20?
to exploit the poor French harvest of 1692 "by including corn
among contraband wares,on the excuse that France had also
Aftordered its seizure. William ordered the claim to be .
dropped, at least for the time being, after Leijonorona had
aq ,denied that Louis had adopted any such measure, but was to
enforce it again when the Second League of Armed neutrality had
60lost its terror. It remained to settle for the past 
attacks on neutral trade, and in July the Swedes presented 
Ileekeren with claims amounting to 93,378 Rd. against the United 
Provinces and began to calculate the extent of damages required 
of England.*^"
(M) Heekeren's Mission to Sweden (April - July 1693)
Lillieroot was highly suspicious on hearing of Hop's
proposed embassy, as of any allied move involving Denmark, and
asked Heinsius at once if it was intended to send a similar
mission to Sweden. ” Such had in fact not been originally
mooted,but in mid-October the pensionary could tell the' envoy
that a minister was being appointed and, at the end of the same
month,that Heelceren would be sent to Stockholm from Dresden. ^
His instructions of November 18th were to make a further bid
for Swedish treaty aid and, if Charles showed himself to be
willing, to negotiate an alliance and restriction of French
trade, but, unlike Hop, he had no positive offer to exploit
and could only wait to see what success attended the talks
in Copenhagen. He was to go first to Brunswick to offer
54mediation in the family disputes.
But, with the news that the comte d'Avaux,French ambassador
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V  ECto the United Provinces "between the wars^' was being sent to 
take Be thune's place in Stockholm,William felt that Iieekeren
Kf.should try to reach the Swedish capital first. In December
orders went out to hurry the negotiations in the lower Saxon
S7Circle, but the Dutchman delayed and William grew impatient*
The king apologized to Lillieroot when April came and Heekeren
had still not arrived in Sweden and promised that a new envoy
58would be appointed. D 'Avaux had come to Stockholm on 
February 20th. Heekeren did not reach there with the Hanover­
ian GSrtz until April 8th. ^
Heither he nor the Frenchman found much immediate satis­
faction. D'Avaux complained that Bielke's friends were able 
to do little,in spite of their claims, and were constantly 
reproaching France with neglect. Bethune, he reported, had 
accomplished nothing. In accordance with his instructions 
he tried, as his predecessor had done, to win the chancellor 
and enjoyed some success with Charles by making a positive 
promise to restore Zweibrucken, but the growing activity of 
French privateers was interfering more and more with Swedish 
trade.^ A request by Leopold for 3*000 troops, either under 
the terms of the guarantee treaty or as the Imperial contingent 
for Sweden's German possessions, was turned down on March 17th 
on the grounds that there had been no agreement on pay under 
the second alternative and that satisfaction on trade from
61
the Emperor's allies was necessary for fulfillment of the first. 
Robinson had very little hope of Heekeren*s obtaining any troops, 
not onljr in view of the seizure of ships but also because of
207
'the mine Denmark seems to make'. Tlie Dutch diplomat
concluded that compensation claims would have to "be settled
63"before anything, else could be discussed.
It was hoped, however, that he would be able to improve 
on Karen’s achievement and incorporate an agreement on troops
F i i  6 kinto one on compensation. ^ As has been seen, 5 the Swedish 
claim was presented on July 14th, but by this time the whole 
Northern scene was overshadowed by Denmark’s interference in 
the question of the succession to Saxe-Iauenburg.'
(iv) The Saxe-Lauenburg Crisis
(a) Origin
Julius Franz, duke of Saxe-lauenburg, died on September 30th 
1689 leaving no male heirs but a territory claimed by Saxony, 
Anhalt and Brunswick-Luneburg.^ Even Sweden claimed the enclave 
of Iladeln. Of these the Wettins in Saxony seems to have had 
the best case, but it was the troops of the duke of Celle who, 
with the encouragement of Ernst August's chief minister 
Bernstorff, immediately arrested the governor of Ratzeburg, the 
chief fortress, and occupied the duchy on behalf, as th^claimed, 
of the directory of the lower Saxon Circle; Hadeln was 
sequestrated by the Emperor. Denmark backed Saxony against 
this aggression by a prince who had been one of the bitterest 
opponents of her policy in Schleswig-Holstein and appealed for 
all parties'to submit to the Emperor. Brandenburg, who was 
not much in favour of Imperial sequestration, called on William 
for his assistance. The English king offered his mediation' 
and pronounced in favour of a maintenance of the status quo.
6?
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This, however, brought little satisfaction, and,while Celle 
remained adamant,both Denmark: and Brandenburg grew more 
menacing. In reoonse George William ordered his troops to 
be^in the fortification of Ratzeburg. Finally, in January 
1690, after further appeals from William, talks opened between 
Brunswick and Saxony. These broke down in the following 
Inarch,but an uneasy nea.ce continued for two years while the
.67
parties looked round for opportunities to exploit the situation.
Celle occupied the time in seeking from the great powers*
guarantees of her nossession of the duchy for the duration of
the war. The Emperor was won in July 1690 and the Maritime
Powers in June 1692. Saxony in the following month promised
to allow the occupation'for three years. But the all-important
support of Sweden could not be obtained. In the alliance with
her signed by Erunswick-luneburg,after long negotiation.!:!
October 1690 Saxe-Lauenburg was snecifically excluded from the
f) Rlands Charles bound himself to defend. w The prospect of 
Ernst Augusts inheriting Celle on George William's death merged 
the problem with that of the ninth electorate, and the proximity 
of,Ratzeburg to the south-eastern borders of Schleswig-Holstein 
provided Christian V with an additional grievance.
Alone he could do little, but he could hope to exploit the 
jealousy felt by many Morth German princes in the face of 
Hanover's ambitions. In May and June 1692 he evolved with
- V  -V..
his counsellors a plan to offer France, in exchange for subsidies, 
a diversion in the lower Saxon Circle which would draw conting- 
ents from the front during the campaign. y It had many
attractions* Extra French, subsidies would relieve the Danish
crown’s financial worriesf the power of the Welfs would he
checked with little danger; Denmark could pose as the champioi
of the rights of the princes and of the Erperor; the extent
of the operation could he suited to the reaction it aroused.
The plan was, however, laid before Lottis too late in the year.
70and was postponed with the rest of the third, party project.
( h ) Saxe-Lauenburg in 1695
In January 1693 Celle played into Denmark’s hands by 
seizing the cathedral in Ratzeburg. Christian opened negotia­
tions with. Asfeld and Wolfenbuttel, who was already a member 
of the alliance against the ninth electorate and the most 
promising ally. Bonrepos took charge when he arrived and. 
treated the whole scheme with some reserve. Louis,however,
decided, that the opportunity of securing such a diversion should 
not be missed, and by treaties concluded on March 1st and. March 
26th France pledged support against any increase in Hanoverian 
power and 300,000 Rd. for the destruction of Ratzebuig’sfortifica­
tions during the course of the 1693 campaign. Wolfenbuttel on 
the other hand refused to commit herself beyond a „strict
neutrality, and an attempt to engage Mecklenburg-Schwerin,who also
7 1had claims to Saxe-Lauenburg, was equally unsuccessful.
Denmark stood alone, and Juel’s reception in Stockholm dimmed, 
her prospects still further.
- Such negotiations and agreements could not.of course be 
kept wholly secret, and fears of Danish intentions had already . 
become fully alive when, on January 9th, Hop was informed that,
2Q9
.S"
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if Brunswick should withdraw her troops from Flanders,Denmark
7 pwould have to do the same, ' Heinsius began proposing to
73Lillieroot an alliance to check possible Danish, aggression.
At the end of February William expressed his fears that the
failure of the negotiations in Dresden to engage Sax'ony to the
Allies would cause Denmark and Wolfenbuttel to launch an attack
on Brunswick-ifoieburg.^’ On. April 22nd lillieroot reported
that Heinsius was convinced that Christian intended to begin
a war in the Lower Saxon Circle,and two days later the States-
General ordered Hop to visit Ehrenschild in Hamburg and warn
him that the United Provinces would be obliged to come to
7SCelle's assistance if she were attacked. Rycaut was instruct-
T6ed to make similar representations on England's behalf.
William was planning even more positive action to meet the
threatening emergency. At the end of April he ordered the
preparation of a joint Anglo-Dutch squadron, which could be sent
to the Sound if necessary and could at least be used.to discour- 
77age Denmark. To all threats and warnings Christian replied
that his sole wish was to see the destruction of the Ratzeburg
fortifications,and in July he. declared openly that since Celle
refused to carry this out herselfjhe must order his troops to 
78do it. But it was suspected that his intentions went much
further,and rumour crowded upon rumour during the summer months.
Reports of designs on Hamburg, lubeck and Gottorn accompanied
79the massing of Danish troops on the border. *'
Sweden's attitude was not wholly satisfactory from William's 
point of view. She promised Brunswick-luneburg help if Danish
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troops crossed the Elbe'and warned Christian against any move 
on Hamburg or lubeck. She declared that she would not 
recognize any counter-attack on Denmark as a casus foederis 
defensivi. But, while resenting any success her neighbour 
might gain, she was not particularly interested in Ratzebvirg 
itself and considered that Denmark's demand for the razing
OA
of the defences built by Celle was a just one. Her'
remonstrances seemed far too mild to discourage Denmark from
a pro-French diversion,and efforts by Heinsius in the Hague
and Heekeren in Stockholm to interest her in an alliance to
protect the lower Saxon Circle continued to be coldly received.
The Dutch envoy offered the support of twenty-four allied
warships if Sweden would commit herself to opposing Denmark,
but Sweden feared getting herself involved and, as Robinson
81suspected, being left in the lurch. At the end of July 
William approved a proposal to send. Hop to visit the Danish .
Op
court at Rensborg to offer med.iation and repeat his threats.
( c ) , Mediation and Settlement
lord lexington was instructed to join Hop as English 
representative and support his efforts with a new,alliance
OA
offer to Denmark. ^ The two held their first conference with 
Danish ministers on August 10th and proposed a mutual withdrawal 
leaving a token Brunswick force in occupation. They were 
promised that no action would be taken for four days and given 
a Danish project to present to Brunswick-luneburg but told that 
any alliance negotiations must wait on a settlement of the ' 
crisis.®^' The dukes rejected Christian's terms®^- but still
•S'
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prepared to act decisively before any counter-measures could
be taken against her. To William's threats to send his .
squadron to cut off Danish trade with Fra.ncej she replied that
she would engage not to cross the Elbe only if such a naval
force were withheld, if Celle took no threatening steps and
if the Emperor did not issue the avocatoria which he was 
87threatening. William in his turn refused to release the
Danish troops in his service if those of Brunswick-Iunebury
were recalled. This, he claimed, would be contrary to the
88terms of the treaty by .which they were hired.
Project and counter-project passed to and fro between
the contending parties, but on August 18th Danish troops moved
into Saxe-lauenburg and invested Ratzeburg. Two days later
they began a three day bombardment,at the end of which a
89fourteen day truce was arranged. A large part of the 
fortifications had been destroyed,but the crisis contintied, 
and settlement seemed still far off. Greg conrnlained that 
the mediators, now joined belatedly by Sweden in the person
of.leijonclo, 'hinder rather than help one another having
on ■ “different designs'."' William had hoped that Brandenburg
might be able to find a solution, but Frederick III was too
closely associated with Denmark to be trusted by Brunswick-
lilneburg, who worked with Lexington and. Hop to the exclusion
not only of Fuchs but of the Imperial delegate Konigsemg.;^
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William,by the end of September, was despairing of a settlement, 
but in fact there was much bluff on both sides.
Denmark's threats to go beyond the destruction of Eatzeburg*s
no hostilities began. -Denmark remained, alone but fully
far too late for him to be interested, whether the disptite were
settled peacefully or. not, and that Denmark had broken the terms
of the March treaty by delaying so long.  ^ But the Allies'
threats to send a squadron to the Sound also became less and
less effective as the season advanced, and in fact much difficu.lt
had been experienced in forming a squadron at all. Nottingham
protested at the beginning of August that England could not
spare any ships to join the eight to be provided by the United
Provinces and indeed relied on the Dutch squadron outside
Dunkirk, on which it had been hoped to draw, for the defence
94- <of the English coast. Rooke at Kinsale was ordered a little
later to prepare to send ten ships,but the demand had been
reduced to two by September,and even these, under Nevill,did not
join the Dutch until the middle of the month,when, as Blathwayt
95confessed to Lexington, it was too late to frighten the Danes.
The ships never sailed, for on September 29th a compromise
agreement was signed in Hamburg which left Celle in possession
but allowed her a garrison of only 200 men to maintain order
and demanded the complete destruction of the fortifications of
Ratzeburg within three weeks of ratification. The settlement
96was guaranteed by the Emperor, Sweden and Brandenburg. .Hop
97and Lexington returned home. 1
In spite of all her legal 'claims,Denmark had, for the second 
time during the war,threatened to break the peace of North 
Germany and create a diversion' which could favour only Prance, 
with whom William for one had no doubts but that Denmark was
defences were hollow v/hen-'lords declared that the season was
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working hand in glove. In fact, however, Louis had little 
to thank Christian for. The treaties against Hanover 
remained, but the second attempt to form a third party in 
Germany was to all intents and purposes at an end, leaving 
its prime mover more isolated than ever. While negotiations 
were in progress the date set for joint reprisals in March 
had passed, and, when Denmark chose later in the year to
seize Dutch ships for the second time, she had, as in 1690,
99to act alone. The time had come for a thorough re-examina­
tion of Danish foreign policy.
98
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Chapter 9
Denmark and the Allies 1693-5
(i) Reprisal and Counter-Reprisal (September 1693 - June 1694)
On August 14th 1693, at the beginning of the Ratzeburg
negotiations, Hop had asked for and been granted a Danish
assurance that the Dutch merchant ships about to set sail for
the Baltic would be unmolested, and ten days later lente was
ordered to repeat the promise.^ The Danes later claimed that
such an agreement had'been made conditional on the granting of
pthe compensation for seizures which Hop had promised, and such
a view is substantiated by the refusal to make a similar pledge
to Lexington unless England also declared her willingness to
make reparation for the interruptions in Danish trade for which
3she was responsible. No such limitation was made explicit 
at the time, but Christian had by no means abandoned hopes of 
putting pressure on the United Provinces to satisfy his subjects 
and free his trade by forceful means.
With the Saxe-Lauenburg dispute out of the way, Luxdorph 
raised the question of joint reprisals under the March alliance, 
and lente was ordered to threaten such in the Hague. No 
immediate attempt was made in Copenhagen to resume the compila­
tion of claims which had been begun before Ratzeburg, but the 
States-General was expected to back its envoy's promise by 
sending powers to Goes to negotiate. At the end of Novemberif
Christian decided to appoint five frigates to seize Dutch ships 
as in 1690, but-Sweden, in the midst of satisfactory compensa­
tion negotiations with Heekeren, replied no more encouragingly
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than on previous occasions and made a special point of the .
fact that the time-limit of September 1st was long past.
She merely hoped that Denmark would be content with as small 
7a sum as she.
8
Heekeren signed an agreement with Sweden on November 15th, 
and it became obvious that, unless Christian could get the
Qhelp from France for which he was asked, he would have to 
act alone. He hesitated. Reports came from the Hague that, 
now Sweden was satisfied, Danish demands were laughed at,"^ 
and it could be pointed out in Copenhagen that action in 
1690/1 had brought swift settlement, but news of the release 
of five Danish ships by the States-General suggested that 
threats alone might be s u f f i c i e n t A  few days after this 
news had been received however, Christian's hand was forced 
by a warning given to eighteen Dutch ships by van Deurs, the 
Dutch consul in Elsinore, on orders from Goes, that seizures 
were imminent, accompanied by his advice that they should 
escape to landskrona across the Sound. On December 11th all
these vessels were arrested before they could leave and troops
12placed on board. Goes was told that they would be held until 
all Danish ships were freed and adequate compensation agreed 
on, but much was made of Christian's moderation in deciding
13to seize no more than twenty-four merchantmen.
Dutch indignation at what appeared a breach of faith was 
aggravated by the recent Danish offer of mediation, which 
Iieinsius had believed would at least delay reprisals.1^ There 
was now a strong suspicion, in fact unfounded but understandable
217
enough, that the seizures had "been made in close consultat i on 
with. France and had as their rain object the backing of
] RFrench-inspired, peace moves* She Dutch claimed that the
shins involved had merely been ordered.to Marstrand to avoid
being frozen in, an assertion which does not bear vor” close .
examination,since Goes makes no mention of it. in his early
16despatches or his first memorial,. but the strength of their
case lay in the Danish failure to produce any figure to indicate
the extent of their claims. Only just before the reprisals
were taken were merchants instructed, on the form their demands 
17should, take.
Both sides insisted on the release of their own vessels 
before any negotiations could begin, and,as in 1691,Fala.iseau 
came forward, as mediator with proposals for mutual release on 
an agreed date under a Brandenburg guarantee of satisfaction 
within a set period.^® Settlement seemed in sight when the 
Danish attitude was stiffened by news of the seizure of a
IQjoint convoy in the Channel in January* " Hopes revived of 
more vigorous action by Sweden, who had confined herself to 
urging moderation on her neighbour,, and new approaches were 
made to France, Luxdorph was ordered to propose general 
seizures and the recall of all troops in the service of the 
Maritime Powers; Christian demanded satisfaction before he 
would consent to free the Dutch ships. Oxenstierna stated 
coolly that Sweden would have to await further details of' the 
new seizures from England and, since Louis* attitude was no ' 
more promising, the Danes decided on January 30th to accept
218
Falaiseau’s project.
On the very same day, however, the States-General resolved
to institute counter-reprisals and seized six Danish ships.
Undauntedly Christian turned to Sweden for support and sent
Jessen’s immediate subordinate, secretary Johan Jensen * to
Stockholm in a final bid to draw Charles into the dispute and
to promise an alliance against the Maritime Powers if the
Hague still refused to yield. France made it quite clear
that she would do nothing unless Swedish co-operation was
assured, and William wrote to Heinsius how essential it was
22to keep the two Northern Crowns apart. Charles wrote
himself to Christian urging him to present Danish claims and,
when Jensen returned on March 9th, having achieved nothing of
any value, the Danes decided to conclude with Goes on the best
23terms available.
April 23rd was finally determined upon for the freeing of 
both Dutch and Danish ships. Denmark agreed to abide by the 
condemnation of two of the six vessels held in the counter­
reprisals, promised to punish any merchants found guilty of 
fraud and gave way on her original demand that compensation
r
negotiations should be completed within three months of the 
a g r e e m e n t I n  fact talks with Goes did not open untii June 
and, as will be seen, continued a good deal longer than three
months.25
The reprisals and counter-reprisals of 1693-4 constitute 
the last serious clash in William’s war on French trade, which 
from now on slips further and further into the background.
20
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Ships continued .to be taken by allied privateers and warships, 
and disputes arose over the interpretation or lacunae of the 
1691 convention with Denmark and the trade treaties with Sweden, 
but attention shifts from the declining activities of English 
and Dutch privateers to the growing pressure exerted by those 
of France, who launched an all-out attack on enemy trade in 
1694 which excited protests from both Northern Crowns.^ But 
the clash has a wider significance. As in 1690/1 Sweden 
refused to follow Denmark into action, although it seems she 
came nearer to doing so than on the first occasion, and rose 
higher in William*s estimation as a result, while Denmark's 
disillusionment with Sweden and France after the Saxe-Laueribtng 
crisis was further intensified.
(ii) Alliance Negotiations (August 1693 - July 1694)
Side by side with her threats Denmark had made repeated
declarations during the Ratzeburg negotiations of her interest
in concluding a closer alliance with the Allies on favourable
terms. Falaiseau was told 'ostez nous cest espine, et vous
27voyeres ce que nous fairions pour les Alliez*, and the duke 
of Eolstein-Pl/n told William, when he accepted the latter's 
invitation to succeed Waldeck as commander-in-chief of his 
army, that Christian had given him his ’demission avec joye 
croyant que V.M. verroit par la qu'il n'estoit pas si attaschez 
a la France corame on le croyait'.^® But her terms had changed 
little in essentials since the beginning of the year, and she 
still felt herself in a position to drive a hard bargain.
Nor was she any less inclined to negotiate with both opposing
parties at the same time.
To Hop’s offer in August of 250,000 Rd. p.a., ratification
of tiie 1690 defensive alliance, a-full trade treaty, and
approval by the Maritime Powers of a toll on the Elbe in
exchange for a ban or limitation on French trade, exclusion
of French privateers from Norway and 4,000 troops, Christian
offered 2,000 to 3,000 troops, liable to recall whenever
needed, in exchange for a yearly subsidy of 300,000 Rd., a
diploma from the Emperor promising the toll, to be guaranteed
by the Maritime Powers, and satisfaction for Danish claims
29against the United Provinces.
When this brought no response, he opened negotiations in
October with Bonrep.os on a third party project and used the
*50Allies’ proposals to put pressure on France. No satisfaction
could, however, be. gained from Louis, and new approaches were
made to the Hague. Even in the midst of the reprisal crisis
in December Christian told Pl/zfn that he' still wanted an
alliance which would compensate him for loss of neutrality
31and trade with France as well as settle Dutch debts.
- In January 1694 William was approached through Brandenburg 
with a request for a reply to the counter-project given to 
Hop, while Bonrep.o s was offered the formation of the third 
party he had proposed in October and the withdrawal of Danish
32
troops from the front in exchange for subsidies of 800,000 Rd. 
Knowledge of this offer to France made William highlysuspicious 
of the invitation to the Maritime Powers. He regarded the 
latter largely as a device to put ..pressure on his enemies but 
wanted Brandenburg to find out how far Denmark was in fact
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willing to go.  ^ When he found that France refused to act 
without Sweden, his fears of an open conflict with Denmark 
over the reprisal action subsided, and he was anxious to 
seise the opportunity for agreement before the opening of the
34
campaign. Falais.e au remained the main channel of negotiation*
The Brandenburger was joined in June by a certain Petkura,
whose mission was, however, unknown to Goes and who seems to
have been sent as unofficial agent by Heinsius. ^
In June and July talks took place in Copenhagen with
these two men on a project drawn up and approved by the Danish
council in May. In addition to the terms offered to Hop,
Christian now'proposed the closure of Norwegian ports to
privateers and war against France if she did not accept just
peace terms within six months, but for this he wanted a
promise of Danish participation in mediation and acceptance
of the last Danish project for a trade treaty with the United
Provinces., These conditions were finally forwarded to the
Hague, but there was hardly time for them to be considered
before a nev; factor made its dramatic entry into William's
Northern policy, one which he found highly embarrassing and
which for a short time seemed to threaten war between England
and Denmark. For on August 11th captain Neils Larsen Barfod
of the Danish convoy ship 'Gyldenl^ve' was attacked'by two
English frigates,-whose order to lower his flag as a mark of
respect to English ships in the English Channel he had refused 
37to obey.
(iii) Barfod and the Channel Salute
England's claim to a salute by lowering flag and top
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sail from foreign ships while within range of her warships 
in the Channel dates at least from the reign of Henry V and 
probably has its origin in Angevin times when both shores were 
under the same crown but did not become of any great signifi­
cance until the reign of Charles I. A serious encounter
with a Swedish fleet took place in 1647, and the repercussions
38of the pretension on Anglo-Dutch relations are well known.
The Treaty of Westminster was, under strong Dutch protest,
renewed in the alliance of 1689, but, in spite of talks on
the subject with Denmark in the early 1670s, this remained
39the sole written agreement. To avoid complications Swedish 
warships had been instructed at the beginning of the Nine 
Years' War,^® not to carry flags in the Channel but Denmark 
had not followed this example, and even Sweden's expedient 
Vías not to exempt her from the conflict.
On June 30th 1694 a convoy of some eighty Danish and 
Swedish ships under Barfod's command was stopped by Berkeley's 
squadron and taken to the Downs for examination.^ The Swedish 
convoy ship 'Wachtmeister*, under captain Wattrangh, had 
become separated from the main body a week before the encounter, 
and Christian threatened to take no further part in joint
A Oconvoys if Sweden did not take more vigorous action, but 
all the Danish ships were soon released after selling their 
corn, and, at William's express order, the greatest possible 
leniency was shown to the Swedes,.who had only two of their 
ships detained and the cargoes of six condemned.^ The 
incident might well have passed with little more to show for
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it than an increase in the compensation claimed from England
by Scandinavian merchants had not admiral Shovell^ taken
offence on August 10th at Barfod's failure to salute the main
English' fleet in the Downs, whither he had followed his 
4-5charges.
At the end of the action referred to, in which three of
the Danish crew were killed and eighteen wounded, Barfod
lowered his flag under protest, and his ship was brought into
the Thames.^ Pauli,^ commissary-resident since July 1693
and sole official Danish representative in London after Skeel.'s
departure in May, presented a strongly worded memorial
4.9demanding the death of those responsible for the attack.
Such language from one' of such inferior diplomatic rank, if 
of diplomatic rank at all, roused English tempers to fever 
pitch and brought the most indignant counter-protests. 
Shrewsbury reported to Blathwayt on August 14th that 'the 
nation is so concerned for anything that may prejudice that 
dominion on the seas....that I am apprehensive this may lead 
us to an extremity with the Danes,' adding, however, three 
days later, 'yet how far the Allies will stand by us in such 
a quarrel is another question.' Preparations were made to 
bring all English ships home from Denmark.^ William agreed 
with Shrewsbury's assessment but was singularly helpless.
He did his best to calm matters down without offending English 
susceptibilities by having Greg's orders sent to him for 
approval and causing them to be changed so that Christian 
Was to be told that Barfod would be sent back to Denmark to
be punished for his insolence and not, as the council in 
London had first decided, that he would be put. on trial in 
England, an action which Christian could hardly have been 
expected to agree to and one which might have had unfortunate 
repercussions in Sweden.
The Danes claimed justly that Barfod had been in the 
Downs for several weeks before he was challenged and had never 
had trouble when passing English warships on previous voyages, 
but, when no strong support was forthcoming from Sweden, the 
problem became largely one of discovering a formula which 
would save face on both sides. Denmark was helped by the 
very circumstances which made Barfod's act all the more 
heinious in English eyes - the presence of the main English 
fleet and the scene of the crime, the 'King's Chamber' of the 
Downs - to avoid acknowledging the general claim to a Channel 
salute and also by her ability to make a counter-claim.
Since 1689 English captains passing Kronborg castle had failed 
to salute it with cannon shot as international etiquette 
required, since their orders were to answer gun for gun and 
the three invariably given by the Danes and the inconvenience 
to which the governor had often put them in the past seemed 
to them a slight on the dignity of the English Crown. Even 
before the attack on Barfod the Danish council had determined 
to protest at this neglect-^ and now decided to promise to 
punish Barfod if he were found guilty of disrespect on 
condition that the English captains who had lately sailed 
through the Sound were similarly treated. After talks of
some length with Greg, the English council agreed to accept
a signed extractum protocolli of October 20th in these terras
56and ordered the Danish captain's release. William instructed
his captains to salute Kro'nborg with three guns if assured
57previously of the same number m  return.
Pauli began to frequent the court again, and Christian
changed his mind abotit recalling him as Xa Fouleresse had
been recalled in 1 6 9 2 . Barfod left England in February
1695» was allowed to resume his duties in March 1696 and rose
to the rank of admiral at the end of the Great Northern War.-^
But the problem was too delicate to be solved so easily.
In April 1695 Sweden was involved in an incident, which, was,
60however, successfully passed over for the time being, but
at the end of May the Danish captain Juel refused a request
from the frigate 'Charles Galley* to salute and had his
6llieutenant killed in the ensuing engagement. It was 
immediately claimed by the Danes that the case was quite 
different from that in which Barfod had been involved, and
gorepresentations were made in Stockholm.  ^ At first Sweden 
was no more interested than in 1694 and reminded Christian 
that she had advised him to follow her example by carrying 
no flag,^^ but she suddenly found herself directly involved 
by an attack on her own ship.^
(iv) Further Attempts to Beach a General Settlement with Denmaric
(September 1694 - September l~S95l
Christian's failure in July and August 1694 to enlist
sufficient Swedish support in defence of Northern trade or
to arouse her interest in the idea of joint mediation, which,
22?
Charles asserted, would look too much like a third party 
alliance, persuaded him to try again for an allied alliance 
which would harm neither Danish neutrality nor Swedish friend-
CC
ship, which he still prized in spite of its meagre fruits. 
Petkum and Falaiseau were approached once again at the end 
of August, and on September 11th it.was decided to instruct. 
Plessen, then taking the waters in Aachen, to visit William 
and sound him on the project drawn up in May as well as to 
try to enlist his help in a settlement of the flag dispute. ^  
Independently of these moves, William's interest in a . 
Danish alliance revived at the end of the campaign, and the 
coming visit of Plessen was seen as a good opportunity to 
discuss the thorniest of the problems likely to be faced - 
that of Denmark's demand for the Elbe toll. Brandenburg.was 
still regarded as the best agent for the work, but Dijkvelt 
was ordered to draw up a project for Frederick Ahlefeldt, 
deputy-governor of Holstein-Gottorp, who was serving with the
¿ToDanish troops in the Netherlands. Ahlefeldt sent a copy
of this to Copenhagen on September 18th. Since, however, it
included a demand for abandonment of opposition to the ninth
electorate and for a complete prohibition of French trade,
Christian resolved to wait for news of Plessen's talks in the
69hope.of more favourable terms.
A French invitation in November to form a new third party, 
prompted by encouraging signs from Saxony, was, in view of 
Louis' behaviour in negotiations on similar plans in the past 
and especially of his refusal to pay the subsidies due to
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fWolfenbuttel, coldly received, but it was decided to keep
negotiations 'en Halleine* to see what he would offer if the
Allies continued to insist on a trade ban. Whatever happened,
the council in Copenhagen determined, Denmark should remain
neutral during the 1695 campaign and try to secure some part 
70in mediation.' Plessen left the Hague on October 26th after
71what appears to have been only a brief stay. He had informed
Christian of William’s willingness to make an alliance but
also of his continued insistence on a cessation of all Drench
trade, and on November 30th, after the minister had reported
on his talks, a memorandum was presented to Christian recommend-
ing that a stop in trade with France should be promised in
exchange for the grant of a toll at Gluckstadt, but that this
should not be mentioned specifically in a treaty and should
be pledged only if Sweden's trade were also restricted.
Before any new terms were proposed by Denmark, however, it
was felt that she should await the allied project which was
72expected to emerge from Plessen's negotiations.
William confessed to Heinsius at the beginning of December 
that Plessen's assurances had overcome his previous conviction 
that the minister was being duped by his government, but that, 
fed presumably by intelligence of Denmark's relations with.
Prance and her efforts to strengthen the anti-Iianoverian 
alliances, lie found her sincerity highly suspect.73 He was 
willing, however, to continue negotiations, especially after 
Auersperg, Windischgratz' successor in the Hague, had given 
positive assurances that the Emperor would be willing to give
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Denmark the coveted toll if she renounced her claim to act
as mediator in the European c o n f l i c t W i l l i a m  was, as
always, concerned with the umbrage which negotiations with
Denmark might give to Sweden but comforted himself with the
thought that the question of French trade would provide an
excuse to break off talks at any time.  ^ Ileinsius replied.
that lente's demand for a restriction on Swedish trade, made
as a result of the November memorandum, showed that Denmark
was up to her old tricks and that it would not be easy to
persuade her to give up her mediation hopes.^ The project
for which Christian waited was at last drawn up, but the
pensionary, fearing the prejudicial use to which written terms
might be put in Copenhagen, confined himself to reading it
77to the Danish envoy on December 24th.''
On the last day of the-year Christian, also assured of
Leopold's willingness to satisfy him, reversed his former
decision and ordered a Danish draft treaty to be.composed,
which resulted in one very similar to that discussed with
Falaiseau and Petkum, and powers to be sent to Lente to
conclude in the Hague. ' 0 This act somewhat revived William’s
confidence in Denmark, which was maintained by Christian's
79assurances in letters to prince George, although his fear 
of offending Sweden and his pessimism at the outcome of 
negotiations, in face of the great obstacles still remaining, 
were undirainished.^ He was willing to make fresh approaches 
to the Emperor over the Elbe toll, but the opposition to the 
ninth electorate, which lente was ordered on no account to
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introduce into a treaty or even to discuss, and the question 
of the payment of any troops that might be lent also loomed 
large. Danish mediation was something the English king 
would on no account consider, nor would he consent to deplete 
his meagre financial resources by paying compensation to
o n
Danish merchants, Iieinsius accordingly rejected the demand 
for mediation and the subsidies demanded by lente, insisted 
on a ban on French trade and abandonment of opposition to the 
new electorate and could offer only the Maritime Powers' bona
Op
officia in support of the grant of the Elbe toll.
In Copenhagen, where a full allied counter-project had 
been expected, this reply was found most unsatisfactory, and 
on March 12th Lente was sent twoNDanish projects. The first 
involved the Emperor and the Elbe toll. The second excluded 
these, but, as was pointed out, for this reason it could be 
regarded only as a temporary settlement and was not to be 
produced until all else had failed. Compensation of 350,OOOHd. 
p.a. was demanded for the surrender of trade with France, but
o
the claim; for mediation was quietly dropped.  ^ Certain 
factors were now operating in the Allies' favour. Their 
alliance with Munster, concluded on March 13th, weakened' 
Denmark's position in North Germany; the death of Mary raised 
hopes in Copenhagen of a marriage alliance between William 
and a Danish princess; Plessen's influence began to make 
itself felt as the effects of his financial reform became 
apparent.^ But the fact that Danish policy.had made no 
sudden reversal v/as emphasized by the renev/al in March of
andtlie anti-Hanoverian alliances first concluded in 169.2,^ 
Christian still wanted far more than William was willing to 
give, while offering very little in exchange. When the latter 
made his late appearance on the Continent on May 14th, he
o Cdeclared that all depended on the toll, subsidies and debts, 
but, as had been hoped in Copenhagen, when Vienna continued 
to withhold any definite statement on the first of these, 
Heinsius himself proposed discussion of an alliance without 
the Emperor. The project which he produced on July 17th, 
however, largely reiterated the Allies' old terms and was 
rejected by the Danes.
In May Plessen had been sent once more to support Rente
in the Hague, but he arrived with no new proposals, and
negotiations dragged on through the summer without a solution
of any of the major problems. The English and Dutch demand
for closure of Norwegian ports to French privateers was again
rejected and an offer of 300,000 Rd. as compensation for the
Danish ships, which Goes had been discussing for over twelve
months, turned down. The furthest that the Danes were willing
to go was an agreement to limit trade with France to a certain
number of ships and to remain passive on the ninth electorate.
Ileinsius gathered the impression that they were aiming to spin
88out the tallcs until the end of the campaign.
Plessen urged his master to accept William's terms in 
order to ease the strain on Danish finances and improve the 
chances of a Dutch loan, but Christian calculated that he would 
lose money if he agreed to them and was unwilling to risk a
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break with Prance* He wcmld allow no further, retreat.^
In September Plessen accordingly proposed to the Allies that
negotiations might be continued in Copenhagen by a special
envoy,- a signal for the end of those in the H a g u e . W i l l i a m
confessed his deep disappointment that more had not been
achieved, but he.was conscious of the gulf which remained
91between the terms acceptable to each side and did not bother 
to take up the invitation.
(v) Molesworth and the 'Account of Denmark*
Anglo-Danish relations were additionally disturbed at 
the time of the second arrest of Dutch ships by the appearance 
in London in mid-December of a book bearing neither author’s, 
printer’s ’nor. publisher's name and purporting to be 'An Account 
of Denmark, as it was in the Year 1692*. It contained a long 
preface contrasting the free institutions-of England with 
Danish despotism and chapters dealing with various aspects 
of Danish life, many of which received adverse comment;
Denmark itself was described as 'the least and poorest Kingdom 
in Europe'. Taxation was, it claimed, crushing, the peasants 
no better than slaves; Danish foreign policy was severely 
criticized. It attracted immediate attention and, although 
the author's name did not appear until its fifth edition in 
1696, it was commonly ascribed at once to the impetuous 
Robert Molesworth.92
Molesworth had left behind him an unenviable reputation 
in Copenhagen. Among other incidents, he had a violent 
quarrel in July 1690 with leijonclo over the non-arrival of
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the Swedish treaty ships  ^and a further altercation with
the diplomat and master of the horse Anton Haxthausen on the
occasion of the receipt of the news of la Ilougue. Christian
referred the latter insult to William, and Molesworth received
94-permission to leave shortly. His absence was announced
as only a temporary one to visit his estates in Ireland, but
he was formally relieved of his post by William in February
1693 and failed, in spite,of repeated attempts, to obtain any
recredentials from the Danish court. The Haxthausen charge
was quietly droppe'd, but Molesworth was not employed again
99under the stadtholder-king.
Slceel protested as soon as he had read the book and on
December 18th presented a memorial demanding a ban on its
sale, the burning of all copies by the public hangman and.
96punishment of the a uthor.• He had, however, little hope
of justice in view of the freedom accorded to the press in
England, and William could promise him little for the same 
97reason. In response to a request from Trenchard, he
presented a new memorial on January 1st 1694 with a list of
98eleven passages to which he took particular offence. The
council ordered the prosecution of the book's licenser on
January 11th, but no further action was taken, and before
99the month was out Skeel declared the situation hopeless.
Danish hopes, turned to the publication of an adequate 
reply, and in the course of 1694 there appeared 'Denmark 
Vindicated' by a certain Jodicus Crull, 'The Commonwealths 
man unmasqu'd' by T.R. Rogers and Dr. King's 'Animadversions'.
93
mShe first was inaccurate, outdated and written largely in 
the expectation of financial reward. She second dealt with 
Molesworth's preface alone and hardly mentioned Denmark at 
all. Only the third was an adequate reply, being based on 
information supplied by Iver Brinck, priest of the Dano- 100
Norwegian community in london, though without Skeel's knowledge 
But three editions of Molesworth’s book had been published 
by March 1694 and it subsequently appeared in many different 
languages. It was to provide an unfortunate picture of
Denmark for a large number of men of affairs for some time
. 101to come.
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Chapter 10
The Road to Peace (January 1693 - November 1695^
(i) Sweden and Mediation in 1693
(a) D'Avaux' Offer of Terms
Bethune’s death at the end of September 1692 deprived
William only temporarily of his hopes of learning of French
peace terms through Sweden. News of d'Avaux’ appointment,
which reached the Hague a month later, caused him to write
to Heinsius suggesting that the new envoy should he given a
pass to meet Dijkvelt, presumably in the Spanish Netherlands
at the start of his journey, 'and see if it were possible to
arrive at any fair peace' but d'Avaux sailed with Bonrepos
1in January from Dunkirk. William was disappointed but suggest­
ed that Lillieroot, with whose attitude he was for the moment 
more favourably impressed, should be approached again, and at 
the beginning of February 1693 the pensionary asked the Swede
casually if he thought any details of Louis' offer might be
2
obtained from d'Avaux in Stockholm.
Further than this the English king was not willing to go 
for the time being. His sincere desire for peace was only 
strengthened by the events of the months following - the arrest 
in April of his friend Halewijn for engaging in negotiations 
with the French, the loss of Heidelberg in May, the disaster 
to the Levant fleet in June - and he was willing to sacrifice 
the original aims of the Grand Alliance to attain it, but he
235
would not run the risk of a public negotiation open to French 
intrigue and causing dissension among his Allies and was
3certainly not ready to offer Sweden unconditional mediation.
He was pleased by the news of Juel's failure to involve her
in the anti-Hanoverian alliances, but, as he explained to
WindischgrMtz in April, he would have.to be absolutely sure
of Sweden's sympathies before entrusting her with the fate
kof Europe. And he was far from sure. Oxenstierna was
the only member of the council he could trust, and the
chancellor's death - he was already seventy years of age -
would, it was expected, divert his country's policy into
5wholly unfavourable channels.
Even if Sweden could be relied upon to insist on terms
which would curb French power and guarantee the English
Revolution, negotiations through Stockholm would be slow6
and open to unwelcome publicity. It is not therefore
surprising that speedier and more secret methods were sought,
and that a pattern was soon established of direct contacts
between Dutch and French agents in the Netherlands alternating
or running parallel with diplomatic moves in Stockholm. In
the same month of July 1693 Daguerre met Di^kvelt and Hulft 
7in Brussels and d'Avaux informed Bengt Oxenstiema of Louis’ 
terms for peace. These concerned the Empire alone and said 
nothing about the Spanish Netherlands nor the matter with 
which William was most concerned, the English drown. Even 
for the Empire Regensburg was modified only by the return of
2^6
8
Philippsburg and Freiburg.
Soon after d'Avaux' arrival the chancellor had asked him
for French terms, which he could compare with those he claimed
9
to have obtained from an unspecified Imperial source. This 
was after receipt of Lillieroot's despatch reporting Heinsius’ 
approach, which presumably inspired Oxenstierna's attempt to 
open mediation negotiations. In a second conference shortly 
afterwards the French ambassador emphasized his king's deter­
mination to convert the Twenty Years' Truce into a permanent 
peace, while Oxenstierna demanded recognition of the English 
Revolution and return of French conquests as conditions for
Swedish mediation. D'Avaux,merely replied that such terms
10
were harsh but that he was grateful for such frankness.
The chancellor then turned to Robinson with a request to learn
William's terms in order that France's reaction to them could
be observed and Charles be persuaded to ;join the Allies if
the response should prove unfavourable, but William preferred
to work through a Dutch rather than an English agent, even
if Oxenstierna preferred the latter, and it was Heekeren who
was informed in May of his desire for a settlement for Spain
half way between the Pyrenees and Nijmijgen treaties, and of
his wish that Robinson should be kept in ignorance of these 
11
terms.
William feared that to continue to use Lillieroot might 
antagonize Oxenstierna, with whose opponents the envoy was so 
closely allied, but Heinsius nevertheless repeated his earlier
request to the latter in May. Heekeren spoke to Oxenstierna
in accordance with his instructions and promised a declaration
13
as soon as Prance had produced one. Since d'Avaux said that 
any statement from him must wait on one from the Allies, a 
stalemate threatened. It was avoided "by the despatch of
terms from Paris already mentioned.
Louis, in spite of his successes, was probably as anxious 
for peace as William but realized that his best hopes for a 
favourable one lay in separating his enemies and exploiting 
their ¿jealousies. This was obvious from the offer communicated 
to Oxenstiema on July 10th. But, limited as this was, from 
the Swedish point of view a beginning had been made, and d'Avaux
reported that even Wrede was impressed by Oxenstiema's presenta-
. • 15tion of Louis’ project in the rad.
To William the French offer was naturally seen as an 
attempt to split the Alliance. The return of Strasburg at 
least was considered a sine q.ua non for peace, and the state­
ment in d'Avaux’ intercepted instructions that the terms were 
being sent at the request of the German princes heightened the 
fears of defection already aroused by the fall of Heidelberg.
He wished Oxenstierna's talks with d'Avaux to continue but was 
unwilling to see them extended to a wider circle, and Lillieroot 
was treated with extreme caution, especially after Heekeren's
report that he was thought to be corresponding direct with
16
d'Avaux through Oliverkrans. Lillieroot kept strictly to
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his orders in pressing for an immediate and unconditional 
acceptance of Swedish mediation, hut he also regarded this as
the best means of breaking Oxenstierna'smonopoly of negotiation. 
The Brussels talks ended without result in October, but
i
Louis immediately despatched the abbe Morel to the Spanish
18
Netherlands with a more detailed programme. He also, however,
continued to work through Stockholm and, probably encouraged
by d'Avaux* report of August 20th that, if the Emperor could
be satisfied with the French offers to Spain, William would
19have to give way, sent off his terms for the remainder of the
Allies at the beginning of the month. All French conquests
in Catalonia would, he said, be abandoned, together with Mons,
IJamur and Charleroi. The United Provinces was offered a
tempting bait in the form of the elector of Bavaria's succession
to the Spanish Netherlands, but on the all important question
of the English Crown no more was said than that the Emperor
and Sweden would be relied upon to find a suitable solution
after all other terms had been agreed. D'Avaux commented to
Oxenstierna that the latter might take the form of a pension
to James and the recognition of his son's right to the succession
and invited proposals, to which the chancellor replied that,
while a pension might be obtained, he did not consider the
20
problem of the succession suitable for public discussion.
He informed Heekeren of these offers and was surprisingly 
optimistic of future progress. He wanted a more positive
17
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declaration from France on the return of the re-unions «r>^  of
Strasburg and Luxemburg, which Louis had shown no sign of
conceding, "but hoped for an early preliminary agreement signed
21
in Stockholm and followed by a general conference. in view,
however, of the discontent aroused in allied circles by the
public presentation of the previous offer, Gabriel Oxenstiema
in Vienna, Snoilsky in Regensburg and Storre in Berlin were
told simply to mention the new terms in conversation and give
22
details only if they appeared to arouse interest.
(b) Denmark and Mediation (June 1693 - May 1694)
Hopes of mediation did not and could not play the dominant
role in Danish policy that they did in Sweden’s, but Christian
never despaired of stealing at least a portion of the limelight
at a peace congress. Brandenburg, the Emperor, Saxony and
Hesse-Kassel had already engaged themselves to support his 
23
claim, but his only real hope lay In joining with Sweden in
offering his services to the belligerents, and this Charles and
his advisers never seriously considered agreeing to. Louis
himself had little or no faith in Denmark's chances but could
not afford to umbrage her at a time when her Ratzeburg plans
promised a useful diversion. He accordingly sent his offers24
on the Empire to Bonrepos at the same time as to d'Avaux.
They were forwarded to Juel, already trying unsuccessfully to
interest Sweden in peace talks, and to Ehrenschild in Hamburg,
25
Mencken in Brunswick-Lüneburg and Schwartz in Münster. In
September Bonrepos offered the establishment of a barrier for
the United Provinces, and Lente was ordered to promise a Danish
26
guarantee for this. But Christian, like Oxenstiema, wanted 
a French project involving the whole Alliance. Louis agreed, 
but by this time Denmark could no longer serve any useful pur­
pose in the campaign, and it was not until November 3rd that 
terms were sent and then without including any mention of William;
Bonrepos merely stated orally that his recognition would present
27
no obstacle to peace. Christian naturally protested at 
the favour shown to Sweden and requested a more definite state­
ment on England, but the French envoy replied that d'Avaux had 
exceeded his instructions and that he could do no more than 
hand in a copy of the relevant extract from his orders, which
formed the subject of a memorial from Lente to the States-
28
General on January 12th l69i+.
When Skeel informed William of the offer on December 19th,
29
the king replied that he must consult his allies. Denmark
might still be considered a channel of communication with
France, but he and Heinsius agreed that Danish mediation was
30
quite out of the question. It was in fact a lost cause, but 
Christian continued to try his luck. Mediation was still, as 
has been seen, one of the conditions for entry into an alliance 
with the Maritime Powers, and on May 11th I69h the council in 
Copenhagen considered a peace project drawn up by Jessen for 
discussion with Bonrepos. At the same time Lente was ordered
240
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to insinuate that Denmark could be useful in securing the French 
promise to restore the Westphalian and Nijmijgen settlements, on 
which William insisted, and the Danish envoys in Vienna, Dresden, 
Berlin and Kassel were instructed to ask their respective govern­
ments to fulfil their treaty obligations to support Danish media-
■ 3 1  ' . .tion in the Hague. Bonrepos asked for discussion of Jessen's
proposal to be postponed until the end of the campaign, when it32
was, as Louis had obviously hoped, quietly shelved.
(c) Heekerenfs Mission (May 1693 - January 1694)
Before Heekeren had become fully occupied in seeking more 
vigorous S w e d i s h support against the threat of Danish agression 
in the Lower Saxon Circle, some progress had been made towards j 
the goals to reach which he had originally been sent. As soon 
as he had made it clear to his principals that there was no hope 
of securing Swedish military aid without a trade settlement, 
William consulted Odijk in an effort to ensure a more concilia­
tory attitude from Zeeland, and on June 2 6th the States-General,
*under the threat of the second League of Armed Neutrality,
resolved to send Heekeren details of the twenty-two ships listed
in Lente’s memorial of May 11th. -^ t the same time he was
ordered, as Haren had been, to try to include the compensation
settlement in a w i d e r agreement engaging Sweden to send treaty
33aid in l69h. Neerwinden brought a more urgent appeal, but
the Ratzeburg crisis intervened, and it was not until October 
23rd that Oxenstierna, Wrede and Gyldenstolpe, who had received 
their commission on June 1 2th, met the Dutch envoy with claims
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amounting to 162,62+5 Rd. Again like Haren "before him Heekeren
was in a hurry to conclude. hot only did Swedish military aid
depend, after his efforts to secure a comprehensive convention
had failed, upon agreement "but he feared the effects of the
merchants’ call for reprisals in the riksdag, which opened on
35
October 31 st.
After only two meetings he agreed on November 15th to pay
76,000 Rd. for twenty of the ships and a further i+6,165 Rd. if
the remaining two were not released within the four months
36
specified for ratification. .Two days later he presented a
memorial claiming that all obstacles which stood in the way of
37
the granting of treaty aid had been removed. He was optimist­
ic, but the situation was complicated by the Danish seizures and 
the French offer of peace terms, and no reply had been received 
by the end of the year. On January 5th he raised the matter
again and offered to discuss the payment of troops and the
38
replacement of the twelve ships by additional land forces.
The debates in the rdd which ensued firmly associated for the
first time the question of treaty aid with that of Swedish 
39
mediation.
The compensation agreement was not ratified by the States- 
General until April 9th, a delay which caused considerable dis­
content in Stockholm, and not until the very end of 1694 were all
ko
payments made. Fortunately for the Maritime Powers the growing 
menace of French privateers and the official protection given to 
them brought an equal, if not greater, resentment against the
k\enemy
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(ii) Mediation and Treaty Aid l6Qh - *5 
(a) 16^
The chancery memoranda.on Heekeren’s request for Swedish
treaty aid, read in the rad on January 10th and 16th, revealed
b2
the dilemma in which Sweden’s policy now found itself. It was 
a dilemma from which she was never to extricate herself for the 
remainder Charles XI's reign and which was to hamstring her 
influence on European affairs for the remaining years of the war. 
In allied eyes she remained under a solemn obligation to lend 
military help until Prance had been compelled to disgorge her 
conquests, and her arguments that the activities of English and 
Dutch privateers had broken the contract appeared a legal quibble 
to cover the pro-Prench inclination of a majority of her ministers 
The only way in which these suspicions could be finally dispelled 
was to send the 6,000 troops requested, but by so doing she would, 
so d*Avaux warned her constantly, lose all hopes of having her 
mediation, on which Charles had set his heart, recognized by 
Prance. Even after Heekeren's compensation agreement, the old 
arguments emphasizing interference with trade could be, and still 
were, used, since the money was not yet paid, no settlement had 
been reached with the United Provinces* allies and seizures con­
tinued to be made, but their inadequacy was clearly felt. The 
main emphasis was now to be placed on Sweden’s role as guarantor 
of the Westphalian and liijmijgen treaties and on a claim that all 
efforts to secure Louis* promise to restore in their entirety must
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■be exhausted before she committed herself. Such a policy might 
he expected to appeal to Prance, since it lent itself to endless 
prevarication and enabled her to throw the blame for the con­
tinuance of the war on the Alliance while she sought to strength­
en her bargaining power through military might and diplomatic 
intrigue. It could, however, also be represented to William as 
an effort to achieve his own war aims by other means. It had 
its dangers; Sweden might find herself in diplomatic isolation.
But it was the only logical position which, as both a guarantor
h3
and an aspirant-mediator, she could possibly adopt.
Before Starhemberg and Heekeren were officially informed 
of the new refusal, a meeting was arranged with d'Avaux in the 
hope of extracting from him a declaration which would not only 
satisfy the Allies and enhance Sweden's position as a mediator 
but also fulfil Sweden's obligations towards them. Oxenstierna 
pressed the French ambassador for a definite promise to return 
Strasburg and for something specific on England, but he was told 
that Westphalia had been modified before without harm to the 
settlement as a whole and that there was no need for any 
pronouncement regarding William; Prance would recognize the
)|J|
two treaties in question as bases for negotiation and no more.
On January 22nd therefore, Heekeren and Starhemberg could be told 
nothing more encouraging than that Sweden would make every effort 
to secure a just peace, that her services as mediator were much 
more useful than her services as the purveyor of such a small 
amount of military help, and, as a second line of defence, that
2 4 J
interference with trade continued. William began the new
year seriously concerned by the welcome the French offers through
d'Avaux seemed to have received in some quarters, the menace
of Louis' intrigues in the North and the danger of the formation
of a new third party. He believed that a counter-project drawn
up with the Emperor might be the best answer, which would also46
prove that he had a sincere desire for peace. He was, as in
1693, particularly anxious for a settlement before the opening
of the campaign and remained uneasy about the slowness of
negotiations through Stockholm, but, after the breakdown of
Dijkvelt's talks in Brussels in January, he grew more and more
47
convinced that Sweden offered him his best chance. He was
pleased to hear of Charles’ insistence on Westphalia and Nijmijgen
and empowered Heinsius to tell Lillieroot that he was willing to
negotiate on this basis, i.e. that the Allies should present their
requests for modification, if peace could thereby be restored48
before the armies should engage once more. This did not, 
however, imply that his trust in the Swedish envoy had been 
appreciably strengthened, and he considered that an offer of
49
40,000 Ed. would be necessary to gain him and back the offer.
Oxenstierna was offended by the employment of one of his
opponents after he had been promised that matters would be left
entirely in his own hands, and, since Lillieroot continued to
press for immediate acceptance of mediation, William in the
middle of April ordered the pensionary to have no more communica-
50
tion with him on the subject.
45
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The English Icing's hopes soon waned. At the end of
February he approved Heinsius' proposal for a declaration in
the Hague congress offering Swedish mediation once France had
bound herself to restore Westphalia'and Nijmijgen, as long as
the other members of the Alliance, especially the Emperor,
should agree; Heekeren had already made a similar statement in 
51Stockholm. William was also still willing to join in the 
drawing up of a counter-project, but he was becoming appre­
hensive of the divisions among the Allies which its composite 
might reveal, a fear which had caused Dijkvelt to oppose such 
a solution from the beginning.^2 The danger of Sweden's 
joining Denmark on the reprisal issue, though in fact rather 
remote, also depressed him.-^ This crisis, however, passed, 
and on May 28th Heinsius put forward the proposal in the
congress, where only Spain voiced her objection to the abandon-
511.ment of the original aims of the,Grand Alliance.
Vienna and the Hague were, however, 'drifting apart.
William finally turned against the idea of the counter-project, 
not only because of the discord it might create and the openings 
it would provide for France, but also because of the control 
it would give Leopold over negotiations; the Emperor trusted 
to the exchange of terms in Stockholm until sufficient agree­
ment had been reached to call a public conference under Swedish 
mediation and felt himself obliged to back Spain's objections
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to Ni jmijgen.-^ The stage was set for the separate talks late] 
in the year between the French and Dutch at Maestricht and the 
French and Imperialists at Steckborn.
When Sweden had declined to accept d’Avaux’ vague assur­
ances as sufficient, Louis had protested at her demands and'
instructed his ambassador to have no further conferences until
56she should show herself more accommodating. When Oxenstiama
accordingly told d'Avaux at the beginning of May that he was
in possession of Imperial terms of which the nature is by no
»
means clear, and asked for a signed copy of the French offers, 
the ambassador refused and said it was now too late."^ Louis 
was, however, willing to keep Sweden in a good humour and not 
only empowered d’Avaux to accede to the chancellor’s request 
but sent a new list of terms for the Empire, which were to 
expire on December 1st and contained some minor concessions. 
There was still no mention of William, but the ambassador 
promised that all conditions would be void if England were not 
satisfied.58
The division between the chief Allies continued to widen
59during the summer and autumn. Leopold asked in vain for
terms to complete the official counter-project, while William
felt he could not answer France before gaining an assurance
60
about himself and the treaties. If he had any secret 
proposals to make, he was determined that they should go to
248
Heekeren direct and not to Horn or Starhemberg through Vienna.
But Amsterdam's call for peace grew more urgent, and he decided,
after considerable hesitation, to accept the Polish agent Mollo's
offer and resume direct negotiations in the Netherlands.
Dijkvelt met Harlay and Callidres at Maestricht in November.
News of these talks, as well as of those which had opened
between Morel and Imperial agents at Steckborn on Lake Constance
in August, soon reached Stockholm, and Heekeren, returning in
November after four months absence in the Hague, was closely
63questioned about them by Oxenstierna. William decided that 
it was useless to deny their existence and, when Lillieroot 
protested at the slight to Sweden which they implied, Dijkvelt 
told him that, if his government were to act more vigorously 
to extract from Prance the guarantee demanded, such measures
61iwould not be necessary.
(b) 1695
The Imperial counter-project, by which Leopold seemed to 
set so much store, was finally sent off to Starhemberg in 
January 1695 after it had been communicated to Lexington. It 
was to be published, as Oxenstierna informed d'Avaux, as soon as 
Prance made an offer on England and at least deposited a signed 
copy of her terms with the Swedish king.^ Even before d'Avaux' 
unsatisfactory reply to these conditions was received in Vienna 
William had ceased to take any interest in the counter-project 
and, in view of d'Avaux' stubbornness, did not believe that it
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would ever be used, but the Emperor*s insistence on supporting
Spain’s demand for a return to the Pyrennean Treaty and, above
all, the stipulation of terms for the United Provinces without
prior consultation with the Stat^-General made him even more
dissatisfied with and suspicious of Imperial policy,^ The
Maestricht talks ended, however, in December without result,
and he was again willing to consider Sweden as a means to the
peace for which he was more than ever anxious after Mary’s
death. He feared, however, that it was too late to expect any
vigorous action in Stockholm to secure a promise of Westphalia
and Nijmijgen and that Oxenstierna would be likely to favour
Leopold at his expense, Heekeren, who was not highly regarded
by the Swedish chancellor, seems to have been largely respon-
67sible for this latter impression.
The Swedish political scene had changed considerably since 
1693. Bielke returned to favour as the Pomeranian reduction 
approached its conclusion and was finally allowed to visit 
Stockholm, where he arrived in February 1695 and where his 
conduct caused some surprise to both d’Avaux and the allied 
envoys, Robinson reported him ’to be altogether of Count 
Oxenstierna’s sentiments’, while the French ambassador was far 
from satisfied by the marshal’s attitude. Bielke’s influence
seems to have regained its full power, but to have been
68
exercised with an unwonted moderation. He found a rival for
60the king's ear in Wallenstedt,  ^ whose authority had grown
250
steadily since he attained a seat in the r&d in 1693. While
showing leanings towards France and to he numbered among the
chancellor's critics, the latter disconcerted d'Avaux, who
had boasted of having been responsible for his promotion by his
70 -71apparent incorruptibility. Hastfer, the governor-general of 
Livonia, remained the French ambassador's staunchest ally, 
but, while he enjoyed great trust from Charles, he was incon­
siderable as a diplomat.^
On April 1st Heekeren and Starhemberg handed in memorials
73requesting yet again Sweden's treaty aid. The Dutchman had 
no hope of success after so many failures but considered it 
good to remind the Swedes from time to time of their obligations
74
and enable then} to put pressure on France. The debates in 
the chancery and r&d which ensued revealed much the same 
attitude as in January of the previous year; there is little 
evidence of the 'great difference of opinion and very hott 
spirits* which, according to Robinson, marked the debate on 
March 29th.^ The answer given to Heekeren and Starhemberg 
on June 3th no longer mentioned interference with trade, since 
the money owing under the November 1693 convention had been 
paid and claims against England were being negotiated with 
Robinson, and discussions on the remaining obstacles standing 
in the way of the despatch of troops were offered, but its 
burden was the interest which Sweden shared with the Allies in
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securing a return to Westphalia and Nijmijgen and a promise 
to approach d'Avaux once more for the requisite engagement."^
A conference held with the French ambassador on the 
following day resulted in an exchange of projects on the form 
to be taken by the Swedish request and French reply and ended 
in a repetition of Louis' orders to give in nothing written 
regarding Westphalia and Nijmijgen until the Allies had made 
known their offers."^
The following months witnessed a decided swing in the
Swedish attitude in favour of the Allies, Sesentment against
France for her interference with trade ran high, especially.
after the seizure of six salt ships on their way home from
Portugal, released eventually by Louis' special grace and
favour, and after the declaration that all ships from Sweden's
German possessions would be treated as enemies, D'Avaux'
continuing stubbornness brought a steady deterioration in his
relations with Oxenstierna, whom the French king had instructed
his ambassador to win, since all attempts to overthrow him had
f a i l e d . B u t  it was above all the allied negotiations with
Denmark, which, as has been seen, Lillieroot did his best to
wreck, which caused alarm in Stockholm as Holstein-Gottorp
80began once more to loom into the picture. In August the
Swedish envoy offered Heinsius a convention by which Sweden 
would engage to send her treaty quota if France should once 
more refuse to give a suitable guarantee, but this was too
obviously motivated by a desire to sabotage the Danish talks 
to be welcomed by.the pensionary with any enthusiasm; he also 
explained to Heekeren that.'le plus que nous nous exposons, le 
moins nous o b t i e n d r o n s . I n  September, however, Oxenstierna 
did write to Lejoncrona hopefully of having been able to per­
form ’a signal service' for the Allies, and Bobinson told 
Trumbull of 'the best disposition that matters have been in 
here during the present war. '® 2
William was sceptical, but new talks with Callieres in the 
summer brought no benefit and the recapture of Namur in August 
strengthened the Allies' bargaining position.®^ He decided to 
make a further bid for Swedish treaty aid through Heekeren,who 
was ordered to apply again at the end of October, and so test 
Swedish sincerity, which bad been placed in considerable doubt 
by d'Avaux' intercepted despatches assuring his master that no 
Swedish troops would be sent to the next campaign.®**
Heekeren's memorial of November 1i*th emphasized the great
85French preparations being made for the coming year. The 
Swedish reply came more speedily than on previous occasions, 
being ready by the end of the same month, for it embodied most 
of the arguments already evolved. The onlynew factor of 
importance to arise was the revival of tension between Denmark 
and Holstein-Gottorp, and this was used as an additional excuse 
to keep Sweden's military power intact.®® D'Avaux reported 
that an attempt by Oxenstierna to use the crisis to the Allies' j
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advantage was defeated by Bielke.®? If so the chancellor did 
not have long to wait fbr another opportunity. 88
(c) Sweden and the Channel Salute
The English quarrel with Denmark over the Channel salute 
in 1695 seemed very likely to peter out in the same way as it 
had done in the previous year with face-saving clauses and no 
genuine settlement, but, with Sweden's involvement in the dis­
pute in August, the situation became potentially dangerous 
and certainly doubly embarrassing for William when influential 
opinion in the Maritime Powers was already incensed by the 
revival in Sweden of edicts restricting the religious and 
commercial activities of her foreign r e s i d e n t s . o n  April 
17th the Swedish captain Gustav Wattrangh, the same who had set 
sail with Barfod, had refused to strike his top-sail to the 
sixth-rate 'Sea Horse', had fought a four-hour engagement which 
had forced the English frigate to retire, and sailed on down 
the Channel.^0 The English council decided, since Wattrangh 
had not been stopped, to let the incident pass.-7 Leijoncrona 
was simply instructed by his principals to ask for orders to be 
sent by which future spilling of blood might be avoided, but, 
when this was done at the end of May, it revived the whole 
question in London. The council now considered it necessary 
to order Robinson to present a memorial demanding the captain's 
punishment and the drawing up of stricter instructions to 
respect England's rights and to inform the Swedish envoy
255
2 J 4
officially of the reasons why no further action had been taken 
at the time, as well as to express the hope that William's 
moderation would not encourage any further insults.92 Before 
this reply could he delivered, however, news arrived of an 
encounter which was not so easily passed over.
On August 10th the Swedish convoy ship 'Wachtmeister' was
attacked by the 'Mermaid* and 'Maidstone' after captain Ribbing
had refused to strike his top-sail. He was mortally wounded
in the engagement, and his lieutenant finally acceded to the
English demand.93 The council ordered the ship's release,
'there appearing no reason to detain them since the Captn.
being killed had born the punishment of his insolence. *9*+
Leijonerona protested immediately but had to wait for further
95orders from Stockholm.
Charles' reported reaction was such that ^obinson feared 
that Sweden's good disposition was completely lost, but he soon 
decided that general Swedish policy would be little affected. 96 
In this he was undoubtedly right, Charles was certainly angry, 
especially after his gesture of goodwill in instructing Swedish 
warships to dispense with pennants; Leijonclo was empowered to 
discuss the matter with the Danes and Robinson's memorial 
returned. But Lillieroot was instructed to propose to William
N
that negotiations should be opened on the whole problem of naval 
salutes, and the Emperor was asked to mediate.97 D’Avaux even 
complained in his report on September 25th that the Swedes 
seemed more affected by the holding of their ships in Dunkirk
than hy the English pretensions.9®
When Lillieroot saw William on September 30th, the king
promised to do his best and a few days later proposed that, if
the Swedes agreed that the incidents involving Wattrangh and
Ribbing cancelled each other out, negotiations could begin on
an agreement based on clause XV of the 1661 treaty; he could
claim that Robinson's orders had been sent without his know- 
99ledge. Dankelman, the Brandenburg envoy in London, offered
his help and suggested that the ships of each nation should be 
instructed to avoid each other. 100 William was as pleased with 
Sweden's apparent reasonableness as Charles declared himself to 
be with William's, but the latter could not dictate any solution 
and remained deeply concerned. The need for a hasty settle­
ment of some kind was emphasized by a fresh encounter Just 
before Christmas, in which six Swedes on the 'Liefland* were 
killed by the guns of the 'Burlington' and 'Siren'. Finally,
in mid-January, Russell adopted Dankelman's plan for avoidance, 
and the council authorised him on January 26th to consult with 
the admiralty on the issuing of the necessary orders. The
Swedes had favoured a reciprocity agreement, but this could 
plainly not be concluded in a short time if at all, and Charles 
expressed himself satisfied with this temporary expedient.10**
It was sufficient to prevent trouble for the remainder of the 
war, and Denmark, who had already shown signs in October of 
weakening her attitude, let the matter drop. ^
2J6
Chapter 11
Failure in Sweden (November 1695 - January 1697)
(i) The Revival of the Holstein-Gottorp Problem and its '
Consequences
(a) Denmark, Sweden and Holstein-Gottorp 1690-5
One of the excuses for the fresh refusal of treaty aid 
given in the Swedish reply to Heekeren and Starhemberg on . 
November 30th was the threatening situation brought about by 
the revival, in an acute form,of the disputes between the duke 
of Holstein-G-ottorp and the king of Denmark. On the afternoon 
of the very day on which the rad had determined on its answer 
to the Allies’ request, but too late to influence its decision, 
a messenger arrived in Stockholm with an appeal for help from 
the duke. Denmark, he claimed, was preparing to attack him.1
This was no sudden and dramatic gesture. As has been 
described in Chapter 2,„.the- settlement in Altona had done 
nothing to resolve the fundamental differences between king 
and duke, both of whom were almost certain to exploit them 
whenever an opportunity presented itself. Christian Albrekt, 
largely it seems influenced by his chief minister Ahlefeldt, 
had shown himself anxious during his remaining years to effect 
a conciliation with Christian V, even at the risk of offending 
his Swedish ally. In 1690 he agreed with Bielke to allow a 
limited number of Swedish troops to continue to augment his army 
only on condition that they were taken into his service. At 
the beginning of 1691 he initiated negotiations with Denmark on 
outstanding problems but, in spite of offers of help from
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Brandenburg and the United Provinces, made little, progress.
The most that he could gain was a compromise agreement in the 
autumn of 1694, by which a Danish dragoon regiment replaced 
that half of the Swedish troops in his pay which Charles XI 
had withdrawn, as he was entitled to do after three years
under the terras of the 1690 agreement.. On December 27th
• 2 of the same year the duke died.
The new duke, Frederick IV, was twenty-four, ambitious, 
highly favoured by Charles XI, at whose court he had spent 
his time since the beginning of 1692, and promised, it was 
believed, to the Swedish princess Hedvig Sofia. One of his 
first acts was to dismiss his father's ministers and promote 
his own favourite, Wedderkop. Christian V was at once put 
on his guard, and, when Sweden agreed to lend Frederick 500 
troops from Bremen and Pomerania, he created difficulties over 
the oath which the young man had to take to him as overlord 
and demanded to see Christian Albrekt's will. Frederick 
refused to yield, and in August 1695 broke off negotiations , 
and appealed to Stockholm and Vienna for assistance. Christian 
expressed great indignation at such a move and presented a 
series of demands which included the dismissal of all foreign 
troops and renewal of the ’unions’. At the.end of October 
he suspended the joint High Court and Frederick began to 
recruit. Sweden was not wholly pleased with some of the duke's 
counter-claims, especially that demanding the abolition of the 
'communions' which governed the lands of the knights and 
prelates, and at first tried conciliation but, fearing that
he would look elsewhere for a protector, she began to back 
her offers of mediation and proposals for a meeting of 
guarantors in Hamburg with threats. Denmark persisted in 
her usual claim that the dispute was a purely domestic 
matter.^
(b) The Stockholm Negotiation (November 1695 to February 1696) 
Receipt of the duke’s appeal at the end of November 
caused the rad to be recalled and the question of treaty aid 
■ to be revived. Oxenstierna,in what can only be interpreted 
as an attempt to favour the Allies, pointed out that, if their 
requests were again turned down, they might well choose to leave 
Frederick to his fate, but he was overruled by his colleagues 
who wished justifiably, to keep the two matters distinct, and 
the previous decision stood. Sweden's envoys at the courts 
of the Altona guarantors were simply instructed to call for 
pressure to be put on Denmark to restrain her from aggression 
and for representatives to be sent to Hamburg.'
Heinsius, however, could not offer Lillieroot much 
encouragement. He in fact imitated Oxenstierna in linking 
Sweden's refusal of military help with the new Gottorp crisis 
and added her action against foreign merchants And Calvinists 
and Denmark's seeming willingness to reach agreement with the
6
Allies as further reasons for inaction by the Maritime Powers, 
William confided to the pensionary that he believed some good 
might be done by a conference in Hamburg,but he suspected that 
Sweden would not act with sufficient vigour when the time came 
and would leave others to face Denmark's wrath. He refused 
therefore to commit himself until assured on this score.^
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leijoncrona had to report that there was little enthusiasm
O
for the duke’s cause.
Oxenstierna continued to impress upon his master the 
dangers of isolation and advised him to promise the Allies 
aid in exchange for a guarantee to observe treaties and a
g
settlement on the troops' maintenance. D'Avaux remained 
meanwhile as adamant as ever in the face of a fresh appeal 
for a satisfactory French declaration of adherence to Westphalia 
and Nijmijgen.. France was anxious to gain time, and an attempt 
to by-pass the ambassador via Palmquist met with a sharp rebuff 
from Croissy. 10
Tension in North Germany mounted steadily, and on January
10th, the day on which the new appeal was made to the French
ambassador, orders were sent to Bielke and Dahlberg to be ready
to march and to prepare the fleet for action in the duke's 
11defence.
It was at this stage that Heekeren, acting on his own 
initiative under the promptings of the arguments put forward 
in the rad and a new request from Charles for the fulfilment 
of the Altona guarantees, came forward with a proposal to 
link Sweden's interests in the Holstein-Gottorp question with 
the Allies' interest in Swedish troops. He .offered on January
15th to conclude an alliance in defence of the duke in exchange 
for a commitment to send the Swedish contingent once the quarrel 
had been settled. 12 This was debated in the rad three days 
later. Wrede again urged that the two matters be kept separate 
and warned of the danger of Sweden's being drawn into the
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general European conflict. Charles was suspicious, 
especially as Heekeren had no authority to show for his 
plan, but the chancellor*s views were becoming more influential 
as the threat from Denmark drew nearer, and the king agreed, 
although unwillingly, to allow a project to be drawn up offering 
aid when the differences between Frederick IV and Christian V 
had been ’concerted, brought to a Negotiation.. in due 
manner concluded & put in a state of s e c u r i t y *  .-*-3 He 
comforted himself with the thought that no troops would have 
to be sent to the.coming campaign, but a reluctance to part 
with them at all dominated his attitude to the subsequent 
negotiations.-*-1*
A project was drawn up in the chancery and discussed 
in the rad on January 22nd and 23rd, when Sweden's various . 
treaty obligations were also examined. This project insisted 
not only on a final settlement in Schleswig-Holstein and the 
support of an allied squadron to that end, but also compensa­
tion from ships seized by Spain as well as the Maritime Powers 
and a promise to accept Swedish mediation when France promised 
to restore Westphalia and Nijmijgen before giving aid, for 
which a monthly subsidy would be demanded. While Charles 
was inclined to support the views Wrede had' expressed when 
the subject was first raised and claimed that the ban on 
trade and claims to the Channel salute were 'such great 
indignities that we have sufficient reason to withhold our 
help from them', Wrede now drew'nearer to Oxenstiema, and the
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project was approved with some modifications, which included 
the abandonment of the mediation clause.^ Oxenstierna 
was hopeful when he met Heekeren, Starhemberg and Robinson, 
who had agreed to take part in the negotiations with some 
reluctance, on the 2*+th, but d'Avaux had written to Louis 
that,if the Swedish conditions were insisted upon, there was 
little to be feared. ^  He felt, however, that some counter­
action should be.taken and on February 1st promised Charles 
a declaration on the guarantees demanded as soon as a similar 
one was given by the Allies, when Swedish mediation would be 
accepted, and that Sweden would be allowed to decide what 
alterations in Westphalia and liijmijgen should be admitted.
The Allies found his pronouncement insufficient, but he could 
17go no further. On February 10th he tried again to wreck
the talks by acting on his instructions to offer French
mediation in the Holstein-Gottorp dispute. Charles refused
18the offer as politely as he could.
The allied envoys commented on the Swedish project in 
a conference on February 8th. They found the articles on 
Holstein-Gottorp generally acceptable but protested at the 
demand for maintenance of the treaty troops, which, Robinson 
had calculated, would require 320,000 Rd.p.a., and at the 
trade clauses, especially when the settlement of claims against 
England had, it was asserted, been postponed by Sweden's 
persecution of her foreign merchants. They proposed in reply 
that the help should be despatched as soon as the duke could be 
considered out of danger and that it should be paid for by an
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annual lump sum, remain with the Alliance throughout the
winter and be supplemented by recruits from Sweden’s Baltic
possessions as a replacement for the twelve ships which had
been long before written off. Ileekeren was far from optimistic
and wrote on the 12th that his hopes were almost gone.1^
A new Swedish project, handed over on February 18th,
embodied the rad's decision to give way to none of the allied
demands, and, in spite of further exchanges, no material progress
was made. On February 22nd the envoys broke off negotiations,
in spite of Oxenstierna's pleas that something could be settled
20by further talks.
The chancellor was genuinely surprised by such an abrupt
termination, and Wallerrstedt believed the negotiations would 
21be resumed, but no move was made. Both sides must bear
some responsibility for the failure. The Allies might have
been wiser to demonstrate their willingness by continuing
discussions, even if they could see no hope of a settlement.
On the other hand Charles could have been more pliant without
committing himself irretrievably. He was suspicious from
the beginning and never satisfied that the risks in which he
was being asked to involve his country and his troops were
worth what he was offered. As Robinson noted, he was strongly
affected by the argument,first put forward by Wrede'in the
meeting of the r&d on January 18th, that the Allies were obliged
22in any case to defend the duke's rights.
William had never been hopeful about the outcome of the 
talks, for his belief in the corruption of the Swedish court
was as strong as ever.2^ Heinsius immediately reflected
in his letters to Heekeren both the hardening of the Maritime
Powers' attitude to Sweden and their failure to appreciate
the motivation of her policy. It was considered, he told
the envoy, that more had been gained than lost by breaking off
negotiations, since the Swedes would understand in this way that
the Allies were not able to be deceived. At the same time
he sent instructions to manage Sweden for the sake of Holstein-
2bGottorp and try to gain her sympathies by bribery.
Such management was, however, exceedingly difficult, 
since both parties had been left embittered by the failure 
of .the February talks. . Charles was angered by the Allies' 
demands and their curt ending of negotiations, the Allies by 
Swedish stubbornness and by the disappointment of their hopes 
for peace and military aid. But they had further causes for 
complaint, which had little bearing either on Holstein-Gottorp 
or the war.
(ii) The Foreign Merchants Dispute
(a) Robinson's Compensation Negotiations (1693 - 5)
Although Wrede had in July 1693 valued Sweden's claims 
for ships seized by English privateers and warships at
200,000 Rd.,2^ it was not until November 169^, that is twelve 
months after the second compensation agreement with the United 
Provinces had been signed, that negotiations opened with an 
English representative in Stockholm. This discrepancy can 
be attributed to the closer association between the claims 
against the United Provinces and the question of treaty aid,
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■which made a Dutch settlement more urgent for the Allies, and 
the greater menace of the Zeeland privateers, which caused 
Sweden to exert stronger pressure on the States-General, hut 
there were also administrative difficulties, whose nature will 
emerge in due course, and possibly deliberate obstruction in 
London.
Gabriel Oxenstierna repeated a demand for satisfaction 
from England originally made in September 1692, in May 1693, 
while on his way through the Hague to take up his new appoint­
ment in Vienna, and on this occasion it was made under the
26threat of the second armed neutrality treaty. Yet, when
Heekeren asked Bengt Oxenstierna in July for details of the
claims against England, he was told that all the documentary
evidence had not yet been collected.2^ William hoped that a
moderate increase in the size of the subsidy for the Swedish
28treaty troops might solve the problem, but this could never 
even be offered, and he was reduced to ordering as much favour 
as was possible to be shown to Swedish ships seized by English 
warships or privateers.2^
Not until May 169i+ were the Swedish merchants' figures
complete. They stood by this stage at 603,957 Rd» for eighty
one ships or cargoes, most of which bad been held for carrying
30passes not in accordance with the 1661 treaty. This, it will 
be remembered, was now recognized by both countries, but its 
strict interpretation now caused the Swedes such annoyance that 
they called for a new agreement under the threat of repudiating 
the one for whose acceptance they had previously worked so hardl
Robinson continued to campaign vigorously in his' despatches
for recognition of the principle 'free ships, free goods,'
and for an end to the unprofitable quibbling which impeded
the establishment of the amicable relations between England32
and Sweden,which was always his dearest wish.
Even when a negotiable figure was produced, the beginning 
of negotiations still lay six months away. Certain difficult­
ies arose because neither Sweden nor England had a fully 
accredited representative in the other's capital. • Names 
continued to be canvassed for the post left vacant by Duncombe, 
and it seems that lord George Douglas was prevented from taking 
up the appointment only by his sudden death,^ but Robinson 
remained alone and without character, with the result that all 
official business had to be left to Heekeren. There was some 
talk in Stockholm of replacing leijonberg, but it was generally 
considered more satisfactory to deal with 'the English priest', 
who was popular with Swedish ministers whatever their views on 
other matters, and in April Leijoncrona was ordered to have 
Robinson accredited.^ Robinson himself was not above 
canvassing for promotion and was backed by Shrewsbury. In 
July he was finally made agent and empowered to examine the 
Swedish claims, but not to conclude an agreement. Commission­
ers to meet him were appointed on November 3rd,and talks opened 
on November 16th.37
Both he and the Swedes urged on the English government 
the desirability of settlement for a lump sum on the Dutch
26?
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model, but the lords justices insisted on the examination of
each individual item in the hopes of gaining a greater reduction
in the merchants* figure.3® The Swedes gave way, and meetings
took place twice weekly until March 8th 1695, hy which time
39twenty-eight ships had been agreed upon.  ^ An interruption
came when Robinson refused a request for an advance of 2+0 —
50,000 Rd., but October saw a resumption of negotiations.^0
On December 20th, however, when fourteen items had been passed
in review, the agent informed the commissioners that he could
not continue until he had received orders as to what his reacHbn
should be to the restrictions being placed on foreign merchants 
2+1in Sweden.
(*) Execution of the Law (November 169U - June 1696)
In 1617, following complaints from the estate of burghers 
of unfair competition, an ordinance was promulgated which for­
bade foreigners, already restricted to thirteen staple towns, 
to trade in Sweden for more than two months in any one year 
under threat of fines and confiscation.^ 2 This was only 
intermittently enforced and, when revived in 1673 and 1687» 
brought forth such protests from English and Dutch envoys that 
it was suspended.^ On November $th 169U» however, foreign 
merchants in Stockholm were again told that they must become 
burghers and submit to all the burdens which this entailed or 
leave the country within eight weeks.^ Although French 
intrigue was later blamed for this move and it was certainly 
welcomed by Louis,^ 5 it appears to have been largely a 
result of the desire of Stockholm burghers, to gain a greater
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control of trade in a period of Swedish commercial' expansion 
and their jealousy of those who were free of the taxes imposed 
upon themselves. Another aspect of the same campaign can be 
seen in the rigorous enforcement at the same time of laws
46
against non-Lutherans, in the main French and Dutch Calvinists.
'1Heekeren and Robindan were ordered to protest against
"both measures, the one as a breach of the trade treaties of
1661 and 1679, the other as an encouragement to the enemies of
. Protestantism.^ Oxenstierna promised Heelceren that his
coreligionists would not be molested as long as they did not
cause a public disturbance, and on February 25th a commission
of sixteen was appointed to investigate the extent to which
the merchant regulations might contravene the treaties, all
action by the capital's authorities being suspended pending its 
48report. It seemed that diplomatic protest was to have the 
same effect as on the two previous occasions.
In June 1695» however, the college of commerce reported 
that it had been unable to discover any breach of treaty 
obligations in the proposed measure,and in the following month 
the Dutch envoy reported a revival of religious persecution.^^- 
To his protest against the latter the Swedes delivered an 
answer which he found wholly unsatisfactory, but no action was 
taken against the merchants until December. In an order dated 
December 4th the original law was reimposed but with the period 
of permitted residence extended to four months and the penalty 
laid down as 300 Rd. for the first week over this limit, to be 
doubled each subsequent week thereafter Defending the action
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in letters to Lillieroot and leijoncrona on December 18th ,
Charles stressed the antiquity of the law, the disadvantages
under which Swedish burghers laboured and his generosity in
81extending the time limit.
Both Heekeren and Robinson presented memorials, but the 
latter had little hope of success or faith in the efficacy of 
t h r e a t s . T h e  Swedes maintained stubbornly that no treaties 
had been broken and that no untoward hardship was being caused, 
since trade could be carried on during the remaining months of 
the year through Swedish factors. They also claimed that their 
own merchants suffered similar restrictions in the Maritime 
Powers, though they were in fact at a loss to name these and 
Leijoncrona had to be instructed to find out what they were in 
England.^
The English and Scots merchants, numbering some fifteen, 
who feared that any property they left behind would be seised 
to pay the compensation money which Robinson had been negotiat­
ing, petitioned for a stay of execution^ and in a conference 
on April 27th the agent pleaded that, since'they were not guilty 
of the offences against Swedish trade mentioned in the December 
4th decree, they were not subject to its provisions,but in 
vain.  ^ He wrote'home asking to be withdrawn if a final 
attempt should prove unsuccessful and revived a proposal for 
reprisals in the form of a restriction of Swedish trade with
England to the four months of December, January, February.and
86March, when the Baltic was frozen. Ilever does he, so ready
normally to see the Swedish point of view, appear so incensed 
as against the edict, although later in the year when he was 
in London he did, according to Leijoncrona, try to calm the 
tempers of the Eastland merchants, who were vowing revenge and 
considering plans to transfer their custom elsewhere. ^  The 
most he could obtain was permission for two merchants to remain 
as his domestics to watch over the royal contracts for naval 
stores, for a non-trading consul to reside in Stockholm, credi­
tors to stay until their debts had been collected and a stay of 
execution until June i+th."^ Only one merchant »according to 
him, chose to become a burgher, and nine left the country.^ 9 
On June 25th Robinson himself started for England leaving 
Robert Jackson, one of his merchant-servants, as charge d' 
a f f a i r e s . H i s  absence»while it could be represented as a 
protest against Swedish policy, was intended to be only temporary 
and, after making his report, he returned to Stockholm on 
November 15th with a D.D. and the title of. minister. He had
proved himself too valuable to be allowed to remain away longer
61when peace was drawing so rapidly nearer.
Sweden*s action against her foreign merchants had by itself 
little or no effect on general policy,but it certainly aggra­
vated her relations with the Maritime Powers at a time when, 
following the breakdown of the February talks, these were more 
strained than they had been for many years. The rad's support 
of the burghers' demands added, for its own part, an unnecessary 
and tactless irritant to the situation. D'Avaux was doubtless 
right when «he reported that 'quand on a commence 
cette affaire, on n'en concevoit pas toutes les
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Cpconsequences...’ but even when the consequences became apparent
no effort was made to correct the original mistake
(iii) Mediation (February 1696,- March 1697)
The chances for Swedish mediation in the spring of 1696
were, for reasons outlined earlier in this chapter, extremely
slender. William pronounced the Stockholm court too corrupt
to be trusted with such a task and reopened talks with Callieres 
64.in May. * Sweden was understandably concerned by the criticism 
which her actions aroused in the Maritime Powers as well as by 
the dangers which a new journey to the Netherlands by Plessen 
portended, and on May 20th both leijoncrona and lillieroot were 
sent a reasoned defence of their country’s policy to be communica­
ted to their courts.^ So anxious indeed did she seem to be to 
win favour with the Allies that, when Starhemberg and Heekeren 
presented memorials on May 22nd requesting an assurance on 
France's intention to restore Westphalia and Nijmijgen in toto 
and a promise of treaty aid until this was obtained, Robinson
66found ’some appearance they will have a tolerably good answer.'
lillieroot, especially anxious, in view of his strong 
personal interest as a potential mediator, to forward his 
country's claims, lent further backing to these hopes by 
announcing to Heinsius at the beginning of June that he had 
been empowered to negotiate on what he claimed was his own 
project for a settlement. Sweden was to threaten France with 
the despatch of her treaty aid, doubled if necessary, should 
Louis continue to be adamant in refusing the required declaration
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on Westphalia and Nijmijgen, in return for a promise that 
no such aid would he required and mediation would he asked for 
as soon as the guarantee was forthcoming and that no agreement 
prejudicial to Swedish interests would he made with Denmark. ^  
This was to take the form of a purely verbal pact between the 
two kings, hut the envoy failed to make it clear how this was 
to he accomplished, and the pensionary, while impressed by the 
honesty of his intentions, was justifiably suspicious of the 
support such a programme would ultimately receive in Stockholm
go
and forwarded the terms to William with little enthusiasm.
The king could see no harm in further discussion, provided that 
the secret negotiations were not thereby interrupted, hut 
declared himself 'convinced that Lillieroot's whole object is 
to break them'.^ There was no real chance that Charles would 
so endanger his neutrality as to threaten France in this way, and 
Lillieroot soon found himself engaged once more in the largely 
unrewarding tasks of pressing for immediate acceptance of 
Swedish mediation as the speediest path to peace and of working 
against the conduct of separate negotiations which still continued 
with Callieres.^0 j
In the latter task it did indeed seem for a brief period jI
that he might enjoy some measure of success. The memorials of 
May 22nd were a result of Imperial initiative and represented an 1 
unexpected acquiescence in the policy which William's envoys in 
Vienna had been urging for the previous twelve months.71 The ; i  
Allies might after all be able to present a united front in 
their peace offensive. It was,however, too late, and
it soon became clear that Leopold wished to continue
negotiations on terms in Stockholm even after the bases
had been secured,a procedure which the English king had no
72intention of following. The old suspicions revived.
In a series of conferences following the new move, d'Avaux 
repeated his promise to allow only those changes in the two 
treaties which were permitted by the mediator,and Charles, 
who was genuinely desirous of retaining the Allies' good-will, 
promised to refuse all alterations not acceptable to both 
sides and declared that he would not look upon mediation as 
absolving him from his obligations as guarantor. In answer 
to a further memorial asking for an assurance on Lorraine 
and Savoy, however, he would not be more specific. He had 
gone, he claimed, as far as a mediator could be expected to
Heekeren was pleased with the result of these exchanges
and expected the acceptance of Swedish mediation to follow
soon. He added, however, that this was even more likely
if Sweden could obtain a signed promise from France,and this
7bhe was instructed to demand. Charles felt that he could
not comply without both allowing the reliability of his word.
75to be called in question and arousing French opposition.
The problem of Swedish mediation was not to be resolved in 
Sweden.
Callières showed himself surprisingly compliant after 
the replacement of Croissy by the moderate Torcy in July and 
made such concessions over the return of Strasburg, Luxemburg
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and the 'reunions' that William suggested the discussion ' 
of a 'Public Treaty of Peace', the States-General resolved 
to inform Sweden that her mediation would be accepted as 
soon as the other Allies, i.e. the Hmperor and Spain, did 
likewise, and Heinsius informed the Hague congress that all 
obstacles in the way of Swedish mediation seemed to have 
been removed.^ Since d'Avaux was never empowered to make 
such sweeping promises as Callieres had indulged in,Sweden 
was puzzled and suspicious at this seemingly auspicious 
turn of events but was naturally anxious to profit by the
77occasion. That her suspicions were justified was shown
by a hardening of the French attitude in October, when,
after the neutralization of Italy, the gulf between William
and Leopold widened noticeably, and offers began to be
7 8withdrawn. Heinsius told Lillieroot in mid-November that
79he feared that negotiations would have to be broken off.
It was at this moment, when William was having second 
thoughts on the wisdom of the decision in August, that Leopold 
chose to waive his previous restrictions and instructed 
Starhernberg to offer Sweden mediation in the conviction, so 
he claimed, that she would fulfil all her obligations as 
guarantor.^ 0 Robinson reported on the bad impression which 
this lone offer created in Stockholm, and Lillieroot and 
Gabriel Oxenstiema were ordered to try to heal- the all- 
too-obvious breach between Vienna and the Hague and to prevent
Oi
the conclusion of separate peaces without mediation.
William would have liked to have drawn back and feared
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tlie results of a public peace congress, but Louis had at last 
agreed to recognize him on the conclusion of the treaty, and 
the financial crisis in England and the cry for peace in
Amsterdam we re weighing heavily against him. lie admitted
82that matters had gone too far. The situation was still
complicated hy the fact that the Imperial acceptance of Swedish
mediation was "based on'Charles XI *s declaration, while that of
the Maritime Powers rested on Calliere’s promises. Finally,
however, Leopold agreed to adopt a passive attitude to the
latter,and in the congress on January 21st 1697 it was decided
to offer mediation to Sweden. Spain, who still hoped for a
83return to the Peace of the Pyrenees, alone abstained. On 
the 25th Kaunitz notified Lillieroot, whose powers as mediator 
and appointment as ambassador extraordinary had been sent from 
Stockholm ten days before.8 "^ Some days after this Callieres 
dictated in lillieroot’s presence the preliminary French offer 
as well as his promise to recognize William once peace had
85been signed, and the official work of mediation had begun.r 
Robinson, I-Ieekeren and Starhe.mberg informed Oxenstierna 
of the congress decision on February 7th, on the eve of Charles* 
departure for Kongsor, but delayed the presentation of memorials 
in the hope that Spain might step into line. Spain, however, 
remained silent, and the memorials were presented on March 9th 
and given to Charles on his return to Stockholm on the 19th.
D'Avaux pointed out that France had already agreed to Sweden*s 
mediation, but he consented to confirm the offer, °
One of Cliarles ZI's dearest wishes had been granted, but 
his victory seemed likely to prove a hollow one, William had 
shown himself singularly unwilling throughout to place the fate 
of the Maritime Powers in Swedish hands without guarantees which 
appeared to leave little or no room at all for mediation, and 
the widening breach between himself and the Emperor Leopold 
and the secret talks with French agents threatened to destroy 
completely whatever reality still remained to the public 
proceedings.
27?
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Chapter 12
The Danish Alliance and Holstein-Gottorp in 1696 
(i) Goes*Compensation Talks 1694-6
The aftermath of the Danish reprisals against the United 
Provinces in 1693 proved to be a longer and more complex drama 
than Robinson's discussion of Sweden’s claims against England 
in Stockholm. The negotiations which opened in June 1694 
with Goes, the States-General's sole representative in 
Copenhagen after Hop's departure early in 1693» prospered or 
languished according to the changing fears and fortunes of 
each side, sometimes merging into the general alliance negotia­
tions in the Hague, sometimes being broken off altogether or 
disturbed by revived Danish threats, and always complicated 
by Dutch counter-claims. For two years they constituted the 
Dutch residents main preoccupation.
The account presented to Goes on May 12th for 253,066 Rd. 
was not intended as a basis for further discussion but as a 
final figure to be accepted without question.^ In spite of 
the precedent set by Heekeren in his convention with Sweden 
a short time before, the States-General, or more precisely 
Hop, whose advice to the States of Holland and West Friesland 
provided a lead throughout the negotiations which followed, 
refused, as the lord justices' in London were to refuse in 
face of Sweden's demands, to accept such a principle and
Odemanded further details of individual merchants' claims. 
Christian decided to show willing and agreed to discuss a small
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number of ships, against the claims for which the Dutch might
3raise particular objection.
In September, when little further progress had been made, 
Goes was empowered to offer agreement on a round sum if this 
seemed likely to speed matters. Since, however, the Dutch 
made counter-claims for their ships which, like some from 
England,^ had suffered from the attacks of French privateers 
in Norwegian waters and Hop’s assessment of Danish damages 
differed widely from that of the Danish commissioners, the 
decision helped little.'* In reply to a Danish claim for 
194,362 Rd., forwarded to the Hague in November, Goes was unable
Cto go beyond 100,000 Rd. In February he did ask tentatively 
whether 120,000 Rd. might be acceptable, but not only was this 
rejected but claims were put forward that Christian alone had 
the right to punish any of his subjects who had offended against 
the 1691 convention and a demand made that further negotiations 
should be by written communication, a method by which Dutch 
offers could be made more binding. The Danes did now, however, 
offer to agree to 150,000 Rd., the sum which was embodied in
Q
Plessen’s alliance projects. Repeated orders were sent to 
Lente to have Goes instructed to accept this figure,^ but 
interest was for some time deflected to the alliance negotiations 
in the Hague.
In September, before Plessen returned to Copenhagen,
Ileinsius tried to reassure him with a promise that fresh orders 
would be sent to Goes to resume the compensation talks, but 
when these arrived the Danes found them insufficient, and Greg
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feared new reprisals.1*^ Not until January 4th 1696, when 
more satisfactory ones had been obtained, could discussions 
begin. 11 Hop had rejected the figure of 150,000 Rd. as 
based on excessive merchants’ claims, modified by the Danish 
commissioners without discussion, and in December 1695 had 
informed the States of Holland that he could find no justifica­
tion for a payment of more than 70,000 Rd. He continued, 
however, to recommend that a larger sum might be offered to 
show good will. The States-General would go no higher than
100.000 Rd., and this was to be set against Dutch claims _
involving twelve ships and amounting to 76,661 Rd. Heinsius ,
had, it seems, tried to persuade them to agree to an amount
12nearer the Danish demand.
The situation improved slightly when in February the 
States-General approved Rente's offer to settle the counter­
claims within three months of Christian's receiving satisfac­
tion,1  ^but this was an encouraging sign of both sides' willing­
ness to reach a compromise rather than a major step forward 
towards the solution of the main problem. Even in May, when 
Christian was anxious for closer ties with the Maritime Powers, 
he would not take less than 80,000 Rd. at once and 60,000 Rd. 
to be set against an agreed figure for the cargo of.the 
stranded Dutch ship 'Kindje’ Jezus' in settlement of all claims, 
and Hop could go no further than 80,000 Rd. at once and
50.000 Rd. to form the subject of further negotiation.1 -^ In 
July Goes reported that no further progress could be made
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and that lie considered he should return.  ^ But the question
had by this time been swept up once more into wider discussions
in the Hague and made dependent upon them for its solution.
Negotiations on the claims against England were never
even begun. Greg reported in May 1694 that they were being
examined by a committee meeting thrice weekly and reporting
to the council every fortnight, and a list totalling l,000,000Rd.
was sent to Lente the following September, but this was intended
only for his information. In January he was told that 300,000
16Rd. would be accepted.
(ii) Plessen's New Attempt and the Alliance of November 1696
Denmark benefitted little at first from the strained
relations between Sweden and the Maritime Powers at the end
of 1695 and beginning of 1696. William wrote to Heinsius
at the end of November that he expected nothing but harm from 
17Denmark, and, when Pauli applied in February for the return
of the troops lent in 1689, Portland taxed him with. Christian's
continued intrigues with France and his proposals to Sweden
18for violent action in defence of trade; William returned
19a cold refusal to the request. But in the long run Denmark
reaped considerable benefit and took every opportunity to profit
20at the expense of her neighbour..
The French attitude after the Ratzeburg adventure and 
the slight offered in communicating the French peace terms 
still rankled in Copenhagen. The activities of the French 
privateers and the long absence of Bonrepos, who left Denmark 
in July 1695 for eighteen months, caused added offence. It
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was above all, however, the need for allied support against 
the duke of IIolstein-Gottorp and his Swedish patron, where 
Louis could and would offer little help, and the approach of 
European peace which enabled Plessen, who considered Gottorp 
a greater threat and peace nearer than did-Jessen, to convince 
his ailing master of the necessity fir. making considerable 
concessions to gain the closer agreement with the Maritime
21Powers for which he had been working since he came into office.
A tentative approach was made in March 1696 through 
Wurtemberg, who asked William whether he was still interested 
in a Danish alliance. William had previously told Heinsius 
that he expected little to come from any new negotiations and 
informed the general bluntly that he must be sure 'Qu'on ne 
reculeroit point, pour faire la marche mieux avec la Prance',
p pbut that he was anxious to conclude a pact. In view of 
this reply Christian agreed to allow Plessen, who had already 
received a call from prince George and arranged to travel to 
Aachen for his health, to negotiate under these covers. He 
had determined to conclude on the best terms possible and 
empowered Plessen in his instructions of April 11th to accept
200,000 Rd. as compensation for ships seized and a subsidy 
of 300,000 Rd. p.a. and to offer a ban on French trade, a 
closure of all Danish and Norwegian harbours to French warships 
and privateers, 5,000 troops, passivity over the ninth elect­
orate, and acceptance of the Maritime Powers' good offices 
with the Emperor for the Elbe.toll. But it was hoped that 
a better bargain might be struck, and the last Danish project,
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of 1695 was,the minister was told, to be adhered to as closely
as possible. No new proposals were therefore to be made until
the allied terms had been heard. The prospects, even to
those without knowledge of the limits to which Christian was
prepared to go, seemed bright. Greg reported that Reventlow
now supported Plessen's policy against Jessen,and Lillieroot
claimed despondently that every favour was being shown to
25Denmark in the Hague.
William considered that a meeting in Aachen would lead
to too much publicity, and Plessen, together with Lente, who had
travelled to Aachen in April, also, ostensibly for health reasons,
agreed to negotiate with Heinsius and Dijkvelt in the Hague,
where they arrived on .Tune l8th.2  ^ The /lilies soon made it
plain that they were in no hurry to conclude; the demands of
the campaign and the peace negotiations provided ample excuses
for delay. The sole indication which the Danes were given of
William's wishes was the anxiety he expressed to reach a settle-
27ment on the ninth electorate. He had little to gain from
Denmark which would benefit him in the 1696 campaign and can .
be forgiven if he remained suspicious of Christian's intentions.
It was,, on the other hand, essential for Plessen and Lente to
28  ^conclude before the war ended,and they began to lose heart.
A project which Dijkvelt finally produced at the end of July 
did little to raise their hopes. In exchange for a subsidy 
of 200,000 Rd. p.a. until peace was signed or for two years, 
whichever should prove the longer period, and 100,000 Rd. p.a. 
for three years as a security for Danish claims against England
and the United Provinces, as well as good offices in Vienna 
on behalf of Denmark's'claim to the Site toll, Denmark was to 
ban all Drench trade, close all her ports to French men-of-war 
and privateers and remain passive in the matter of the ninth 
electorate; the 1690 defensive alliance was to be ratified
2Qafter certain minor alterations in it had been approved.
Plessen presented a counter-project which modified these
conditions in accordance with the terms that he had offered
in 1695» "but Christian, on being informed, resolved to accept
William's terms with such modifications as his envoys could
30obtain without opposition. The English king, unmoved by 
Swedish protests against the negotiations, declared himself 
satisfied at the beginning of September, although anxious, 
as he confided to Heinsius, 'to discover one means or another
so that, if peace be concluded, we are not obliged to pay all
31 'that m o n e y - a natural sentiment in viev; of Callieres
concessions - and empowered lord Villiers to sign when the
32States-General gave its sanction. The defection of Savoy
alone made the acquisition of a new ally desirable if the
war continued, but it is to be remarked that no military aid
was involved in the transaction. Plessen explained to his
king that he had chosen to keep the offer of troops, which he
had been authorized to make, as a card to be produced when it
might seem important to create a favourable impression or to
33g a m  a concession. ■
Christian's compliance and William's consent did not end
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negotiations, for Dutch claims for compensation and debts,
\tfhich had bedevilled Goes’ work for so long, and attempts to
exploit the opportunity.to contract a definitive trade treaty
between the United Provinces and Denmark led to new delays.
Agreement could not be reached on the latter owing to Holland's
refusal to grant any privileges whatsoever to Danish defence
ships,and all that could be achieved :^ as a mutual undertalcing
to continue negotiations between Hop and Christian's commission-
3kers independent of the alliance. Dutch claims finally formed 
the subject of two appendices to the latter. By these the 
United Provinces were to retain, out of the 100,000 Rd. already 
agreed upon in the fifth secret clause of the alliance as their 
share of the compensation to be paid to Denmark, 90,000 fl.
(i.e. c.60,000 Rd.) as an indemnity for ships attacked off the 
Norwegian coast and for the freight of the 'KLndje Jezus', and 
Denmark promised that the debts owed to Holland and .Amsterdam 
should, if possible, be deducted from the 200,000 Rd. which
was to be paid in settlement of the Dutch debts if no other/
agreement were arrived at, and, if not possible,.should remain
35Denmark's responsibility to their full amount.
The alliance was finally signed on November 23rd, but
even then its fate was a little uncertain. '5 It had been
possible to retard Bonrepos' return journey to Copenhagen for
a month at Hons by withholding his passport, but he was now
37on his way to prevent the ratification. Plessen did not 
arrive back until December 15th, and Christian appended his 
signature to the treaty on the 29th, a mere fortnight before
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the French ambassador's arrival* Katifications were
exchanged with the United Provinces on January 30th 1697 and
39with England on February 1st.
(iii) Aftermath of the Alliance (December 1696 - March 1697)
The conclusion of the alliance was greeted by some among 
the Allies with mixed feelings; its terms fell a good deal, 
short of the original aims of William's Danish policy,and it 
seemed in itself unlikely to contribute very materially to 
the crusade against France. Stepney wrote in mid-December 
that it 'may be useful to us in future Warrs but will not 
much availe us for ye present.', and William confessed to 
Heinsius in January that he was in no condition to pay the 
subsidies to which he had committed h i m s e l f T h e  ratifica­
tion of the 1690 alliance was delayed until April 23rd, although 
the first instalment to Denmark was duly paid in the month 
following.^ The English king's confidence in Danish good 
faith can hardly have been strengthened by his reading of the 
intercepted despatches of Meyercrone ,the Danish secretary in 
Paris,and Bonrepos, which, as will be seen, revealed Christian's 
efforts to maintain friendly relations with Louis, and Vernon 
wrote to Greg in February to enquire how far the commitment 
to ban trade■with France was being honoured. But a serious 
blow had nevertheless been delivered to French diplomacy, the 
possibility of a permanent breach between Denmark and France 
had been increased and Dijkvelt's claim, reported by lillieroot,
that if the alliance had not been concluded,Plessen would have
43 '
been overthrown, while used mainly to allay Sweden's suspicions
38
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and answer her protests, does indicate its usefullness as 
a guarantee against any worsening of the situation, perhaps 
as important as any positive gain.
It may in any case have been some comfort that Christian 
benefitted as little as the Maritime Powrers. When he resolved 
to ratify the agreement on December 11th, he determined at the 
same time to maintain Danish neutrality and good relations 
with France, which meant the continued receipt of subsidies 
under the treaty with Louis.of 1691. Meyercrone was ordered 
to explain that Plessen and Lente were discussing no more 
than the settlement of compensation claims and debts, but the 
French were not to be fobbed off so easily and in October 
1696 ceased payment of subsidies. Louis promised that they, 
would be again forthcoming as soon as a satisfactory explana­
tion was given to Bonrepos of the rumours that all Danish 
trade with France had been forbidden and all Danish ports 
closed to French warships and privateers, in answer to which 
he seized in December several Danish ships in French ports.^ 
Meyercrone explained feebly that in wartime Norwegian ports 
were open only to merchant ships, and Christian complained 
more boldly that French subsidies had not compensated him 
for his losses in trading with France and that the ban, which 
he now admitted, was meant to be imposed only until such 
compensation had been gained.^5 Not only did lie expect 
subsidies from both sides but indemnification from each of 
them for the same losses!
Even after Bonrepos had learnt of the ratification, and
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the news was kept secret from him as long' as possible,^ ■ 
Jessen gave him hopes that the terms would not take effect,^ 
but, whether this was merely an attempt to'soften Louis’ 
heart or the expression of a genuine belief on the Danish 
minister’s part in his ability to negative Plessen's policy, 
the French remained adamant.
In another direction, however, Christian's expectations 
of the alliance were more fully satisfied. The stadtholder's 
enthusiasm for duke Frederick’s cause was considerably dampened,
(iv) Holstein-Gottorn
(a) Prelude to Pinneberg (February - August 1696)
William’s attitude to the new Holstein-Gottorp crisis 
was basically the same as that in the months before Altona.
His primary aim was to prevent by all means available an 
outbreak of hostilities in the Lower Saxon Circle,which would 
prevent the sending of the north German contingents to the 
front and threaten his naval supplies, concern for which, 
already intensified by the crisis over Sweden's measures 
against foreign merchants, led to discussions in the new 
English council of trade in the summer of 1696 on the possibil­
ities of exploiting the resources of the North American
AO \
colonies. Questions of strict justice must, he considered,
be subordinated, . if necessary and within certain limits, to
the larger needs of the war against France, and he made it
clear to both Northern Crowns at the beginning of 1696 that
he would act against the first power to resort to armed force,
49regardless of its rights. He proposed an alliance to
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threaten war on the aggressor and offered his mediation to 
50Denmark. His sympathies mere certainly not engaged to
one party in the dispute, for, while he protested at the
contradiction in Christian’s call for execution of the Altona
guarantees against the duke at the same time as he was claiming
51the quarrel to be a purely domestic one and replied to the
Danish king’s call for a return of his troops that they could
hardly be regarded as Danish when they would have ceased to
exist as an independent body if their recruitment had been
left to Christian,^ 2 he found at the same time Frederick's
demands for a revision of his traditional relationship to the
Danish crown inopportune, feared. Gottorp would be pushed too
far by Sweden and Brunswick-Luneburg and, as has been seen,
was afraid of being left in the lurch by the former. He
could not in any case afford to offend Denmark too much and
pressed for a provisional agreement until peace should confine
the problem within its proper limits.^
The tension slackened after Sweden had failed to form
an alliance with Brunswick-Luneburg and Brandenburg on the
duke’s behalf, owing to the latter’s reluctance to commit'
kerself and the former's insistence on including a guarantee
for Saxe-Lauenburg, and Denmark, failing to enlist the
sympathies of Louis XIV, who wished merely to keep the question
open until the campaign was over, had adopted the Emperor's
proposal to submit the dispute to the same mediators as at
55Altona - the Emperor himself, Saxony and Brandenburg.
This latter move was given as an excuse for the rejection of
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7/illiam's mediation, but there can be little doubt that 
Christian remembered the behaviour of Heemsksrck on the previous 
occasion and feared that the other guarantors - Sweden and 
Erunswick-luneburg - would claim equal rights.^ The relaxa- ■ 
tion of tension had deleterious effects on the Stockholm
y
negotiations, of which, as has been seen, Christian took full
advantage, and which lessened sympathy for the duke's cause
in London and the Hague. Portland told leijoncrona bluntly
in'March that there was much to be said for Denmark's case.-^
A treaty between duke Frederick and the Allies, which was
signed in the Hague on May .4-th and which engaged him to provide
2,270 troops and to join the Grand Alliance, did much less than
might have been expected to bring him the favour from William
which he had hoped for; the motive behind the offer had been
too patent, and it was known that Christian had encouraged the
move in order to rid himself of such a body of troops on his
borders. But it did make Denmark more amenable. She
procrastinated as long as possible, partly because of and by
means of the Hague negotiations, but her agreement in June to
the continued stay .of the Swedish troops, which had entered
the duke’s service in 1695, and to Pinneberg, near Hamburg,
as a meeting place for negotiations brought the time for these 
59nearer. The effect of such reasonableness on Plessen's 
work was doubtless watched by Christian with keen interest.
At the beginning of July the States-General agreed, in 
response to requests from Sweden and the duke, to send Hop to 
Hamburg to help reach a settlement,and on August 1st Cresset,
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English envoy in Brunswick-Luneburg since 1694, was ordered
. . . , . 60 to join him.
(b) The Opening of the Pinneberg negotiations
(August - December 1696) ,
Hop and Cresset did not arrive in Hamburg until the first
week in September, by which time the mediators had already
begun their work. The presence of representatives from the
guarantors of Altona was resented by Christian, who refused
to recognise them officially and was soon protesting against
the behaviour of Hop, who, uninhibited by any but the most
general instructions from his principals, co-operated with i
Vellingk, representing Sweden as at Altona, in defending
vigorously the duke's ius armorura et foederum and in pressing
the guarantors' claims to settle what the mediators failed to;
lente and Plessen were ordered to protest at the attempt of a !
61third party to dominate the discussions. little was accom­
plished at Pinneberg before a new subject of dispute was inter­
posed.
Christian had made vain representations soon after the 
conference began to prevent the return of the Gottorp troops 
lent to the Allies to the duke’s territories and on October 23rd; 
issued orders to oppose their entry by force. Guarantors and j 
mediators joined in protest and warned him of the possible j
consequences of such action. At the end of November both I
Cresset and Hop demanded free passage and supported plans for j 
an alliance to defend the duke, which Charles ordered Vellingk 
to negotiate. Not until December 11th did the Danish king
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give way.
The road seemed to "be open for a resumption of discussions 
on the main points in dispute, hut the negotiations languished. 
Christian’s stubbornness over the return of Frederick’s troops 
had evoked some sympathy for the duke, but it was not enough 
to outweigh the impression caused by the separate discussions, 
particularly resented by Hop, which he opened with Brandenburg, 
who hoped, as before the Altona treaty, to bring about a settle­
ment single-handed, the effects of the dispute between Sweden 
and the Emperor over the Mecklenburg succession, which qiit the 
mediators, and of the signing of the Hague alliance between 
Denmark and the Maritime Powers, and above all the prospects of 
European peace. The Maritime Powers, Frederick's most valuable 
supporters, grew less and less interested in his fate and found 
in the Berlin talks, much as they disapproved of them, a good 
excuse to delay issuing the declaration in favour of the duke’s 
'ius armorum’ for which Charles was pressing, since, so, Heinsius 
instructed Hop in reply to his request for orders, this might 
prejudice the talks and also, as Cresset claimed, because it
' 63might offend William's trusted ally, Brandenburg.
With the solution of the passage dispute, Vellingk was
ordered to shelve the idea of drawing up a project for an alliance
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to protect the duke, and Hop returned to the United Provinces.
He had done so, Heinsius explained to Lillieroot, to be present
when the Amsterdam magistrates were changed and would soon return
65
to Hamburg, but it was.obvious that Dutch interest was at a lew 
ebb. It was to be revived dramatically before peace was signed.
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Chapter 1~5 
The Final Year
(i) Preliminaries to Ri.jswi.ik (January - April 1697)
Over three months separated the decision by the Hague 
Congress to accept Sweden's mediation and the opening of peace 
negotiations at Rijswijk. Lillieroot found himself fully 
occupied during this time in composing projects for the conduct 
of the conference, in making unsuccessful attempts to persuade 
the French to agree to an armistice, which William was anxious 
to arrange in view of the unfavourable military situation, and 
above all in inducing the Habsburg powers to modify their con­
ditions for their participation in the talks, which threatened 
to drive the Maritime Powers into acting alone. Until mid- 
April Leopold demanded an assurance from France on the restora­
tion of the duke of Lorraine, in which Charles also had an 
interest as duke of Zweibrucken, and consented to meeting at 
the place already agreed on by his other Allies only at the end 
of the month. Spain was persuaded with great difficulty to 
rest content v/ith an oral promise of support from the remaining 
members of the Grand Alliance for her claims to a number of 
towns in the Netherlands, and the first meeting in the house 
at Nieuwburg near Rijswijk finally took place on April 29th.1
The Habsburgs’ stubbornness had already made it clear 
that the mediators' chief difficulties would lie in the mainten­
ance of allied unity and in prevailing upon the Maritime Powers 
not to seek for a swifter settlement through separate negotia-
tions with France, which would not only harm his own status
but also threaten Sweden’s interests in the maintenance of the
Westphalian and Nijmijgen settlements. He was unfortunately
not wholly trusted by either side. , While d ’Avaux reported his
•grandes liasons avec le pensionnaire Heinsius* and the unreli-
2ability of Olivecrants, his father-in-law, something of the 
reputation as a francophil with which he had arrived in the 
Hague remained, and it was thought necessary to gain and keep 
his interest: in the Allies’ cause by bribery. Dijkvelt 
proposed to Kaunitz that 60,000 Rd. might be employed to induce 
him to insist on the return of Strasburg, and, as has been seen, 
William had supported use of the same means when writing to 
Heinsius.^ Whether any such amount actually changed hands
remains uncertain, but there is nothing to indicate that 
Lillieroot had any desire other than to carry out his instruc­
tions to maintain his country’s honour as mediator and interests 
as a‘ guarantor of European peace.
Before his work could really begin, however, news arrived 
which called in doubt Sweden’s position as either of these. 
Charles XI had died on April 5th, and, according to his will of 
August 1693, a regency council of six, headed by the queen-nlother,
had been set up to guide the kingdom until the young prince were
(5declared of age.
i t
(ii) Sweden under the Regents
(a) The Change of Government (April - May 1697)
Charles had returned from Kongsor to accept the mediation
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offer a sick man,and Iieekeren had forecast that his passing would
"be a great blow to the Allies’ cause, for, he also reported,
Oxenstierna had not for some time been so deep in his master's
6confidence as he was at present. D'Avaux boasted that he had
brought the Swedish king,towards the end of his reign, closer to
7 /the French point of view,' and the Dutch envoy’s judgement is 
not to be wholly relied on, since he confessed that his outspoken 
criticisms had lost him so much credit at court that he should 
he replaced and that he had not discussed matters with Oxenstiema 
for some time. There was, however, general agreement that the 
composition of the new government was not one to reassure William 
and his friends. Of the regents only the queen-mother herself 
and the chancellor were considered sympathetic to France's 
enemies,while the remainder - Wrede, Gyldenstolpe, Kristian, 
Gyllenstierna and Wallenstedt - had long been lumped together 
as members of 'the French party'. Among the rest of the r&d, 
to which all matters of foreign policy had to be referred, only 
the brothers Wachtmeister could be relied upon to follow
QOxenstierna's lead.
Doubts of Sweden's sympathies were matched by doubts of * 
her ability to back with sufficient strength whatever policy 
she chose to follow and especially of her competence to fulfil 
her obligations as a guarantor of Westphalia and Nijmijgen. 
Reports flowed in from all sides concerning the havoc and dis­
content which had been caused by the succession of disastrous 
harvests since 1695 and the effects of the reduktion^ Robinson,
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however, forecast optimistically on May 15th that 'this Nation
will again make the figure it ought to',since'this new government
pretends to look abroad with more concern than was done in the
last reigne’,and assurances were issued from Stockholm that no
changes would be made in the conduct of mediation or in attitude
11to the Holstein-Gottorp problem. New credentials were sent
to Lillieroot on April 10th,and a detailed denial, drawn up by 
•
Akerhielm, of the country's reputed weakness was despatched to
IP ■all Swedish envoys on July 1st. But the doubts remained,
and, even if Heekeren’s report to Iieinsius at the same time as
the English minister’s to Ellis that 'entre vous et moy ces
13gens sont icy bouffis de vanite et de gloire’  ^be dismissed . . 
as born of personal bitterness, the divisions among the regents 
could not be wholly concealed. -
There is no doubt that Bengt Oxenstierna was seriously 
concerned for his position and his policy, already undermined 
by the quarrel with Vienna over the succession to Mecklenberg- 
Gustrow,1^ and that this lay behind his approach to Heekeren 
immediately after Charles XI's death with proposals for the 
renewal of Sweden’s alliances with the Maritime Powers and the 
Emperor. The Dutchman was not enthusiastic - such a measure 
offered little immediate advantage - but wrote home for orders, 
agreed to postpone the departure which he had planned and spoke 
to Gyldenstolpe and Wrede. Heinsius replied with equal cool­
ness that any further.move would have to wait on William's 
arrival, and there the matter rested until July Any hope,
of Swedish negotiations with the Emperor vanished for the time
"being with, the news, which reached Stockholm at the end of 
April, that Gabriel Oxenstierna had been forbidden the Imperial 
court because of Sweden’s part in the expulsion of the duke 
of Mecklenberg-Schwerin from Gustrow. Even Swedish mediation 
seemed to be threatened.
(b) Mecklenburg - Gustrow (January - September 1697)
The death of duke Gustav Adolf of Mecklenburg-Gustrow in 
October 1695 had been followed by a quarrel over the succession 
involving duke Friedrich-Wilhelm of Mecklenburg-Schwerin,who 
had the best claim by primogeniture, and duke Adolf Friedrich 
of Mecklenburg-Strelitz,the deceased’s uncle and of the elder 
line. The former’s Danish connections and claims on Wismar, 
and the latter's being the nephew of queen Hedvig Eleanora 
made Sweden's choice of candidate a simple one, in spite of 
Friedrich - Wilhelm's attempts to achieve a reconciliation, 
and»when in January 1697 the Emperor announced that he had 
awarded the duchy to the latter, she stood forth as the champion 
of the rights of the lower Saxon Circle against Imperial 
arbitrariness. Her attitude differed little in essentials 
from Denmark's to the ninth electorate.
When the duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin came to claim his 
new lands, the troops of the Lower Saxon Circle under the 
command of the Swedish lieutenant-colonel KlinkowstrSm shut 
themselves in Gilstrow, called for reinforcements from Wismar 
and ordered him to ledve again in ten days. In March the 
Swedes rejected a compromise proposal by Denmark, and Klinkowstiom 
expelled not only the duke but also the Imperial commissioner
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William had no reason to favour either candidate hut was
anxious to compose a quarrel which might seriously embarrass
the peace negotiations and even lengthen the war. He had
Lexington instructed at the end of March to persuade Leopold
17to modify his attitude, but this was too late to prevent 
the ban on the Swedish ambassador already referred to. After 
Starhemberg had indeed threatened to withdraw his acceptance 
of Swedish mediation at Rijswijk, to which the Swedes replied 
that the quarrel concerned the Lower Saxon Circle and not 
Sweden as such, the r&d determined on May 3rd, in spite, it 
seems, of efforts by the chancellor, Robinson and Heekeren,
to retaliate by refusing Starhemberg access to the Swedish
. 18 court.
In Vienna Heemskerck and Lexington continued to mediate 
and on June 25th succeeded in securing Kinsky's signature to 
an 'Act d'Accomodement*, by which Gabriel Oxenstierna agreed 
to Sweden's disavowal of KlihkowstriJm's action if he should be 
found on examination to be guilty and August 21st was set for 
resumption of normal diplomatic relations. 7 Lexington gave 
vent to his feelings in a letter to Blathwayt immediately after­
wards: 'God deliver me from the Trade of a Mediator,a man had 
better row in ye gallies,especially when one had to do with two
such people as Kinsky and Oxenstierna', though he confessed that
20
»the last...has been much the resonablest.' The document was 
referred by the rad to the Lcwer Saxon Circle,and peace was signed at 
Rijswijk before Starhemberg and Oxenstierna returned to their
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duties. The dispute did not in fact harm Sweden as mediator, 
hut it did lessen her effectiveness as protector of the duke 
of Holstein-Gottorp, who again became a focus of attention 
immediately after Charles' death, and divided the Pinneberg 
mediators.
(c) Denmark's Attack on Holstein-Gottorp (January - August 1697]
Throughout the early months of 1697, while the negotiations
in Pinneberg languished, the Northern Crowns eyed each other
suspiciously. Sweden feared, with considerable justification,
a Danish attack on Gottorp and continued her efforts to bind
the Allies to a definite promise of action against any move by
Christian against the duke and a guarantee of his ius armorum,
but, for reasons already stated, she received nothing more
tangible than verbal assurances and vague promises. Denmark,
heartened by her November alliance with the Maritime Powers,
prepared to’ take full advantage of any further weakening of
Sweden's position,and Charles' death, which, according to
Luxdorph's reports, would release pent-up social forces such
as a divided regency could not hope to control, provided a
heaven-sent opportunity for action. Hop returned unwillingly
to Hamburg in early May to face a crisis similar to that over
oo "Ratzeburg in 1693.
The Danes had a legitimate grievance against duke Frederick 
in that he had recommenced the building of forts, which he had 
promised the mediators in May 1696 that he would not undertake 
while negotiations were in progress. An excellent test of 
Denmark's diplomatic strength was thus at hand^and on April 18th
21
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it was resolved in Copenhagen to send the duke an ultimatum 
and prepare to destroy his new defences, if, as was expected, 
he refused to destroy them himself. On May 3rd Christian 
left the capital for his headquarters at Rensborg,and Frederick 
fled to Tphningen.^ Dankelman,who had remained in Hamburg 
after the departure of the other mediators, Eck and Militz, 
had himself left, and the responsibility for restraining the 
Danish desire for revenge fell fully on the shoulders of Cresset 
and Hop, who drew up a project for an alliance between the 
contending parties, warned the Danish king of the possible 
consequences of armed intervention and offered to guarantee 
that the forts would do him no harm.^
William was by this time seriously concerned, especially 
by the threat of losing the contingents from Gottorp and 
Brunswick-luneburg. He asked Heinsius to speak seriously to 
piessen, who had returned to the Hague at the head of a Danish 
mission to the peace conference, and to lente and feared that 
Christian would not stop at destruction of the forts. He 
favoured the use of that familiar weapon in the armoury of the 
Maritime Powers’ northern diplomacy - the threat to send a
' V
squadron to the Sound, which Heekeren had already urged in his 
25despatches. But Christian’s mind was made up, and Cresset 
complained of the lack of firmness shown on the duke’s behalf 
by Hop, who seems to have received orders in the Hague to 
restrain his enthusiasm for Frederick. ’The Dutch... .are now 
great Danes’ he wrote to Ellis on May 28th,’and I am not to
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hold, a different language from Myn heer Hop’.2^
Swedish counsels were, as Denmark had divined,
seriously divided, the majority of the regents "being unwilling
to provoke the Danes unnecessarily by the extensive mobilization
on land and sea for which the chancellor pressed and fearing
that a part of the reinforcements it was proposed to send to
the German provinces might "be used "by him to aid the Allies
and compromise Swedish neutrality irretrievably. When it
became apparent that Denmark was determined on the use of
force, however, it was Gyldehstolpe who proposed in the rad
on May 31st that negotiations should be opened with the Maritime
27
Powers and Brunswick-luneburg for a concert on Holstein-Gottorp.
Danish troops opened the bombardment of Ilolmerskrans, the 
largest of the five forts involved, on June 1st. During an 
armistice on June 3rd Hop, who had arrived at Rensborg on the 
previous day, joined Cresset in proposing to Christian that 
the forts should be placed in the hands of the mediators until 
a settlement had been reached, but the Danish king replied 
that this would take too long, although he did promise to 
withdraw when the immediate task had been accomplished, and
by June 10th the last fort had surrendered. The Allies had
„ 28 made no move.
In Stockholm the suggestion of an alliance met with a cool 
response from the allied diplomats, especially from I-Ieekeren, 
who doubted whether Sweden was prepared to play her part and 
advised against a large scale transport which would be inter-
5oo
29cepted by Danish warships before it reached its destination.
Kristoffer Gyllenstierna expressed a suspicion that the Maritime
Powers wished to keep the Holstein-Gottorp question open to
engage Sweden, and Oxenstierna promised the allied envoys in
strict confidence that part of any Swedish reinforcements in
Germany might, indeed, as his opponents had suspected, be used
30to support Sweden's guarantee of Westphalia and ITiJmijgen.
•
Ileekeren doubted if this would receive any support from the rad, 
and he and Bobinson demanded to see for themselves the prepared­
ness of the fleet at Karlskrona. The chancellor reported this 
request to his colleagues on June 7th, when permission was 
reluctantly given and orders sent to admiral Wachtmeister to 
warn him of the visit. Neither Robinson nor Heekeren was
particularly impressed by what they found at the port, especially
31as they were aware of Wachtmeister1s instructions, but it soon
became apparent that the danger was not so great as had at first
been feared,since Christian had found insufficient support for
large scale operations and intended to keep his promise to Hop
and Cresset. Danish troops began to withdraw on June 17th,and
tension relaxed. In July Iiop returned again to the Hague,
32 -which became the centre of negotiations.
Sweden still worked for an alliance to defend the duke, and, 
while Vellingk was sent to open negotiations with Brunswick- 
luneburg, Oxenstierna’s son, serving as a brigadier with the 
allied armies in the Netherlands, was authorized to negotiate 
with William, with whom he had already spoken’on minor matters
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in 1696, and to offer 6,000 or more Swedish troops if the 
Maritime Powers would engage themselves to send a squadron of 
warships to the Baltic.-^ The English Icing promised his 
support, and I-Ieinsius, approached by Lillieroot on the subject 
of a league, promised to draw up a project.^ This was, 
however, as far as things went. William considered that any 
hasty declaration on military aid would make the young duke, 
who visited him at loo in August, too bold,and no support was 
forthcoming for a Swedish demand for Danish compensation to 
Frederick for the attack.^
(d) The End of the War on French Trade (June - September 1697)
June 1697 witnessed the rising of the curtain on the last
scene of the trade-war drama. On the 27th of that month a
convoy of forty-six Swedish, six Danish and three Danzig
merchant ships, returning from France in charge of a Swedish
warship, was encountered by admiral Hooke's fleet and taken to
Plymouth for examination.-^ The escort was released almost
immediately,and brigadier Oxenstierna at once approached
William to ask for the merchantmen to be similarly treated.
The king promised that the requisite orders would be sent, but
he could not prevent a tedious examination of all the ships'
37papers.
Erigadier Oxenstierna was ordered to demand compensation 
for the delay, and lillieroot v/as told on September 24th to 
obtain a firm promise at least to release the remaining ships 
before the ratifications of the peace treaty, signed on the
J02
further created in Stockholm by the speedy freeing of the six j
Danish ships, especially as there was a strong suspicion that 1he!
arrest had "been made on information supplied from a Danish 
39s o u r c e . A t  the end of August Blathwayt wrote to under­
secretary Ellis that 'this is not a time for us to disoblige 
that Court and therefore will it be well pleasing to the King 
Mr Secry Trumbull & you do take all possible care with the 
Judge of the Admiralty & otherwise that the Swedes may not 
suffer the least hardship or irflistice.• • but judgment had 
nevertheless been passed on only half the ships by the time 
peace was signed.^
(iii) Ri.jsw ijk
1
(a) Denmark's Final Bid
In spite of constant rebuffs, the Danes never abandoned
itheir ambition to play at least some part in the final peace 
settlement. Their neutrality should, it was deemed, win some 
such reward. Christian was annoyed by the Dutch demand made 
during Plessen's negotiations to include in the alliance a 
specific renunciation of any claim to mediate, and Plessen' j
succeeded in evading a promise to embody such an abrogation in 
the final protocol.^2 Jessen was therefore quite free to put 
forward the pretension again after the signing, and Christian to 
decide on February 5th to despatch Plessen to Rijswijk on the 
strength of the new treaty.^ The growing rift between Sweden 'f
ft "and the Emperor over Gyistrow even held out possibilities of
/ 3810/11th, were exchanged. An unfortunate impression was
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Denmark’s succeeding as sole mediator. Promises of support were 
made to "both Prance and her enemies,which pleased neither when 
they inevitably leaked out,and Heinsius,on hearing of the embassy, 
told Lillieroot,doubtless with some thought of both Holstein- 
Gottorp and Denmark’s fulfilment of the November alliance,of his 
fears for the consequences of Plessen’s absence from Copenhagen^ 
Denmark even had dangled before her by Portland,at the same 
time as Hop offered her a closer alliance, the possibility of 
acting as guarantor against any breafdi of faith by France, and a 
suggestion that she would be willing to take on such a respon­
sibility was later used by the Dutch minister to Lillieroot as a
threat when Sweden showed an obvious reluctance to fulfil her 
uobligations.
No undue haste was taken with Plessen’s journey. His in­
structions, to protect Danish interests,settle disputes over 
trade and debts with the United Provinces and sound the Maritime 
Powers on the possibilities of a more intimate agreement,such as 
had been suggested by Hop, were not issued until April 17th. He 
left finally with four trumpeters,twelve pages and twenty 
lackeys and arrived in Rijswijk on May 6th, before the first 
peace projects had been lodged with Lillieroot. He was backed 
by a threat not to recognize the peace if Denmark were not 
allowed to take partyin its composition, which naturally made 
little impression, and did his best to convince the Maritime 
Powers of Sweden’s inability to honour her guarantees, an 
inability which, as has been seen, they strongly suspected 
already. While he might have had some effect in preventing 
discussion of the Holstein-Gottorp question, in which neither
French nor Imperial delegates showed much interest, Denmark cut 
a rather sorry figure and received little return on her outlay on 
the embassy.^
Christian’s policy remained at the end of the war as uncer­
tain as at the beginning. Neither the extent of his ambitions in 
Schleswig-Holstein nor his desire for revenge on Sweden had dimi­
nished with the years,and his partial commitment to the Maritime 
powers in the 1696 alliance had failed to bring the prospect of 
satisfaction in either of these respects much nearer. Plessen 
had failed to build up the convincing case he needed,and, while 
the idea of a double marriage alliance with Sweden to break the 
latter’s links with the duke was toyed with, beginnings were made 
in the creation of a more promising eastern alliance system,wholly 
contrary to the interests of William and his allies,which was to 
bring open war under Frederick IV three years later.
(b) The Path of the Mediator (April - September 1697)
Even when Lillieroot had succeeded in bringing together the 
representatives of the belligerents in the same building, it was 
some time before peace negotiations proper could begin. Trouble 
arose immediately over Imperial claims to precedence, and several 
weeks passed before the detailed conduct of the talks had been 
agreed upon. The private talks between Dijkvelt, Boreel, 
burgomaster of Amsterdam, and the French delegation continued 
in spite of the Swede's warnings of the suspicions they were 
arousing among the other Allies, and in the middle 
of June William, despairing of any conclusion to the public
>04
negotiations and anxious to break through the clouds of mutual 
suspicion which divided him from Louis, decided to try to reach 
agreement on the all-important 'English question' through meet­
ings between Portland and the French marshal Boufflers.^® When 
news <?f these reached Lillieroot and he challenged Heinsius about 
them, the pensionary claimed that it was Prance who prevented the 
problem of William's recognition passing through the hands of the 
mediator and assured him that preliminaries alone were being
d i s c u s s e d .  ^
In the meantime the choice of a senior mediator, such as 
the Swedes desired to add more lustre to their mission and for 
which d'Avaux pressed to counter-balance Lillieroot's attachnent 
to the Allies, had caused some concern in the r&d. The first 
name suggested seems to have been that of the governor - general 
of Livonia, Dahlberg, but he excused himself on account of age, 
and the names afBielke, Carl Bonde and Gabriel Oxenstierna were 
brought forward. The first»although d'Avaux claimed that he was 
supported by Wrede and Gyldenstolpe and on April 21st that he was 
elected, can hardly have been seriously considered as acceptable 
to the Allies, and both Heekeren and d’Avaux reported in January 
that the second was a strong possibility.-^ But on May 18th 
agreement was reached to appoint the third. At 7 a.m. on the 
following morning ifrbinson called on the chancellor to protest 
that Gabriel Oxenstierna *s indlscretjcns vtsle in London had made him per-
1 I
sona non grata to William and,after considerable indignation had 
been expressed in the r&d at the minister's action, Wrede
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opposition and even reminded his colleagues that the late king
51had favoured such a choice.
Bonde, a councillor since 1695 and Bielke's predecessor 
as envoy in Paris from 1674 to 1678, was firmly linked to the
Ichancellor's critics "by his marriage to Kristoffer Gyllenstiernas
daughter and was highly favoured "by d'Avaux who, however, found
52him rather weak. But he had little opportunity to demonstrate
any “bias. His instructions were not examined until August 17th,
a circumstance naturally Blamed on Oxenstierna's intrigues, and
53he did not arrive in Rijswijk until September 30th.
(h) Crisis (July - September 1697)
The progress of the talks between Portland and Boufflers 
at Halle, combined with military successes in Catalonia and the 
Netherlands, encouraged a stiffening in the attitude of the 
French ambassadors in Rijswijk, which resulted in the imposition 
of a time limit of August 21st for the acceptance of the terms 
they handed to lillieroot on July 10th. The mediator, while 
he thought that the terms themselves might form a reasonable 
basis for negotiation, protested at the stipulation attached 
and refused to communicate them officially to the Allies. He 
complained once more, however, of the secret negotiations, 
which he blamed for such a state of affairs. They resulted 
in the reaching of a tacit agreement on William's recognition, 
and at the beginning of August the representatives of France 
and the Maritime Powers; were' ready to present lillieroot with 
a fait accompli. Mediation, he reported, had become a mere
proposed Bonde for the vacancy. Bengt Oxenstierna offered no
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formality.^-
The struggle which developed over the French demands 
regarding the Empire centered on the return of Strashurg. 
Louis* new terms, as had OaLliere*s preliminaries, offered the 
city with its fortifications razed or an equivalent acceptable 
to the Emperor. Leopold, in spite of Lillieroot*s appeals, 
hesitated to agree to the destruction of its defences, and on 
the date stipulated the French, further heartened by the news 
of Barcelona's fall, presented new terms which offered only 
an equivalent and were to expire on September 10th. The 
mediator, who had appealed to the French for moderation in vain 
and failed on more than one occasion to conceal his annoyance 
at their conduct, once more protested violently and threatened 
to retire from the negotiations altogether. He called on the 
Allies for unity in defence of Strasburg and even offered 
Swedish help if France broke her word.-*"* In this, however, 
he went beyond his instructions and met with some allied 
scepticism. Heinsius complained to him of Sweden’s uncertain' 
reaction to the new Holstein-Gottorp crisis and of the cool re­
ception given to anything proposed by Heekeren, in spite of his
agreeing to discuss the renewal of the alliances for which he 
56had been asked.
The Emperor was, however, anxious to exert whatever 
pressure on France he could muster, and on August 30th the rSd 
heard a request from Starhemberg, delivered through Heekeren, 
to present a memorial.*" .It was decided to allow him to
508
communicate one through the Dutch envoy, and on the following 
day he appealed for a fulfilment of Sweden's guarantees. 
Gyldenstolpe and Wallenstedt protested that any new condition 
would endanger mediation, and no more encouraging reply was 
given than a fresh promise to fulfil- treaty obligations when 
this seemed necessary.^ A report of the new French demands
reached Heekeren with orders to apply once more for the fulfil­
ment of Sweden’s duties as a guarantor,and he himself now 
requested a conference,which met on September 8th, when he met 
Falkenberg, Akerhelm and Bergenhielm. and asked for a specific
engagement that Sweden would compel France to respect Westphalia
59
and Nijmijgen and a definite answer on the renewal of alliances.
This resulted in a particularly heated debate in the rad on the
following day, when Oxenstierna failed to gain the detailed offer
for which he pressed and had to be content with a repetition,
similar to that made to Starhemberg, of Sweden's intention to
honour her agreements and mild representations to d'Avaux to
finrequest a withdrawal of the ultimatum. Heekeren was, however, 
granted.a further conference on September 13th, when Robinson 
was also present, at which he presented two projects, one for 
a convention, by which Sweden bound herself to send help up to
18,000 troops if the negotiations in Rijswijk broke down,and 
one for a renewal of alliances between Sweden and the United
ti
Provinces.
Negotiations on the latter had been resumed in July, when 
Heekeren told Oxenstierna'of Heinsius’ demands for a clearer
merchants, hut he was unable to elicit anything better than
vague promises. He advised.the States-General to wait for
a more favourable opportunity and prepared again to leave.
Robinson supported his efforts and in mid-August expressed
England's desire for a new trade settlement and a closer
alliance, which was well received by the Swedish ministers,
fiPand Heekeren was prevailed upon to stay a little longer.
But the whole scene changed on receipt of the news of 
the signing of peace between France, the Maritime Powers and 
.Spain on September 10/11, before further negotiations could : 
take place.^
(c) The Final Act (September - October 1697)
Efforts by William to persuade the French to return to 
their original offer on Strasburg by means of a new meeting ■ 
between the marshals fared no better than Lillieroot's appeals, 
and, when the hour struck,he resolved, with the Spanish success­
ion open to discussion, the lands whose policies he controlled' 
exhausted and weary of a seemingly endless war, many of his 
Allies uncertain, and his recognition secured, to risk the 
odium of deserting his principal ally. * This decision 
caused, however, a considerable dilemma for the mediator.
He agreed, after what appears to have been a rather heated 
interview with Heinsius, to acceed to the treaty in order not 
to alienate the Maritime Powers; after all his expedients
had been rejected by both, sides,he felt, he explained, that
65he had shown the Emperor sufficient compliance. ^
declaration on religious freedom and the residence of foreign
He defended
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his action fully in his despatch to Stockholm on September 14th. 
The settlement was, he argued, one involving a majority of the 
parties, one which contained nothing prejudicial to either 
Swedish or Imperial interests and one against which the 
Emperor's representatives had done no more than show their 
displeasure. The Emperor would further gain nothing from his 
not signing - a just if ignominious assessment of the mediator's
CC
"power. The most lillieroot had been able to secure was a
>
further postponement of the time limit for Leopold's acceptance
of the French offers until October 20th, but this merely put
off the inevitable conclusion by a few weeks of pointless 
67wrangling. ' In answer to his report,the regents rather 
belately expressed their disapproval of the separate peace, 
and consequently there were appended to the final treaty 
protests by himself and Bonde against the Church settlement 
in Alsace, where they had failed to gain safeguards for the
68
Protestants, and against the conduct of independent negotiations.
V
- The prize for which Charles XI had striven for most of the
war had been won, only to prove an empty honour, which had
enhanced Swedish prestige not a jot; he was happy in the hour
of his death. Yet Sweden's rigid observance of a neutral
status, in the maintenance of which her king's desire for
V>mediation played a not inconsiderable part, while it la/ her*/
open to the perils of isolation, saved her from the even 
greater hazard of involvement in a European war, in which none 
of the principal contestants could have rendered her much 
assistance and in which the jealousy of her neighbours would
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Chapter 1h •
Conclusion
(i) Old Problems, Old Friends and New
The conclusion of a European peace left unsolved many of 
the problems with which Willisn's representatives had had to 
grapple in the Northern capitals during the war. Swedish 
merchant ships were still held in English ports and compensation 
for seizures made during the war still unpaid! the. restrictions 
placed on the residence of foreign merchants in Sweden still 
hindered the renewal of her agreements with the United Provinces: 
agreement on a commercial alliance between Denmark and the States- 
General seemed no nearer: England's payments for the transport 
and maintenance of her Danish auxiliary troops were uncompleted: 
her claim to a salute in the Channel had been merely shelved: 
the Emperor had yet to grant the toll on the Elbe at Gluckstadt 
which Denmark claimed and which the Maritime Powers had pledged 
themselves to help her obtain: the Pinneberg negotiations 
languished: the Saxe-Lauenburg dispute awaited a final settle­
ment : and Sweden's relations with the Emperor were strained by 
the question of the succession to Mecklenburg-Gustrow.
A few of these matters were finally settled during the 
early years of the new century. A commercial alliance between 
Denmark and the United Porovirices was signed on June 15th, 1701,
in conjunction with the renewal and exention of the triple/
alliance of 1696, after Frederick IV had agreed to suspend the
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customs concessions allowed to his defence sh ips on condition
that Sweden agreed to do likewise in the trade treaty which
1
she was negotiating with the Dutch. In the same year the
Emperor, anxious for Danish aid against Prance, granted2
Frederick IV the Elbe toll for six years, and by a treaty
between the dukes of Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Meoklenburg-
Strelitz under Imperial mediation the greater part of G&strow
3
passed to the former. Saxony surrendered to Brunswick-Ltineburg 
her claims to Lauenburg for 600,000 Rd. in 1697, and Wolfen- 
blittel followed suit in 1703» although George I’s right to the 
territory was not recognized by the Emperor until 1716 and the
kImperial sequestration lifted from Hadeln only in 1720.
Most of the questions were, however, only partially solved,
swept up into larger issues or left to the passage of time.
Existing defensive alliances between Sweden and the States-
General were renewed in 1698 and confirmed in the alliance,
which-included England, made in January 1700, but the commercial
treaty of 1679 was then referred for further discussion to
commissioners meeting in the Hague, who appear to have failed to
reach any agreement; in the twelfth article of the Anglo-
Swedish alliance of January 1720 restrictions on the residence
5of English merchants alone were abandoned. The duke of 
»» .Wurtemberg-Neustadt was ordered to march his troops back from .
Flanders as soon as news of RijswijJk was received in Copenhagen,
. 6
and all had returned by March 1698, but England was still
mwhen they formed the subject of the eighth article of the
7alliance referred to above. The disputes between the kings
of Denmark and the dukes of Holstein-Gottorp, with which William
found himself once more engaged, as a guarantor of the Altona
settlement and ally of Sweden, by Frederick IV's unsuccessful
attack in 1700 on the duke, now married to Charles XII*s sister,
dominated Danish foreign policy for a large part of the
eighteenth century after her permanent seizure of Schleswig in
1713» which was guaranteed by Great Britain and France in 1720,
owing to Russia’s intermittent advocacy of the duke's cause8
between Nystad and the 'mageskifte' of 17^7» Stephen Poyntz, 
English envoy in Stockholm, was still afraid in 1726 that the
9
Swedes would revive old claims to compensation for ships seized,
and England's pretension to the Channel salute, in spite of its
causing a serious encounter with a Swedish convoy in 1701*, was
10
not dropped until after the Napoleonic wars.
The whole Baltic problem was transformed by the outbreak 
in February 1700 of the Great Northern War. Ultimately this 
resulted in the emergence of Russia as the dominant power in the 
area, but while William III lived its prime significance for
” T»
the Maritime Powers was as a distraction of forces in Northern
Europe which might, after Louis XIV's repudiation of the last
partition treaty and subsequent provocation had made a new
conflict in the West inevitable, be employed against France, and
11
as a threat to their supplies of naval stores; the situation
promising to pay arrears due under the treaty of 1689 in 1701,
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to prevent which William had intervened so vigorously "before
Altona and at the time of the Ratzeburg crisis had come about,
and he devoted his energies up to his death to attempting to
restore peace in the Forth. In spite, however, of his early
success in restraining Sweden and restoring the status quo
after Frederick IV*s attack on Holstein-Gottorp in March 1700,
all his efforts to persuade Charles XII to submit to mediation 
12
failed. The defensive alliances made with Sweden in January
1700, on the eve of hostilities, proved largely ineffective;
the threat which had driven one party to agree to their terms
was of only secondary importance to the other, and William found
it as vain to call for Swedish troops to fight against France
as Charles did to appeal for aid from the Maritime Powers against
13his enemies in the East. As in the Nine Years War, William 
secured more practical help from Denmark, where Frederick was 
conscious that the Anglo-Dutch intervention had saved him from 
treatment far harsher than that to which he had to submit, at 
Traventhal and realized that the enmity of the Maritime Powers 
was likely to prove more dangerous to him than that of France. 
Traventhal also removed Denmark from the Northern war and 
released her troops for hire. The stadtholder-king lived <
long enough to witness the-opening of negotiations in Copenhagen 
which led to the signing, only three months after his death, of 
a new treaty which extended the existing defensive alliance
1k
and offered 12,000 troops for 'the service of the Maritime Powers.
in Stockholm and Copenhagen and of the Northern Crowns in London
and the Hague in 1697» Greg was promoted to the rank of minister-
15resident in 1701 and died in Copenhagen the following year:
Robinson was made an envoy in 1702 and was recalled, after
serving in Poland and Saxony, to become bishop of Bristol,
senior British plenipotentiary at Utrecht and finally bishop of 
16
London in 1714: he was succeeded by that same Robert Jackson
who had served as chargé d'affaires during his absence from
Stockholm in 1696 and whom he had defended from the provisions
17
of the ordinance against foreign merchants: Heekeren left
18
Stockholm in 1698, and Rumpf died there in 1706: Goes was
appointed envoy in Copenhagen in 1702 and left in 1718 after
19
thirty-three years continuous service at the Danish Court:
Lillieroot left the Hague in 1698 but returned as ambassador the
following year, played an important part in the negotiations
leading up to the alliances between Sweden and the Maritime
Powers concluded in the Hague in January 1700 and was not
finally recalled until 1703, when his services were rewarded
20
with a count ship : Leijoncrona was made envoy to q.ueen Anne
in 1703 and died in London 1710 so deeply in debt that even his
21
body and coffin were seized by his English creditors: Lente
was recalled to Copenhagen in May 1698 and Pauli from London the
22
following September.
Of the diplomatic representatives of the Maritime Powers
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(ii) William Ill’s Northern Policy: an Assessment
In the first chapter of this study an attempt was made to
enumerate the possible objectives open to William III in his
23
relations with the Northern Crowns in time of war; the time
has now come to try to summarize the part actually played by
each of these in his policy between 1689 and 1697 as well as to
examine the main factors in the Baltic situation with which he
had to contend during this period, to assess the extent of his
success and to apportion the blame for his failures*
He was unable to bring either Sweden or Denmark into the
anti-French alliance. Of the two, Sweden, economically stable,
2k
militarily powerful and universally respected, was consider­
ably the greater prize, which, in view of her attitude since
Nijmijgen, he had, at the beginning of the war, high hopes of 
25winning. He failed, however, to appreciate the strength of
the arguments which influenced Charles XI in favour of neutrality
The Swedish king had, in spite of his great personal courage, a
distaste for war and its wastefulness unless his kingdom's
interests could be shown to be directly involved. They had
26
been in the Holstein-Gottorp crisis of 1689 and would be if 
Denmark should join France against the Alliance, but the Baltic 
war which this-would bring about was certainly not a price which 
William would have been prepared to pay for what would, in such
- " f <
circumstances, have been Sweden's purely nominal . alliance. Her 
whole sale commitment to the allied cause might further tempt 
Sweden's jealous neighbours to form such a league as was in fact
engaged in the west, offer little security. Charles was deeply
solicitous of the welfare and safety of his troops and had no
desire to see them decimated on foreign battlefields fighting
27
for a cause not their own. War would at least seriously
interfere with his uncompleted programme of internal reform and
might weaken the strong financial position in which the
reduktion policy had placed his government.
But neutrality also offered Sweden more positive benefits.
A far greater share of Baltic trade and even the monopoly of
which Swedish statesmen had long dreamed might be captured from
belligerent merchants harassed by enemy privateers, and, in
spite of the losses incurred at the hands of the latter, the
war indeed proved to be a period of great expansion for Sweden's
28
merchant marine. Even at the beginning of the conflict
allied diplomats were noting the hold which the idea of mediation
29 .
had on Swedish governing circles, and the prestige, as well as
the possibility of the more material gains and the futherance
of specifically national claims which might be hoped for by a
mediator, certainly appealed to Charles and his ministers, what-
30
ever their differences on other aspects of policy. And while 
neither side could gain a decisive advantage on the battlefield
v
such attractions would continue to militate against active 
participation and even the showing of undue favour to one side.
forged in 1699, against which the Maritime Powers could, while
The necessity of devoting all available energies to the 
defeat of Prance, which was so clear to William, was by no means 
so clear to Swedish statesmen. They were not directly threaten­
ed by Louis' ambitions and indeed owed the integrity of their
Baltic empire to French support at Nijjmijgen, however high-
31
handedly this might have been given. Such differences as
existed between Prance and Sweden might be ironed out by 
32
negotiation; and here again the acceptance of Swedish media­
tion would place her in a favourable position. The tradition
of Franco-Swedish friendship was of long standing, and the two
33
countries had never been at war on opposing sides. To some 
at least in Stockholm William's success in uniting the Maritime 
Powers and the alliance of those powers with the Emperor con­
stituted a threat to the European balance of power, to the 
maintenance of which Bengt Oxenstiema himself had devoted his
talents throughout the '80s, as great as if not greater than
3h
French designs on the Rhine. The challenge to Sweden's plans 
for control of Baltic trade was considerably enhanced by the 
English Revolution, and an Emperor, victorious on Rhine and 
Danube, might well turn his attentions northwards and attempt to 
revive the plans of Wallenstein for Imperial control of Germany's 
destinies to the exclusion of all powers beyond her borders.
i
William's appeals to a European conscience might well be listened 
to with sympathy at the Swedish court, but the response to them 
was either that Sweden could not be expected to provide anything 
beyond the aid*to which she had already committed herself by
treaty or that she could render more valuable service as a peace-
35maker. William could never accept such arguments, and his
dismay was commensurate with his initial expectations. But
it may "be doubted whether Sweden's belligerency would have
brought him the advantages he imagined would flow from it unless
Denmark could also be secured, and the failure of Louis' efforts
36to affect a reconciliation between the two Northern Crowns, 
except in the limited sphere of an armed neutrality in defence 
of common commercial ambitions, suggests the remoteness of this 
possibility.
William never betrayed much hope of Denmark's joining the
Alliance; her previous conduct had taught him caution.
Christian V, threatened as much as was Charles XI by the close
alliance between the Emperor and the Maritime Powers, made little
37secret in 1688 of his opposition to the Revolution, but, when 
an Anglo-Dutch squadron might appear in his waters at any time 
and French military support was not to be expected, the situation 
demanded considerable caution and the exploitation of opportuni­
ties as they arose. Denmark was too weak to risk any 
independent action on a large scale, and no other power, whether 
it be France before Altona or the attack on Ratzeburg, Sweden 
in the defence of neutral rights or Hanover in the third party 
plans of 1690-1 ever offered sufficient support to encourage 
Christian to advance beyond the most limited objectives. These 
circumstances led him finally to a trial of the policy, always 
favoured by Plessen, of attempting to further national ambitions
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in the alliance of November 1696 and appeared to he hearing
38
fruit at Pinneberg at the end of the war.
He would probably have heen willing to join the Allies if
he could have heen assured of sufficient security, very large
subsidies, including compensation for his trading losses, and
practical support for an aggressive policy in the Lower Saxon 
39
Circle. The first seemed to the Allies to have heen provided
by the defensive alliance of November 1690, hut this was not
enough for the Danish king. The second were beyond William’s
financial capacity, especially when he had to compete with
h0
generous French offers for mere neutrality, and, even if they
had not heen, it is doubtful whether he would have considered
Danish assistance wonth such a price. The last was not in the
interests of the Maritime Powers to give; such encouragement
would have created an explosive situation in the North such as
would have cancelled out all benefits.
William did succeed in securing Danish troops, which gave
him good service in all his campaigns, but the initiative for
the transaction came from Denmark for motives amongst which
devotion to the allied cause was evidently not one, and his
hopes that their loan would draw Denmark closer to him were
1+1doomed to disappointment. His efforts to enlist recruits
produced nothing more promising than the agreement in April 1691
1+2
for the hire of troops from Brandenburg, ~ and, after further 
unsuccessful attempts had been thwarted by Christian’s anxiety
through co-operation with the Maritime Powers. This resulted
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not to violate the 1691 neutrality treaty with Prance, the matter
was not even raised in the negotiations leading to the treaty of
November 1696, although, as has been seen, Plessen was empowered
b3to include the loan of troops in the terms.
Charles XI's sense of duty prompted the despatch of Swedish
kk
troops to the Rhine for three years, hut for this, such as it
was in view of the slight part played by the troops in the actual
fighting, William’s diplomacy can claim little credit, and he
never expected much to come out of the States-General's repeated
U5
requests for the furnishing of their share of treaty aid.
It is possible that a speedy settlement of disputes over the
seizure of Swedish merchant ships, over which William had at this
stage little control, would have enabled Oxenstierna to draw a
closer parallel between the position of the United Provinces and
the Emperor, in whom no such fault could be found, but¿unless
he could have also proved to his master's satisfaction that a
refusal of aid would so increase Sweden's isolation that the
integrity of her empire would be placed in Jeopardy - and it is
highly unlikely, in view of the failure of his actual efforts
in this direction, that he would have succeeded in doing this -
the argument that, since the United Provinces had not themselves
been attacked, the casus foederis had not arisen could have still
U6
been brought forward. It is significant that the only
situation in which William seemed likely to obtain his troops was
-  bl
one in which Holstein-Gottorp was threatened.’ It does seem 
that the Swedes would have sent their twelve ships, however
unwillingly, under certain conditions, but the English king was
quite justified in rejecting demands, prompted by national
pride and fears of antagonizing Prance, which threatened to
U8
remove the squadron from his control altogether.
The same factors which militated against Sweden’s entry
into the war also helped to defeat all attempts to persuade her
to ban her trade with Prance; not only would any acquiescence
in such a request have compromised her neutrality so as to spoil
all hopes of mediation, but it would have forced her to abandon
U9
her dreams of commercial expansion and exposed her to French
50
reprisals. The approach, once more flowing from a misunder- | 
standing of the Swedish attitude to the war, was clumsily handled, : 
insulted Swedish pride, caused unnecessary friction and drove her
closer to Denmark, with whom her interests on this one issue
51 j. 
coincided, but a more diplomatic treatment had no better chances
of ultimate success; Sweden's legal position was unassailable.
The various schemes to buy her exports seem at first sight
promising, but it is highly doubtful whether any mutually satis- |
factory agreement could have been reached in private transactions
with individual merchants, which is all that Charles XI would
52
finally sanction. The policy's only real hope of success lay
in the establishment of an overwhelming superiority at sea, which
would have enabled the claims of an effective blockade of the
French coast to approximate to reality and have left neutrals
53with no alternative; but Beachy Head made this impossible.
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Danish opposition to the "ban was less stubborn and less
5k
doctrinaire, . but William's failure here was no more due to a
failure of his diplomatic methods than was the case with Sweden.
Christian V and his ministers also entertained hopes of profiting
from their neutral status, and in a more personal way than their
Swedish counterparts, and, if the latter could not be persuaded
to join the boycott, Danish participation in the early years of
the war was out of the question. Not until the very end of
hostilities, when Christian's disappointment with Prance and
the failure of his attempts to build a united front with Sweden
had driven him to try his luck with a rapprochement with the
Allies, did he give way, and even then at a stiff price and
55
when it was too late to affect Louis* war potential. Only
in the convention of June 1691, which did much to ease the tension
56
caused by the trade war, did William achieve a limited success.
Friendly mediation, the third type of positive aid a
neutral power might have rendered William's cause, was a
possibility which he never considered willingly; the resort to
any form of mediation was a confession that the original aims ©f
57the Grand Alliance had been abandoned. His attitude was 
always that, if mediation should prove to be the only road to a 
satisfactory peace, Sweden was the most suitable, and indeed the
58
only, power worth considering for it. He did indeed consider 
her especially when secret talks with French agents in the 
Netherlands offered no immediate hopes of a settlement, as an 
alternative channel through which to learn Louis' intentions
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and even thought on occasions that she might help in binding
the latter to a firm promise to recognize his occupation of the
English throne and that her interest in the Westphalian settle-
59ment might prompt her to demand its preservation. Negotiations
in Stockholm, even when they appeared to be attaining none of
these objectives, provided some cover for the secret talks and
a means of keeping Sweden's friendship by flattering her
ambitions. Stockholm's distance from the Hague, however, and
the dangers of independent Imperial action and influence there
60
did not make it an ideal site for peace negotiations, and by 
the time the possibility of a compromise settlement had to be 
faced, William's suspicions of the Swedish court had become so 
deeply engrained that his demands for a French promise to 
restore Westphalia and Nijmijgen were aimed at providing as much 
a guarantee against Sweden's possible actions as mediator as 
against French duplicity. It is difficult even then to believe 
that he really expected either Charles XI to ask France or Louis 
XIV to agree to shut the door on any possibility for bargaining 
before peace negotiations began and thus to make mediation 
superfluous. His faith in the Swedish king himself remained 
firm throughout the war; never is there a suggestion in his 
correspondence that Charles was to blame for any strained 
relations. But he could hardly believe that, in the light of 
previous Swedish reactions the latter would antagonize, or be 
allowed by his advisers to antagonize, France to no purpose by 
trying to impose conditions she had no intention of accepting.
The demand was, it seems, largely a device to avoid committing
himself to accepting Sweden's mediation until he had obtained
by some means a promise at least of Louis' giving way on the all
important problem of his own recognition, with which a mediator
in whom he had greater confidence might have been entrusted.
Only then was Swedish mediation accepted and even so the final
solution of the 'English question' was made the subject of
secret negotiations over which Lillieroot, who found his duties
reduced largely to those of witnessing agreements already reached
and attempting to keep the public congress in session, had no 
61
control. William never even considered the possibility of
Danish mediation, and it is doubtful whether those of the Allies
who bound themselves to support by treaty would have done so if
62
they had considered that it had any hope of being accepted.
William's efforts to secure positive aid from the Northern 
Crowns thus enjoyed comparatively little success. Negotiations 
for Sweden's belligerency, troops, ships and participation in 
the ban on French trade came to nought; her attitude made her 
mediation very much of a pis aller to be surrounded with extensive 
safeguards and was employed in the end as little more than a sop 
to her pride, from which she gained none of the prizes which had 
made its attainment such a dominating factor in her attitude to 
the war, and as an insurance of her friendship. Denmark lent 
no further troops after 1689 and agreed to ban trade with France 
only when it was too late to affect the outcome of the war and 
with the full intention of maintaining as friendly relations with
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Louis XIV as possible.
What of William’s more negative aims - the prevention of 
aid "being given to Prance and the maintenance of peace in the 
North? There was, as has "been suggested in examining Sweden's 
reasons for neutrality, as little danger of her repeating the 
mistake of 1675 as there was a possibility of her hurrying to 
the defence of the Maritime Powers; she had learnt a salutary 
lesson on that occasion and Louis did not seriously expect her 
to take the risk again. The most he hoped for was that, by 
laying stress on Swedish grievances against his enemies, he 
could persuade her to join Denmark, Hanover and other German 
princes in the formation of a third party to impose terms 
favourable to Prance, specifically the acceptance of the Twenty- 
Year Truce as a permanent settlement. The danger of this seemed 
very real to the Allies at the beginning of 1691, and the fear of
65
it haunted William for long afterwards, but the possibility of
achieving it was in fact as remote as that of Sweden's openly
joining Prance. Even at the height of his influence, Bielke's
66plans never received Charles' full approval, and the co­
operation of Denmark, and Sweden in such an enterprize would have 
encountered insuperable obstacles.
Charles had little desire to share the honours of mediation, 
whether armed or not, with a king with whom he had been on the 
point of war in 1689 and whom he strongly suspected of awaiting 
only a favourable opportunity to attack him. Only the interest of 
the two powers as neutral traders provided common ground for a
63
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detente, and in this sphere some progress was indeed made.
The threat of even closer union and joint action, to which the
67treaties of armed neutrality pointed ' and which might exclude 
the ships of the Maritime Powers from the Baltic altogether, 
compelled William to sanction the relaxation and finally the 
complete abandonment of the Anglo-Dutch convention of 1689 and 
the payment of compensation; hut even here the co-operation 
between the Northern Crowns was never wholehearted. In spite 
of all her declarations of solidarity with her neighbour and her 
consciousness of the use which might be made of an outward show 
of friendship, Sweden suspected that Denmark was using the dis­
pute over neutral rights to embroil her with the Allies for
purely Danish ends and to cover fraudulent trading with Prance,
68with which she had no wish to be associated. She was con­
scious both of her stronger legal position in possessing a 
commercial treaty with the Dutch and one with the English whose
6 9validity was fully recognized in 1693- and of the greater value 
which was placed on her friendship by the Allies. Both these 
advantages might have been lost by following Denmark's lead too 
closely or too far beyond the limited objectives which were 
achieved.
But, had William not agreed so readily to modify his 
original plans, a much closer and more dangerous union might 
have been forged, and he must enjoy full credit for his part in 
weakening the links between the two countries in this sphere.
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A rigid adherence to his interpretation of neutral rights,
especially in regard to Sweden, might well have driven the
latter against her will into joining Denmark in a drama of
reprisals and counter-reprisals such as that played out between
70
Denmark and the United Provinces in 1693/U* That Denmark
failed to secure the support she required on this occasion can
he attributed, in part at least, to the successful conclusion of
Heekeren's compensation negotiations in Stockholm on the eve of 
71the crisis. William and his ministers must also be given
their due for the skill with which they helped to keep the
Northern Crowns apart by exciting their mutual jealousies,
especially in regard to Holstein-Gottorp, and by iaaintaining
negotiations with one of the two powers even when a speedy and
72successful outcome seemed unlikely. This played a consider­
able part in ensuring the continuous flow of Baltic naval 
supplies throughout the war, even if a greater share in their 
carriage had to be allowed to neutral merchants.
Denmark would have been willing to join Prance on the same * •*
terms as she would have been willing to join the Alliance, but 
her security requirements included a guarantee against Swedish 
attack which Louis could not give except by drawing Sweden 
herself into a French alliance. The possibility that Christian 
might hire out troops to Prance as he did to William was a remote 
one in view of the formidable transport problems involved but was 
a further reason for acceptance of the English king's terms of 
the 1689 treaty. It was Denmark who was always the prime mover
v
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in the first half of the war, in any scheme for reprisals against
73allied shipping or for armed neutrality, hut here again she 
relied heavily on Swedish support and without it had to give 
way and make the most of the situation created hy the threat of 
joint action.
The most pressing danger provided hy Denmark was that of a
disturbance in North Germany flowing from her claims in Holstein-
Gottorp and the Lower Saxon Circle. By taking a firm stand
against pression before concerning himself with the merits of
74the case on either side, William did much to ensure peace in 
the area without risking a breach in his good relations with 
either of the Northern Crowns; this was the field in which he 
could act with most effect. It was fortunate that his threats 
never had to be translated into action, as is shown by his
75efforts to fit out a Baltic squadron during the Ratzeburg crisis,
but it is obvious from this same incident that he did not rely
on bluff to secure his ends. Other factors beside fear of
direct intervention by the Maiifclme Powers persuaded Christian
76
to give way in 1689 and 1693, but, had William's envoys not
acted with vigour on these occasions, Denmark might well have
been persuaded to defy Sweden and Brunswick-Lüneburg on the
former or to risk the consequences of crossing the Elbe into
77Brunswick-Lüneburg on the latter.
Some of the reasons for William's limited success in the 
North have already been suggested. His strained financial 
resources handicapped him in his negotiations with Denmark, but
v
her early demands however much money he had been able to call
on; and Christian could not be bought with subsidies alone.
The same is true of his attitude to the compensation demands
of the Northern Crowns; he resented the very existence of the
claims as much as their size, felt more than once that his
representatives had given way too readily and agreed to grant
such sums as were negotiated unwillingly and from political
78
necessity. More important was his failure to break the
military stalemate in Flanders and to establish an unchallenged
supremacy at aea. He was well aware of the close relationship
79
between war and diplomacy, but, on the other hand, a spectacular
victory, while it might have, encouraged Denmark to renounce her
French ties, would have jeopardized Oxenstieras's position and
80
might even, if the latter's memorandum of the spring of 1690
is to be taken at its face value, have driven him to support a
>*•
third party programme in a bid to restore the European balance 
of power. The mutual jealousy of the Northern Crowns was a 
handicap to William in so far as the entry of one into the 
allied camp might drive the other into the arms of France, but 
it did militate against vigorous action by both, or indeed 
either, against his interests.
His position as the ruler of two states who had long been 
commercial rivals with contrasting traditions gf government and " 
policy certainly added to his difficulties but surprizingly little 
friction in fact arose in the affairs of the North. The
it is doubtful whether he would have been willing to accede to
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effective exclusion of the English parliament from any practical
control over the direction of foreign policy, the general
ignorance of continental affairs on the part of English ministers
81
and consequently the limited influence they were able to exert,
and the use made of the obedient Blathwayt and of Heinsius, whose
views coincided so closely with William's own, to convey his
orders direct to his envoys all reduced such friction to a
minimum. There was certainly some jealousy and even some open
animosity: between the Dutch and English representatives in the
Northern courts and even a failure to present a united front in
82
the Scandinavian capitals, but this never reached the point at
which either Sweden or Denmark could play one Maritime Power off
against the other as they had been able to do in the past.
Much friction was avoided by the reliance placed after 1692
upon Dutch representatives of higher rank than their English
colleagues, and William’s efforts to concentrate all negotiations 
83
in the Hague, although not wholly successful, was, from this
point of view alone, a wise move.
The interpretation of the role of neutral trade which he
adopted was that long held by his kingdom and, as has been
8k
described, was vigorously opposed by independent Dutchmen.
Yet it was not Dutch opposition which made him modify it in
practice; in fact fls exploitation by the privateers of Zeeland
became an embarrassment when the inadvisability of its application
85
had become apparent. Dutch commercial interests did lead to 
an approach different from England's to the question of a toll on
332
the Elbe and scotched the attempt to draw up identical
86
instructions for all allied privateers, but these disputes,
if such they can be called, had no significant effects on
relations with the Northern Crowns. Trade disputes between the
United Provinces and Denmark might appear to have placed an
obstacle in the way of an early agreement with the latter, but
the 1696 alliance was concluded without the reaching of a settle-
87
ment in this sphere, a fact which suggests that the Danes
used their differences with the Dutch merely as an excuse for
the failure of previous negotiations for other reasons.
England's claim to the Channel salute seemed to threaten war
with Denmark in 1694, but Denmark was certainly unwilling to
88
act without an assurance of Swedish support and England's 
policy was hardly likely to be Viewed with sympathy in the
89United Provinces. The immediate reaction of the lords justices
was foolish, but William's control of his diplomatic service was
90
adequate to soften its worst effects.
His distrust of all James II's appointees in the diplomatic 
service, which led him to choose new and often inexperienced men 
for his English representatives had unhappy results in the appoint­
ment of Duneombe and the singularly undiplomatic Molesworth.
The earlier promotion of Robinson, who was able, experienced 
and trusted by the Swedish court, might well have favoured the 
allied cause, but even he could not have changed Sweden's basic 
attitude to the war any more than a diplomat more tactful than 
Molesworth could have persuaded Christian V to modify his
ambitions
For his Dutch servants in the Northern courts William was
fortunate in being able to call upon men not only of considerable
diplomatic experience but also with first-hand knowledge of the
countries to which they were accredited. This often made them
91
act too independently for William's liking, but on the whole 
he had little reason to be displeased with the way in which they
carried out their orders. Amerongen, Haren and Heekeren all
92
concluded successful compensation agreements which, however
much William may have resented the sums involved and felt that
93
his representatives had given way too easily, helped to break
the threat of armed neutrality. Heekeren showed praiseworthy
initiative in seizing the opportunity offered by the Holstein-
94
Gottorp crisis in January 1696, and Hop worked untiringly in
95mid-1693 to avert war over Saxe-Laueriburg. It was their
greater fund of experience and the fact that problems such as
the payment 6f compensation for ships seized, the conclusion of a
commercial alliance with Denmark and the securing of Swedish
treaty aid concerned the United Provinces more specifically than
England rather than any national prejudice on William's part
which gave greater prominence to Dutch diplomats in both
96
Stockholm and Copenhagen during the war.
William's Northern policy was so closely bound up with 
factors beyond his control that it is difficult to see how he 
could have achieved more than he did. In Sweden the attractions 
of a neutral status far outweighed anything he could offer to 
tempt her to abandon it or even to risk its abandonment.
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Denmark’s price for active help of any appreciable size would 
have weakened rather than strengthened his cause. He made 
mistakes, as in his attempted enforcement of the ban on French 
trade; he failed fully to appreciate the aspirations of the 
Scandinavian crowns or to understand the balance.of power 
within their courts. But he exploited the limited resources 
at his disposal with skill, and the maintenance of friendly 
relations with both Sweden and Denmark throughout the crises 
which arose in the course of the war was no. mean achievement.
v
